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EKSERPT 
In die studie is die grondvraag na die tegniese verwantskap ondersoek. Daar is gevind 
dat die term ‘tegnologie’ buite konteks misbruik word deur verskeie vakwetenskaplike 
outeurs. Sommige gebruik dit vir wat beter aangedui kan word met die term artefakt. 
Gevolglik is wat genoem was ‘tegnologie-oordrag’ eintlik beter beskryf met die terme 
artefakt oordrag. Ander het konsentreer op produksie en ontwerp wat eintlik beter 
beskryf kan word met die term tegno-praktyk. Sogenaamde ‘tegnologiese kennis’ is 
verder verwar met wat eintlik beter beskryf kan word as tegniese kennis en tegniese 
geletterdheid. 
 
‘n Oorsig van terme en gebruike van outeurs in die veld van wetenskap en tegnologie 
studies (STS) veral diegene wat op ‘tegnologie’ gekonsentreer het, het die volgende 
elemente ge-identifiseer. Tegno-praktyk vir die praktyk van vervaardiging, ontwerp en 
instandhouding van artefakte. Tegniese kennis (tegno-kennis) vir die ondervinding van 
vorming en instandhouding van die artefakte. Tegniese wetenskap (tegno-wetenskap) 
vir die wetenskap wat kennis aangaande die tegniese proses byeenbring uit ander 
wetenskappe soos wiskunde, fisika en elektronika, byvoorbeeld om tegniese probleme 
op te los en moontlikhede te skep. Laastens was tegniese geletterdheid onderskei 
van tegniese kennis soos om ‘n motor te kan bestuur sonder om dit noodwendig te 
kan herstel. 
 
Die gevolg van tegno-praktyk is gewoonlik ‘n artefakt. Wat interessant was is die feit 
dat verskeie die resultaat van ‘tegnologie’ as ‘tegnologie’ beskou het. Baie gevalle van 
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waar ‘n artefakt gelykgestel was aan die proses van tegno-praktyk was opgemerk 
natuurlik onder die term ‘tegnologie’. ‘n Verbasende paradigma versteendheid was 
gevind waar outeurs nie die onderskeid tussen die tegniese en tegnologiese kon 
onderskei nie. In ‘n sekere sin kan dit nie beter geïllustreer word as die volgende 
bevooroordeelde stelling dat dit tog ‘…duidelik is dat rekenaars tegnologie is…’ terwyl 
dit ewe-eens duidelik is dat rekenaars eintlik artefakte is, die resultaat van ‘n ontwerp 
en vervaardigingsproses. 
 
Laastens is die transendentaal empiriese metode gebruik om die onties (transen-
dentale) struktuurvoorwaardes  vir die tegniese verwantskap in ag te neem en daarna 
is dit beskryf in ‘n ontologiese, (wysgerig) antropologiese en samelewingsraamwerk. 
 
HSF 
2009
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ABSTRACT 
In this study the fundamental question about the technical relationship is investigated. 
The term ‘technology’ was found to be misused out of contexts by various disciplinary 
authors. Some authors used it for the notion that could better be described as artefacts. 
Consequently what was called ‘technology transfer’ was little more than artefactual 
transfer. Others concentrated on production and design that could better be described 
by techno-practice. Still others confused so-called ‘technological knowledge’ with what 
could be described as techno-knowledge and techno-literacy.  
 
A survey of notions of the authors in the field of Science and Technology Studies 
(STS), especially those that focussed on technology was done and it was found that the 
following elements were identifiable: Techno-practice for the ‘practice’ of the making, 
forming, designing and maintaining of artefacts. For this was required Techno-
knowledge, for the know-how and experience in making, and maintaining these 
artefacts. Furthermore the element of Techno-science for the technical science that 
was recording knowledge from different sciences like mathematics, physics and 
electronics etc. to help in the solutions of techno-practice was identified. Lastly techno-
literacy was distinguished from techno-knowledge, indicating the capability to use 
artefacts without necessarily having the knowledge to fix them. Driving a car but not 
being able to fix it sounds like a good example. 
 
The result of techno-practice is normally an artefact. What was interesting, is that 
many saw the result of technology as technology. Many associate an artefact with the 
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process of techno-practice under the term ‘technology’.  An amazing paradigm-
paralysis was found that could not distinguish the technical from the technological and 
cannot be better illustrated than by the biased statement: “Clearly computers are 
technology…” where-as clearly computers are artefacts, the result of a technical 
design and production process. 
 
Lastly the transcendental empirical method was used to consider the ontic 
(transcendental) conditions required for this technical relationship and it was described 
in an ontological, anthropological and societal framework. 
 
HSF  
2009 
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1. Introduction 
  
In this section the background of the research problem will be outlined, to be 
followed by a statement of the problem as well as an indication of the 
methodology employed in the investigation of the problem. 
 
1.1. The problem 
 
Initially, the problem was condensed into two short questions: 
• What is technology1?  
 
• How does it fit into reality and society? 
 
The problem arises from the diverse and often contradictory descriptions of or 
notions about technology, which are found in literature and in everyday life. 
Assuming an intelligible orderliness within the world around us, it may be 
expected that a certain consistency and clarity would characterize references 
to phenomena associated with technology. Some blame the confusion in this 
regard on a lack of systematic reflection (Rapp, 1974: ix); or the lack of a 
                                            
1
 At this early stage I would like to highlight a possible contextual fallacy. The question is 
what is (the characteristical nature of) the technical and NOT what is it about the technical? 
To talk about technology could include that it is good or bad, useful or treacherous, has a 
major impact or not etc. without worrying too much about what it really is. In principle we can 
all have an opinion about technology without knowing what it actually is. Here the ‘unique’ 
identification is of importance.  
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proper understanding of the subject field (Ströker, 1983: 325); or simply a lack 
of effort (Schuurman, 1980: 1). 
 
We believe that the challenge is to develop a systematic understanding of 
technology that includes a model accounting for the structural features2 of 
technology. The above-mentioned assumption regarding the orderliness 
discernible within reality presupposes an awareness of some or other order 
for. The notion of lawfulness or law-conformity suggests a difference between 
law or order and that, which behaves in an orderly way. An insight into the 
underlying order for technology may prove to be useful in demarcating the 
domain of technology – in deciding which phenomena ought to be included in 
the family of what is technologically distinctive. 
 
The search for the order for or structural principle of technology is 
complicated by the term ‘technology’ itself. The suffix ‘-logy’ normally 
indicates the presence of human thinking and theoretical reflection. Bio-logy 
is the scholarly study of ‘bios’ (i.e., of what is alive), and socio-logy is the 
theoretical study of social phenomena. Does it then follow that techno-logy 
ought to be seen as the scholarly study of technical phenomena? This 
                                            
2
 At this point it might not be obvious that the persistent order for reality will also be relevant 
to ‘technology’ as part of this reality. The structural features assume that it is not an aspect 
but a structure in reality. Furthermore, any disciplinary (subject) science will not have the 
totality of this structure in its focus. This implies that only philosophy, as a ‘totality’ science will 
be able to supply a totality view.  
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consideration has prompted an investigation into the differences between the 
two terms technology and technical.3 
 
Is it correct to suppose that what is called technological is the scientific study 
of the technical, where technical is viewed as the applied construction and 
production of things? Are the technical sciences or engineering sciences the 
same as or something different from technology or technological science? 
Another issue here is that if technology is in fact a science (as the term 
implies) it is tautological to speak of science and technology. Although it does 
seem to be intuitively clear that the technical and the technological are not the 
same, it is not so easy to distinguish between them effectively. 
 
Latour (1999: 190) states that the word technical is a good adjective and that 
the term technique is an unsatisfactory noun. As far as he is concerned, 
technology is the upgraded version of technique. He proposes the use of the 
adjective only. It would be interesting to know whether or not modern 
literature has actually followed his proposal. 
                                            
3
 Terms are lingual ‘constructs’ that can be coined without any relation to what is ontically 
given. For example, the terms ‘triangular circle’, which is grammatically correct, does not 
indicate a spatial figure that exists ontically; therefore terms do not guarantee an ontical logic. 
It is also clear that not all terms with a suffix ‘logy’ indicate “a study of’’. It is accepted in this 
thesis that ‘technology’ is not the study of the technical. Another interesting ‘mis’-construction 
is the term chronology. Although it is not the study of time as one would expect but the study 
of events in time as in history. 
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The more important point here is not the grammatical possibility because 
language does allow a wide possibility; but the nature or characteristics of the 
given. One can speak grammatically correctly of ‘life’ without realising that life 
is not a thing but an aspect or function of a thing. Is the technical a thing or an 
aspect of a thing? 
 
1.2. Background 
 
The initial impression gained from an introduction to Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) is that in the available literature more attention is given to 
philosophy and to the sociology of science than to technical practice4. A 
second impression gained is that in the literature on technical practice the 
dominant approaches come from the disciplines of sociology and history and 
that very little has been done within the domain of the philosophy of technical 
practice. The preoccupation of the philosophical approaches encountered is 
with a kind of social philosophy where the technical is placed within society or 
in relation to society.  
 
                                            
4
 Compare the volume allocated to science studies versus technology studies in a standard 
handbook of technology such as that of Jasanof for example. (HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES. 1995. Edited by Sheila Jasanoff [et.al.] Sage. London). It is 
also found in the works of the authors highlighted in this study. 
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In this respect the discipline of sociology provides valuable insights regarding 
the influence and interaction between the technical and society. We may take 
the view of Giddens (2001: 365, 376, 380) as an example. He relates 
technology to work, economic life, capitalist development, telecommuni-
cations or communication technology, and ecological disasters. 
 
Tiles (1995: 12) explains that it often seems as if technology created more 
problems than it provided solutions in society. Both at the beginning and the 
possible end of life, physicians now have the power to keep alive, almost 
indefinitely, people who would have died had nature been allowed to take its 
course. Immunization against childhood diseases such as measles and 
chicken pox has contributed to overpopulation and hunger in developing 
nations and some attempts to increase crop yields to avoid starvation have 
required the introduction of costly fertilizers and pesticides, which, in turn, 
have caused chemical pollution and medical disorders. All these examples 
indicate that the technical solution to one problem often leads to the creation 
of many new, unanticipated problems. 
 
Tiles argues that these ambivalent feelings towards ‘technology’ have 
developed into two conflicting visions – one optimistic, the other pessimistic: 
technical omnipotence versus technical impotence, or a vision of control of 
the environment and human destiny through technology versus the vision of 
technical systems running out of control (Tiles, 1995: 12). 
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Feenberg (1996: 1) describes another sentiment about the importance of 
technology for society. He argues that when technology was not praised for 
modernizing us, it was blamed for the crisis in our culture, and whether 
interpreted in optimistic or pessimistic terms, determinism appeared to offer a 
fundamental account of modernity as a unified phenomenon. This approach 
has now been largely abandoned for a view that admits of the possibility of 
significant ‘difference,’ i.e. cultural variety in the reception and appropriation of 
modernity. Yet the breakdown of simplistic determinism has not led to quite 
the upsurge of research in the philosophy of technology one might have 
hoped for. 
 
Mitcham (1994: 9) points out that the first scholarly meeting to take 
philosophy of technology as a theme in its own right instead of approaching it 
by way of theories of culture or society was organized by Melvin Kranzberg of 
the Society for the History of Technology (SHOT). This was at a special 
symposium at the eighth annual SHOT meeting held in San Francisco in 
December 1965 in conjunction with a meeting of the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science, with the proceedings published in the SHOT 
journal, Technology and Culture, the next year. 
 
Prior to this event, technology was not seen as a theme in its own right. 
Schuurman (1980: 1) explains that when systematic philosophical reflections 
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on modern technical activity first appeared at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, its practitioners did not devote much effort to the structural analysis 
of contemporary technology. Their aim at that stage was primarily to defend 
technical activity as an independent segment of culture.  
 
Van Riessen (1949: 1) also indicated that too little attention was given to the 
analysis of the technical as technical itself, initially at least. He argued that the 
problem of the interaction between (societal) culture and the technical had 
been addressed too soon. Although it is an important problem, he feels that it 
can only be properly addressed after an extensive philosophical analysis of 
the technical. This is what he has aimed to achieve.  
 
Modern literature shows that a similar problem still appears to be haunting 
scholars in this field. It seems that less attention is given to technology as 
such than to its impact on society and on the economy. It simply seems to be 
sociologically more interesting that all major societal transitions have been 
linked to technological change where new materials, products, production 
processes and organizational processes have replaced the old, or that the 
basket of technologies that characterize a particular society always perform 
essentially the same function of providing transport, production, 
communication and living arrangements (Brotchie, 1985: 1,2).  
 
Brotchie (1985: 2,3) further illustrates these changes by supplying many 
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examples, of which the following can be highlighted: the partial displacement 
of public transport (that supported a paid labour force) by private transport; of 
telephone operators by direct dialling; of servants by kitchen appliances; of 
theatre by radio, TV and video; of formal working hours by flexi-time or part-
time employment; of the coffee house by the home percolator; of large 
mainframe computers by personal computers. Even increasing personalized 
(‘do-it- yourself’) activity and greater informality are features of these newest 
shifts. 
 
Many notions of technological change can be identified and these include 
notions of automation, telecommunication, the effects of energy prices and 
threats of shortages, unemployment patterns and their impact on lifestyle and 
urban activities. However, very little is said about technology as such. 
 
A central problem in planning for technology is the issue of individual 
autonomy or freedom versus social (or societal) control (Harris, 1985: 297). 
This brings about the classic tension between individualism and universalism.  
 
Feenberg (1996: 2) illustrates a variation of the problem clearly in his 
statement: 
 
‘There is something distinctive about modern societies captured in 
notions such as modernization, rationalization, and reification. 
Without such concepts, derived ultimately from Marx and Weber, 
we can make no sense of the historical process of the last few 
hundred years. Yet these are "totalizing" concepts that seem to 
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lead back to a deterministic view we are supposed to have 
transcended from our new culturalist perspective. Is there no way 
out of this dilemma? Must we choose between universal rationality 
and cultural variety? Or more accurately, can we choose between 
these two dialectically correlated concepts that are each 
unthinkable without the other?’ 
 
Here the tension between ‘totalising’ and individualizing and deterministic 
versus indeterministic as opposing concepts in the study of the technical are 
illustrated. It is clear that opposing motives and contradictory views (also 
called ‘ambiguity’) about the technical and its role in society subsist. Although 
this could stimulate debate and research it could also be a symptom of a 
more fundamental tension originating from outside the focus of sociology. 
 
1.3. Purpose of the Study 
 
Because different disciplines develop their own nomenclature and because 
phenomena can be studied by different specialized sciences, some scientific 
concepts and ideas typically originate from outside the perspective or view of 
the specific discipline. It could therefore be possible that, whereas a study of 
the nature and structure of technology transcends the focus or scope of 
sociology, the impact of technology on society is within that scope. If the 
nature and structure of technology transcend the focus of sociology, it implies 
that sociology requires philosophical assumptions about technology in order 
to proceed with the analysis of the impact of such a phenomenon. (Strauss, 
1988: 100). 
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Against this background, the aim of this study is to concentrate on a 
philosophical focus on the ‘technical activity’ as such5 and the key questions 
that will be addressed in this study may be formulated as follows: 
 
1.3.1. Are any of the different notions of technology in the current philoso-
phical and sociological 6discourses transcendentally acceptable? 
 
The term ‘transcendental’ is used to designate those ontic7 conditions making 
the existence and/or functioning of something possible. Synonymous phrases 
are therefore: transcendental conditions and ontic conditions. In order to 
                                            
5
 This seems to be misunderstood by disciplinary scientists. With philosophical is meant 
concentrating from an overall (ontical) view that transcends any specific disciplinary focus 
and secondly this study concentrates on the technical activity itself and its unique 
characteristics and NOT about the influence or any other statements about the technical that 
disciplinary scientists might have made. It would be a contextual fallacy to suggest that 
statements about technology are similar to statements about the nature of technology. 
6
 It might be important to highlight that STS literature are in focus. Because of the ‘precisely’ 
focussed study of ‘ontical’ conditions of what is specific technical the relevant literature was 
limited but the study was still considered to be significant. 
7
 The term ontic is used, as it is the most elementary conditions possible. The difference 
between ontical and ontological could possibly be illustrated as follows: a stone falling from 
my hand to the ground is the ontic given reality. A theoretical account of ‘the falling stone’ and 
why it does not fall upwards, for instance, is found in ontology. At this stage the explanation 
of why it happens is not important, the interest is in the conditions of what is happening. 
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assess whether or not the different notions of technology found in the current 
literature are transcendentally acceptable, a framework will be developed, 
yielding a set of conditions serving as criteria against which the various 
notions can be measured. The framework will take into account the question 
of the transcendental conditions that are required as ‘elementary 
characteristics’ or ‘a priori’ (Duintjer, 1966: 3) for our knowledge of reality and 
consequently of technology and will be used to examine the following 
problems: 
1.3.2. How can a transcendental philosophical approach8 focusing on onto-
logy, epistemology, and anthropology be used to clarify our under-
standing of the technical or technological? 
 
What is known as the transcendental-empirical method is oriented towards a 
structural cosmonomic order that reveals a totality in diversity, which does not 
                                            
8
 It is important to realise that questions about technology and about its unique nature could 
be studied with different methodologies. One could study the issue by focussing on what 
Plato said, or what Socrates said, or Kant, or Habermas or compare what these and other 
philosophers stated. The transcendental-empirical method was preferred because it allowed 
an own study direction, focussing on the ontic characteristics, of the technical, in an ontical 
framework as orientation that will be described in the compact functional and structural 
theories of the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea in the last chapter. The important issue 
here is that the ontic (factual) characteristics will be identified firstly, before a possible 
theoretical explanation will be given.  Given the focus of this study it was clear that consulting 
also other representatives of the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea (such as Van de Vlugt, 
Verkerk and Strijbos) would not add anything new to our argument. 
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inherently entail any antinomies or dialectical tensions9. This contradicts the 
widely accepted idea that everything is subject to historical change and that 
no constant fundamental structure prevails in reality that could act as a basis 
for all orderliness within reality (Strauss, 1988: 38). 
 
Here the influence of an ontology, epistemology and anthropology (or the lack 
thereof) on our understanding of the technical will be highlighted in order to 
enhance our investigation of the following question: 
 
1.3.3. What are the unique characteristics10 of ‘the technical’ and/or ‘techno-
logy’ that will provide for an evaluation of the acceptability of diverging 
views? 
 
Here the structural features of technology will be highlighted and used as a 
criterion for the evaluation of diverging views. 
 
                                            
9
 Without belabouring the point some implications are that reality is orderly, implying changes 
can only be noticed on the basis of what persists. Although things can obtain different 
meanings in different contexts, it does not follow that the contexts can override the persistent 
structure of entities. Strictly speaking an entity does not change its structure when it is used 
in a different context and the idea that things ‘become’ what they are ‘through their use’ is 
strictly speaking not supported. 
10
 In line with the assumption in the previous footnote, a thing ought to have a persistent 
structure in (ontic) reality. 
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1.3.4. What relationships present themselves as important to ‘the technical’ 
and/or ‘technology’ in society? 
 
This last question will focus on the relationship between technology and 
society and will highlight the transcendental features 11of this relationship.  
 
1.4. Plan of study 
 
The study was undertaken in three phases. 
 
In the first phase various notions and definitions found in the literature have 
been evaluated by means of a fundamental framework in order to assess 
their transcendental soundness. Concurrently the set of unique fundamental 
(transcendental) characteristics associated with technical practice have been 
refined. 
 
In the second phase an analysis of 12three leading authors in the field of 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) provided some theoretical 
                                            
11
 These will obviously be within an ontological framework. The chosen ontology, which 
distinguishes well between structures and functions, will be on the basis of the philosophy of 
the Cosmonomic Idea.  
12
 Early in the study these three authors were chosen. This choice did not proceed from 
assuming one or another specific connection between them. It is neither warranted nor 
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possibilities for an analysis of the meaning of technology. This analysis also 
accounted for three current approaches to technology in the field of STS. 
From these analyses a theoretical account of the place of ‘technology’ in 
some of its relations was highlighted. 
 
Lastly, the place and relations of technology in society are considered from a 
transcendental perspective,13 which might provide an insight into the 
interaction between the technical and society. 
 
                                                                                                                            
desirable to superimpose a master narrative upon them. Ihde was chosen because of his 
influence on the American scene, Bijker, for his interesting view on the social construction of 
technology, especially bicycles, and Latour because of his known influence on science 
studies and his changing interest regarding technology. 
13
 This transcendental perspective implies a totality view within the chosen ontology of the 
Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea that would be used to give a possible explanation of the 
structure and relationship of the technical in reality and society. 
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1.5. Theoretical framework 
 
In this section various assumptions, the chosen methodology, terminology 
and the evaluative model are highlighted. 
 
1.5.1. Assumptions 
 
Duintjer (1966: 1) indicates that in the philosophical tradition the term 
‘transcendental’ is used for ‘the most elementary characteristics’ of reality (in 
ontology) or for the ‘conditions for the possibility of all we know’. This implies 
that the term transcendental has both an epistemic and ontic scope. 
 
‘Transcendental’ should be distinguished from ‘transcendent’ or 
‘transcending’. ‘Transcendent’ is the opposite of ‘immanent’, indicating 
‘outside’ and ‘inside’ respectively. When something is ‘outside’ the field of 
study of a specific subject discipline, it transcends the discipline, and when it 
is inside, it is immanent to it. The word ‘transcending’ also indicates the 
human capability to ‘break through’ certain barriers. We can transcend our 
actual surroundings and concern ourselves with recollections, future 
expectations, or theoretical images or we can start daydreaming. In all these 
examples we transcend demarcated barriers or frames of reference. People 
thus have the capability to move from one framework to another. Regarding 
the importance of a framework in general it can be argued that one does not 
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register facts, events or things individually, but actually presupposes some 
kind of orientation framework that acts as a generalized view of reality 
providing for the interpretation of incidental impressions.  
 
Although this fundamental or elementary realization of a totality accompanies 
our experiential cognition and aids us in our interpretation and placing of all 
our experience, it does not imply that we could know everything in advance. 
Duintjer (1966: 2) indicates that when one alludes to the world or the whole, it 
is not intended to be the sum of all objective existence but a mental space or 
position with which we are familiar, without specifically highlighting or 
recognizing it. 
 
The term ‘ontic’ indicates all occurrences or phenomena with their discernable 
characteristics and relationships – for example, things, plants, animals, 
people, planets, etc. This is sometimes designated as the empirical or the 
factual or even (mistakenly) as a posteriori. Our fantasized creations, 
theoretical objects and representational contents are also included. Our 
intentional directedness can also occur within ontic reality. However, our 
intentional relation to ontic phenomena is guided by determined ontological 
notions. What is meant by ontological notions is a theoretical account of the a 
priori basic characteristics of reality. Such an account is worked out in 
theoretical frameworks and language structures while observing norms, 
schemes and symbols. Orientation frameworks such as these act as a field of 
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presentation that determines the way in which phenomena reveal themselves 
to us. 
 
This notion of individual facts or occurrences requiring some universality 
reveals itself in various forms. Duintjer (1966: 351, 2) explains that in physics 
the observation itself and the observation of facts are predetermined by 
specific ontological notions of the nature of physical concepts such as 
quantity, motion, force, position and time span.  In conclusion one can say 
that ontological pre-suppositions open up the mental space or position or field 
from within which one can account for the experience of phenomena that are 
given in an ontic sense. In his explanation of the formation of theories 
Herman Weyl (1949: 151) argues that individual scientific statements cannot 
be ascribed an intuitively verifiable meaning, for truth forms a system that can 
be tested only in its entirety.  In modern physics the building material is no 
longer the elements of consciousness abstracted from reality but purely 
arithmetical symbols. Dingler (1923: 305) in fact defines physics as that 
scientific domain in which the principle of symbolic construction is carried 
through completely. Weyl regards it as important that, coupled with this a 
priori construction, we also have experience and the support of experience by 
an experiment. 
 
Max Planck (1970: 341) states a similar perspective concisely:  
‘To be precise there is generally no single question in physics 
which can be proven by measurement and unequivocally 
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answered, without the help of a theory.’14 
 
Duintjer (1966: 351, 2) also identifies a pre-ontological dimension concerning 
the status and context of ontological notions. Ontic structures cannot be 
related to the creations or constructions of a human subject only, but must be 
experientially tested against the ontically given. Construction without 
experiential testing and confirmation might generate questions of adequacy.  
 
Whenever a theoretical account is provided for what is ontically given, a 
specific theoretical framework is articulated that may make it difficult to 
appreciate insights derived from different or other frameworks. Consequently, 
a theoretical insight into given states of affairs ought to be distinguished from 
the ontic status of the latter. 
 
To put it differently, ‘out there’ exists an orderly consistent reality, which we 
can experience and within which we live. Our insight into this reality is not 
equal to the reality itself although it is supported by the conditions of this 
reality – explaining why the expression transcendental-empirical is employed.  
Constructionists did realize that constructions are different from ‘reality’. For 
that reason it is important to distinguish that one’s understanding of reality 
can develop based on further experience and insights. Knowing reality is 
                                            
14
  “Denn genau genommen gibt es überhaubt keine einzige physkalische Frage, welche 
direct, ohne Zuhilfenahme einer Theorie, durch Messungen geprüft und eindeutig 
beantwortet werden kann.” 
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more than a mere copying of it (against realism) but it is also different from a 
purely subjective construction of it (against nominalism)15. 
 
1.5.2. Methodology 
 
Whatever we can experience is made possible by given ontic conditions and 
since the latter idea is captured by the term transcendental, this approach 
could be designated as transcendental-empirical. The transcendental-
empirical method will therefore be followed. It entails that the ontic (and 
epistemic) conditions of our experience of and reflection on reality ought to be 
articulated. The underlying assumption is that ontic16 reality is experienced as 
a unity in its diversity. This diversity displays an inherent orderliness ultimately 
referring to an underlying and conditioning order for. 
 
The preliminary research17 of the field suggested that it might be wise to 
                                            
15
 It is important to highlight that no argument is made for ‘ontological’ realism but for a 
transcendental-empirical approach that transcends – as just mentioned – the opposition 
between realism and nominalism.  
16
 Although the expression ontic reality appears to be tautological it serves to avoid the 
constructionist fallacy according to which “reality” is nothing but a construction.  
17
 Nothing of the preliminary research is reported here because it would lead to unnecessary 
duplication. Yet an indication is required concerning what has been done. All the authors 
studied were firstly interrogated on what they saw as the ‘essential’ elements of their notions. 
It was found that some authors see artefacts as the most important element of technology. 
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introduce new terms. This will entail the introduction of new ontic categories 
with the intention of creating some order in what appears to be conceptual 
chaos.  
 
1.5.3. Ontical categories 
 
The ambiguity of the term ‘technology’ indeed prompts the proposal of new 
terms. Not only the ambiguity of the term but also the fact that no clarity can 
be found about the ontic characteristics of the thing or function to which this 
term refer. Is it a thing or an aspect? The term itself cannot give any light on 
the problem and to ease the analysis one might as well go back to the 
ontically given.  
 
As terms could have multiple meanings in different contexts, and might 
distract attention from the ontical context in which the study focuses, it was 
decided to analyze the ontical situation and to allocate terms for the ontical 
context18. 
                                                                                                                            
Others saw knowledge, others saw forming, others designing, etc. All these elements were 
recorded and synthesized into ontic (factual) categories. In that sense they all contributed to 
this evaluative model. Unfortunately, they also all lacked the total picture as it in principle 
transcends their focus. All disciplines only use those conditions that seem relevant to their 
specialised interests. 
18
 This seems to be misunderstood or overlooked by some critics. This implies also that the 
theorists discussed might have ‘content’ in their notions of the technical that might not 
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 In order to find out whether or not the term ‘technology’ should be treated as 
merely a ‘synonym’ for ‘technical’ or for ‘technique’, this study proposes to 
develop a new classification scheme19 and to apply it to descriptions, 
definitions, notions and statements involving technology found in the 
literature. 
 
1.5.3.1. Techno-practice 
 
Firstly, TECHNO-PRACTICE20 will be used to indicate the technical activities 
involved in innovation, design, production, and maintenance in societies. The 
term includes the use of tools and technical artefacts. The result of techno-
practice could be new artefacts but this does not imply that the artefact as 
                                                                                                                            
correlate with the ontic elements, and therefore are slanted and irrelevant to the study of the 
ontic characteristics of the technical. 
19
 This will thus be an ontical scheme initially and would be ontologically described in the last 
chapter. 
20
 Just to clear up any confusion the term practice can be used in a multiple variety of 
activities for instance in the performance arts the musicians practice their vocation as artists, 
one can think of medical practice, legal practice, as well as communication practitioners. 
Although they all use techniques, it is artistic techniques, medical techniques and 
communication techniques. Techno-practice utilises techniques to form and produce artefacts 
for usage on preferable mass scale. 
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such is necessarily technical21.  
 
1.5.3.2. Techno-science 
 
Secondly, TECHNO-SCIENCE will be used to indicate the reality of technical 
sciences (engineering) where knowledge of technical processes and of 
relevant scientific principles of mathematics, physics, electronics, and so on, 
are registered and conveyed. 
 
It might be important to note that this differs from the meaning that Latour 
(1999: 203) attaches to the term. He uses it to denote the technical-science-
industrial complex, which in this study is referred to as techno-practice22. 
More specifically modern techno-practice acquires its distinct place if we 
accept that it was ‘influenced’ by science and industry – as also argued by 
Van Riessen (1949: 499) and Schuurman (1980: 8). The interesting point 
here is that the relevance of historical development and of discerning periods 
might enable us to shed more light on the nature of modern techno-practice. 
                                            
21
  Although this will be argued later an interesting implication must be highlighted. If all 
artefacts that are produced become technical it would imply that all of culture, all cultural 
artefacts that are produced through techniques, even society, would lose its individual nature 
or characteristics and would become technical. This is an unacceptable notion for an 
assumption that things have a persistent structure. 
22
 Although the term might have obtained some support in sociology the usage in that context 
is still questionable and will be highlighted later. 
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1.5.3.3. Techno-knowledge 
 
Thirdly, the term TECHNO-KNOWLEDGE will be used for technical know-
how in techno-practice – for instance, maintaining, designing and producing 
the technical components of artefacts. This knowledge base could have been 
developed through intuitive experience, artisanship and/or systematic 
knowledge obtained through scientific activity. The important issue here is 
that techno-knowledge should not be confused with scientific knowledge. 
 
1.5.3.4. Techno-literacy 
 
The term TECHNO-LITERACY will be used to indicate the human 
competence needed to operate any artefact that requires some technical skill 
– like a cell phone, ATM, computer, VCR, motor car and so on. Techno-
literacy as such would not require techno-knowledge – only the ability to use 
an artefact efficiently. It will be shown that the use of the term ‘technology’ 
sometimes results in techno-literacy being confused with techno-practice or 
techno-knowledge. This term would also allow of the notion of techno-
illiteracy, which is akin to information illiteracy and would indicate 
incompetence in dealing with ‘hi-tech’ artefacts. This is obviously an important 
issue when it comes to more advanced versus less advanced techno-literate 
societies and the impact of techno-practice and associated artefacts on these 
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societies. 
 
1.5.3.5. Artefact23 
 
The last term to be described is ARTEFACT. Negatively, this indicates an 
‘object’ that is not produced by nature. Positively, it indicates all ‘objects’ 
formed (that is, created, designed and produced) through human ingenuity. 
 
The types of artefacts are numerous and can be classified by their unique 
inherent structural principles, which should not be confused with the purpose 
of the artefact. Any purpose of an artefact presupposes an intrinsic structural 
nature and the latter can never be deduced from divergent purposes. An 
example to illustrate the point might be useful here. A book is made to be 
read. It can therefore be characterized as a lingual object and typified by an 
inner structural lingual typicality. It may also be used in various contexts for 
non-typical purposes without disclosing or realizing its typical lingual potential. 
When a bookshop buys and sells books they actualize their economic object 
function without reading all the books bought and sold. If it is concluded that a 
book is an economic object because it serves an economic purpose in a 
specific economic context (the bookshop), the typical lingual characteristic 
and potential of a book is ignored and its typical structural totality 
                                            
23
 According to my language editor artefact is the British spelling and artifact the American. 
When I quoted American orientated authors I did not ‘correct’ their spelling. 
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misunderstood.  
 
The key insight here is that the economic activity of buying and selling books 
do not actualize their internal lingual destination – namely that books are 
typically made to be read. Therefore contexts and purposes alone cannot 
replace the typical internal structural reality of artefacts. Further examples are 
art, furniture, buildings, bicycles, books, clothes and religious icons, to 
mention only a few.  
 
Dooyeweerd (1984 Volume 3:146) mentions the difference between the 
empirical reality of things and their actualisation.  Whether historical founded 
things of earlier times can still be used in accordance with their qualifying 
function depends on the historical milieu.  Fashion can make things outdated 
on the one hand but on the other hand could make things sought after like 
antique furniture, glasses, ornaments, etc. Old Shawls, may be used as wall 
decoration, different from the first examples that still use those articles in their 
original qualifying function. The important point here is that the old shawl 
could still be recognised as an old shawl, although not used as a shawl 
anymore. Here the original qualifying function is NOT replaced by another a-
typical aesthetic object function. The typical qualifying function is just not 
activated and another object function is actualised. Essentially, the qualifying 
function STILL exists, empirically, but is just not actualised. The structure did 
therefore not change. 
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It is important to realize that artefacts are not only ‘objects’ but could also be 
infrastructures that support ‘objects’. The electricity system or net consists of 
artefactual ‘objects’ like wires, substations, relays, generators, distribution 
boxes and insulation, for example. A system thus contains a combination of 
artefacts. 
 
The term ‘object’ has been placed in inverted commas because the fact that 
material things display both ‘subject’ and ‘object’ relationships is not taken 
into account in positivist scientific circles. The practice of referring to ‘objects’ 
ought to be questioned in the light of the fact that material things are physical 
subjects – subjected to physical laws – and only ‘objects’ in non-physical 
contexts (such as objects of perception or of designation, i.e. sensitive and 
lingual objects). For example, a coin may be, as physical entity, ‘subject’ to 
physical laws and therefore be a physical subject, but it can also have an 
economic object function. This can be summarized by stating that insofar 
material things are physical, they are subjects and insofar they are non-
physical (economic, lingual, etc.), they are objects.  
 
Strictly speaking, one should not use the term object or subject unless the 
context is clear. Preferably the terms entity, structure or thing are used when 
contexts are not indicated and if something is referred to in general. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
27 
1.5.3.6. Other terminology24 
 
In line with the previous notion of thing or structure the philosophy of the 
cosmonomic idea developed a notion of enkapsis. Enkapsis indicates the 
interlacement of distinct, differently structured or dissimilar structures into a 
totality where the intertwined structures retain their internal sphere of 
operation (sphere-sovereignty). An example here could be table salt indicated 
as sodium chlorine (NaCl). The important issue here is that neither Na nor Cl 
displays a salty (NaCl) characteristic on its own but neither of them loses its 
intrinsic structure in the totality either. This seems to be a highly complex 
notion for readers who straight-forwardly accept a part/whole relationship as 
an explanatory principle. However, from the NaCl example it is clear that the 
part/whole scheme has its limitations. 
 
The term technical is used to indicate an aspect of reality. All concrete things, 
made by human forming power have therefore a technical aspect. This 
unfortunately does not mean that their totality is necessarily technical as each 
artefact has an own unique (typical) inner structure that qualifies or 
characterise it. It does allow for a technical substructure to be (enkaptically) 
interlaced into the totality. 
 
                                            
24
 My thanks to Prof Mouton for his suggestion to clear up specific terminology early in the 
thesis to lessen the possibility of confusion later. 
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Lastly, the term technology is provisionally viewed as a ‘mis-construction’ of 
our rationalistic heritage that does not indicate any ontic (factual) unique or 
typical characteristics. The implication is that the usage of this term could 
indicate confusion, especially if no distinction is drawn between the technical 
and technological.  All authors will be interrogated to confirm whether any 
ontical characteristic that is NOT indicated by techno-practice, techno-
science, techno-knowledge or techno-literacy could possibly be allocated to 
the term. 
 
1.5.4. Evaluative model 
 
An overview of the literature25 on the technical indicates that technical activity 
in society seems to consist of the interaction of human activities such as 
designing, producing and maintaining artefacts or systems of artefacts. An 
accompanying know-how seems to have developed through experience and 
                                            
25
 This was a preliminary study which was done and on which it was decided not to report in 
depth, as the insight of that study will be argued during this report. It might be important also 
to note that the study was NOT just a one-sided affair of a pre-theoretical bias that was 
forced onto authors. It was in the interrogation of these authors that the elements were 
identified. The fact that the order of the second chapter is according to the evaluative model 
highlights that the literature found confirmed the elements. The only weakness was of course 
that no single author used all the elements but that is understandable as the ontic (factual) 
elements and the factual totality would in principle transcend any particular (disciplinary 
specific) focus. 
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analysis. This will be indicated as techno-practice and techno-knowledge 
respectively. In the literature a clear distinction between older and modern 
technical activity is made and the difference is ascribed to ‘the influence of 
science’ on technology. This will be indicated as techno-science (engineering 
science) in the model. The relationships can be indicated as follows: 
 
 
Fig.1. The technical relationship. 
 
Techno-practice results in artefacts or artefactual systems. It has an 
interactive relationship with techno-knowledge: the knowledge is needed to 
design, produce, service or fix artefacts on the one hand, while, on the other 
hand, the experience gained through techno-practice improves our 
knowledge base. Artefacts furthermore interact with techno-practice as 
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artefacts can serve as components of a system of artefacts and are thus 
recombined by techno-practice into other artefacts and systems. 
 
Techno-science influences our knowledge base but it obtains feedback from 
current knowledge, current techno-practices and current artefacts. 
 
Techno-literacy indicates the level of competence required for using an 
artefact and would obviously be influenced by artefacts and interaction with 
artefacts. Furthermore, how difficult it is to use an artefact also feeds back to 
techno-knowledge to improve and simplify designs and create newer 
artefacts. The impact of artefacts on humans and society in general is only 
hinted at in the notion of techno-literacy. 
 
The term ‘technology’ is specifically excluded from the above model.  Notions 
in literature will now be examined to determine whether the term ‘technology’ 
is used as a collective term for the above relationship or whether it is used for 
certain sections or combination of sections of the above model.  
 
Please remember that the above model indicates the transcendental or ontic 
conditions for the technical activity. How this will be explained will be an 
ontological issue for later. Initially only the ontical elements will be used to try 
and get a notion of where authors place the focus in their usage of the term 
‘technology’, in the technical activity, within their own specific framework.  
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It is almost to obvious to state but because this study specifically studies the 
ontic (factual) in an ontological perspective it will have the advantage of 
focussing on the issue in an ontological framework, which will allow a totality 
perspective or image, that any other more specific (disciplinary) perspective 
will not allow. 
 
What is of importance is whether the more specialised (disciplinary) 
theoretical perspective on the one hand confirms the ontical conditions and 
on the other hand possibly overlooks other ontical elements, as can in 
principle be expected. 
 
To put it differently, no (specialised) disciplinary perspective can hope to 
develop a totality view of ontic elements because it26 transcends the 
disciplinary focus. To therefore engage in the disciplinary theory and evaluate 
the disciplinary theory, as a theory and not just its assumptions, as well as 
critical commentators to the theory, as if it could contribute to a totality view of 
                                            
26Scholars within particular disciplines (i.e. special scientists) are normally quite sensitive to 
the fact that special scientific work implicitly or explicitly depends upon a totality view of reality 
exceeding the point of view of any specific academic discipline. It seems as if they do not 
easily concede that even a discussion about a particular discipline necessarily transcends the 
universe of discourse of that discipline (saying what mathematics, biology or economics is) 
involves a talking about these disciplines and does not entail actively doing mathematics, 
biology or economics. 
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the ontic (factual) elements of the technical process viewed from a (ontic) 
totality perspective, is to misunderstand27 the limitations of (specialised) 
disciplinary focuses. 
Obviously the assumptions and the relevant parts of the theory of each author 
would be addressed and compared with the ontic conditions. What seems to 
create a misunderstanding though, is the confusion between addressing the 
theories in terms of the relevant ontical arguments and the evaluation of the 
theory in terms of its standing in the ‘Realm of Knowledge’. 
                                            
27
 To put it differently, this study wants to identify the basic (ontic) characteristics of the 
technical, which transcends any disciplinary focus. Attention is paid to different notions of 
‘technology’ by different authors to establish the ontical logic of such terms. To expect this 
study to also evaluate the theories of the different authors that utilize the notion of technology 
and account for critique of their theories from other authors, is to misunderstand the purpose 
of this study.  Although scholarship means to take note and learn from others it hopefully 
does NOT mean that a study must lose focus and bark up all possible trees. 
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2. Evaluation of notions of technology against the designed 
model  
 
In this section a number of notions, descriptions and definitions of technology 
and related terms will be highlighted and compared with the proposed terms 
of the model. It is understood that many authors might not have the intention 
of describing technology within an ontical framework nor of concentrating on 
transcendental issues but the intention here is to explore whether any new 
perspectives could be added to the model. In the following sections some 
leading authors in STS will be analyzed with reference to the transcendental 
issues involved in determining the meaning of technology within an ontical 
framework. 
 
The order of the following sections will be according to the elements of the 
ontical evaluative framework28. We will start with techno-practice. 
 
                                            
28
 The order was chosen almost randomly but will follow all descriptions that try to describe 
the technical (technology) in terms of one of these ontical categories. 
  
 
 
 
 
34 
2.1. Variations on Techno-practice29 
 
2.1.1. Modern Techno-practice  
 
Schuurman (1990: 4) argues that in order to bring the distinguishing 
characteristics of modern techno-practice30 into focus as clearly as possible, 
one must begin by comparing it with classical techno-practice. The 
differences can be accentuated by highlighting the extremes in the features of 
both. For this, Schuurman argues that one will momentarily have to ignore the 
development of classical techno-practice into modern techno-practice.  
 
Schuurman defines techno-practice initially as: 
‘the activity by which people give form to nature for human ends, 
with the aid of tools’ (Schuurman, 1980: 5). 
 
It should be pointed out that this is not unique to techno-practice: art also 
                                            
29
 The term techno-practice was selected after a preliminary investigation of various authors 
that described the need for ‘application’ or ‘techniques’ even ‘applied science’ where 
designing, forming, production (manufacturing) was indicated with the term ‘technology’. As 
the term technology was found to also appeal to ‘knowledge’ or ‘study’ the term techno-
practice was tentatively coined for the ontical situation of application or techniques of 
designing, forming and production.   
30
 Schuurman uses the Dutch term ‘techniek’ which is translated as technology to indicate a 
practical activity, in contradistinction to technological science, which indicates a theoretical 
activity. In line with the evaluative model of this study the terms should rather be techno-
practice and techno-science and are therefore corrected. 
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gives form to nature for human ends, with the aid of tools like brushes for 
painters or chisels for sculptors. The definition does indicate ‘the technical 
aspect’ of forming but is valid for all forming, not only ‘technical’ forming. 
 
To him the differences between classical and modern techno-practice involve 
 
‘environment, materials, energy, skill, tools, the steps in 
technical execution, cooperation in technology, working 
procedures, the role of people in the formative process, and 
the nature of technology development’. (Schuurman, 1980: 5) 
 
This could be summarized under the following headings. 
 
2.1.1.1. The basic structure of modern techno-practice 
 
Schuurman (1980: 11) argues that the grand quest in modern techno-practice 
has been to develop technical objects that can operate independently; this 
implies operators that can independently form something in nature.  
‘...human proficiency in forming is projected into and 
transferred to the technical object. By means of automatic 
switches, people make provision for the technical forming 
process to undergo discontinuous changes with the passage 
of time.’ (Schuurman, 1980: 11) 
 
He argues that the projection of proficiency, the transfer of decisions, and the 
use of formed energy constitute the foundation of the independent operation 
of the modern panoply of tools and instruments. This panoply consists of what 
he called technological (to be translated as technical) operators. People need 
only to set these operators going. 
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He argues that the ‘proficiency’ of the technical31 operator surpasses that of 
human beings in speed, reliability and accuracy. He indicates that mechanical 
‘decisions’ are realized more quickly and faultlessly than decisions made and 
implemented by people. Furthermore, he stresses that the power of formed 
energy far exceeds human power. The implication is that people equipped 
with technical operators can accomplish a great deal more than people 
without them can. He also states that there are recently created technical 
operators that work in ways that bear little or no resemblance to human 
activity.  
 
He names electro-technology, which might be better translated as electro-
technics or electro-techno-practice and chemical technology (or chemical 
techno-practice) as examples of such operators. 
 
He points out that through the scientific approach to modern techno-practice, 
a distinction has arisen between preparation (designing) and production 
(technical forming).  
‘Human responsibility and decision-making have been 
transferred to the phase of preparation, and the human 
activity of designing has thereby come to occupy a higher 
place. There has, in fact, been an intellectualization of 
technical labour. Preparation along the lines of the techno-
scientific method leads to the accomplishment of a design for 
                                            
31
 As indicated, Schuurman uses the term technological; this could be an imprecise 
translation. 
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the execution; this design is complemented by the inde-
pendent operation of the technological panoply of operators.’ 
(Schuurman, 1980: 12) 
 
He also points out that in some cases there is a possibility that technical 
operators can be controlled from a distance; this possibility is unrealised as 
yet (for economic reasons, for example), and in some cases will remain so – 
at least for the time being. In these cases techno-practice is restricted by 
certain particular circumstances. He believes that in the future, with the help 
of cybernetics, it will be possible to alter this situation because with the 
feedback principle, even the singular can be controlled. 
 
To summarize, it seems that the most striking characteristics of modern 
techno-practice to Schuurman are the modern panoply of tools and 
instruments, technical forming, technical design, the independent technical 
operator, the scientific foundation and the techno-scientific method. 
 
It is interesting that Schuurman distinguishes between technology and 
technological sciences as he specifically links them in his description, 
allowing for the technological-scientific32 method as part of the technological 
process. Furthermore, he limits technology to ‘forming’ nature for human ends 
by means of tools and the independent technological operator. Crafts also 
form ‘nature for human ends’ although not by using independent operators, 
                                            
32
 It is interesting that the method is indicated not only as ‘technical’ but as ‘techno-scientific’. 
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the techno-scientific method or scientific-technical forming and design33.  
 
What is clear is that although Schuurman views matters from the perspective 
of engineering practice, he indicates a totality of various entities that would 
need to be placed in the correct relationship in the final design. In an 
engineering context, Schuurman focuses on the ‘forming’ function of the 
technical operator, which is maintained throughout the transformation 
process. He elaborates on this technical forming by distinguishing between 
designing and production in this forming process. 
 
2.1.1.2. Division between design and production 
 
In his comparative study of classical and modern techno-practice Schuurman 
(1980: 6) found marked differences in the area of technical forming. In earlier 
techno-practice, people performed and determined the sequence, using their 
own strength and skill. In modern techno-practice, human skill is projected 
into technical operators that have been actualized by means of formed, 
natural energy; the sequence in forming is delivered by automatic linkage and 
not human capabilities. 
 
The most characteristic feature of modern techno-practice is the division 
existing between preparation and execution. The design process links these 
                                            
33
 This hints to the fact that crafts could be a ‘primitive’ or ‘less modern’ techno-practice. 
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two stages. It is primarily in the preparation phase that people (engineers) are 
involved. 
‘Wherever possible, people are excluded nowadays from the 
post-preparatory, forming phase, and even where they are 
not excluded from the execution, the role of the worker in 
mass production has been analyzed in the preparation and 
immutably predetermined in the design.’ (Schuurman, 1980: 
24) 
 
In designing, Schuurman argues, the engineer has in mind both the design of 
the product and a plan for its production. The production plan establishes as 
precisely as possible the order according which production should proceed 
and the design plan tries to establish the order for a thing, which implies the 
internal structure, and what he calls destinational function. 
 
To summarize, the quest for production in which the product is fashioned in 
conformity with a theoretical design implies that the (free) labourer is as far as 
possible excluded from production in order to reduce the chances of 
deviation. The techno-scientific method accordingly requires production by 
technical operators. However, because of the limited forming possibilities 
afforded by their structural inflexibility, technical operators require a division of 
the production process. The production process therefore is a linkage of 
technical operators. 
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2.1.1.3. Steps in the designing process 
 
Schuurman (1990: 38) outlines the following: 
‘1. Initially the technical problem is described, analyzed, and 
scientifically processed and formulated.  
2. Such established knowledge (of the laws) of things and 
facts as may be expected to contribute to a solution of the 
problem is gathered. When this has been done, the 
productive fantasy can begin to function. 
3. The engineer imaginatively conceives technical solutions 
to details, or even to the problem as a whole, and then 
proceeds to formulate them scientifically.’ (1980: 38) 
 
In a certain sense, the engineer actualises the product of his/her fantasy in a 
design in terms of the laws appropriate for the technical object. Schuurman 
further points out that the demarcation of these phases is seldom clear in 
practice and that there is normally a constant interaction between phases. 
‘Theoretical and experimental operations are employed to 
ensure that the objectification in the design will provide a 
possibility for future realization in the execution.’ (1980: 38) 
 
This description highlights the role of people in the technical forming process. 
It seems as though the designing function is still a technical event, but the 
production or forming phase becomes an automatic technical fact or process. 
Schuurman explains the differences as follows. 
 
2.1.1.4. Technical events, facts and things  
 
According to Schuurman (1980: 12) technical events exist whenever people 
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play the decisive role in the objectifying and actualizing relations. In this 
sense techno-practice is linked with a human capability. When human 
formative power forms technically it is identified as a technical event. 
 
Whenever people cease to play a role it becomes a technical fact or an 
automatic forming process. Schuurman (1980: 12) believes that a technical 
fact is always introduced by a technical event. He stresses that if one 
disregards the event, one cannot understand the fact, for then the initiating 
role of people is ignored.  
‘The independently working technical operator is made 
possible by the introduction of the techno-scientific method in 
the preparation. Techno-science, mathematical physics and, 
frequently, chemistry together form the basis of the scientific 
approach of techno-practice, while the industrial enterprises 
provide the opportunities for realization. For this reason, 
modern techno-practice (especially the production or forming 
part) is characterized by the quest for automation, by worker 
redundancy, and by mass production.’ (Schuurman, 1980: 
24) 
 
In the technical forming process, things and materials manifest themselves 
first according to their unique character. The function of the technical operator 
is forming; therefore it is active. In the forming process, the product under-
goes a lasting alteration of form in the sense of technical individualization. 
The operator, which always brings about a process of energy transformation, 
maintains its forming function throughout this actualized forming. 
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2.1.1.5. Technical objects as specialized utilities in techno-practice 
 
Schuurman (1980: 9) attempts to formulate the law for all technical objects. 
These are objects that are fashioned by people for the express purpose of 
being put to use in techno-practice. It is important to point out the feature that 
these objects have in common and at the same time show how their technical 
uses may differ.  
‘An important distinction is to be found in the fact that objects 
formed in technology are either technological objects or 
objects of another kind. The latter do not have a technological 
destination or purpose or end function; cars, houses, and 
washing machines, for example, do not. Technological ob-
jects are not just formed technologically; they also have a 
technological destination.’ (Schuurman, 1980: 9) 
 
This is a fundamental distinction that should be highlighted. It implies that a 
washing machine is not a technical object. It has a technical structure 
interlaced in its totality, could be said to be the result of a technical process 
and could have a significant influence on society; however, unlike a technical 
operator, it does not form any technical products. 
 
On the other hand, the fact that a washing machine primarily exists to do 
washing and could be more technically advanced or more primitive than other 
models does not imply that it does not have an influence on society that could 
be linked with technical forming. It was formed by technical activity, even if 
Schuurman does not regard it as a technical object. These artefacts that are 
manufactured by modern techno-practice and which completely change our 
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world are generally indicated with the term 'technology' whereas it should 
more precisely be indicated as artefacts and possibly 'artefactual' influences 
on our society.  
 
Schuurman emphasizes that we should take note of a certain distinction 
between technical objects, since it will later on prove to be essential to an 
understanding of modern techno-practice. He states that technical objects 
may be things that may be more or less durable or they may be facts or 
processes subject to constant change.  
 
Not every fact arising from actualization by a technical operator and directed 
to the realization of an energy transformation process has a technical 
destination or typical inner structure. A fact might find its destination in 
communication instead, as is the case with a tape recorder, or it might have a 
traffic destination, as is the case with traffic lights. These facts might well 
contain technical elements as parts. This concurs with the notion that a 
technical structure could be part of a totality, which is not necessarily destined 
as technical in the sense that it forms or transforms as a tool. Here again arts 
and crafts can be mentioned: they ‘utilize’ the formative power of techno-
practice or have a technical substructure, but are not technical objects 
themselves.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
44 
2.1.2. The computer 
 
Schuurman (1980: 19) considers the computer the pre-eminent technical 
object of the future. To him the computer is one of the most fundamental 
technical achievements of mankind. He indicates that a computer performs a 
range of functions. As a control mechanism it performs a technical function 
and is therefore a technical object, but as a ‘thought’ or ‘communication 
apparatus’ it performs an information function and then is not a technical 
object in the sense that it ‘forms’ something, but a communicative tool. 
‘What the computer produces is unforeseeable, and this 
distinguishes it from other technological operators. That the 
computer's results may contain surprises - within certain 
limits - does not mean that the computer, like the human 
being, is free. The computer works in a set way; its rapidity, 
precision, and accomplishments are so enormous that it is 
easy to forget that it is a tool or implement of human beings. 
The potentialities of the computer furnish fertile ground for all 
manner of optimistic or pessimistic speculation. On the one 
hand, the computer excites great expectations for the future. 
On the other hand, the surprising results arouse fear and 
anxiety.’ (Schuurman, 1980: 19, 20) 
 
 
2.1.2.1. Computers only work technically 
 
Schuurman (1980: 20) stresses that in connection with computers, it is 
customary to refer to information-processing or data-processing.  
‘The danger in this is that one might be led to ignore the fact 
that information is fundamentally lingual. Language indicates 
and signifies something. And indicating and signifying are 
human activities, expressions of human freedom and 
creativity that cannot be tied up in set rules. The language, 
which results from human activity, can certainly be 
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formalized, and formalized language can be objectified in the 
computer. Yet the significance of the objectified signs and 
symbols is human in origin; the computer's results receive 
their meaning through people.’(1980: 20) 
 
He stresses that whenever these considerations are not respected, confusion 
may arise. In this regard he refers to the question concerning the machine’s 
capacity to add new information – a notion that arises because it is forgotten 
that computers only work technically or electronically.  He emphasises that 
the computer can only process data that has been analyzed and abstracted 
and then stored in an energy form – the signal.  
‘Although it would be much better, in the interests of avoiding 
confusion, to speak of signal-transmission and choice-
transformation processes, the term data processing has already 
become well established. An improper use of such terminology 
can easily lead to misplaced notions and expectations 
concerning the computer’ (Schuurman, 1980: 21). 
 
Schuurman (1980: 21) explains that a signal in the computer can find its way 
along either of two alternative, mutually exclusive routes. One bit thus allows 
of two mutually exclusive possibilities - yes or no, open or closed. 
‘In a strict sense, what is processed is not information but the 
analytical substratum of information, and then by choosing. 
The number of possible choices in the computer depends on 
the number of independent switching elements with which 
the machine is furnished. Such mathematical processes as 
adding, subtracting, dividing, and multiplying can be reduced 
to a combination of these elementary choice possibilities. 
Through electronic switching, they can be processed one 
after the other at great speed. With the help of the controlled 
switching elements, millions of processings can be accom-
plished in one second. Where the fundamental processing 
consists of a choice of two possibilities, numbers must be 
transposed into the symbols of the binary system - 0 and 1. 
Analyzed and quantified information must also be translated 
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into these symbols. When this has been done, processing on 
the basis of a great number of choices becomes possible.’ 
(1980: 21) 
 
A list of commands (also presented by the symbols 0 and 1) called a program 
guides the computer to process and store the results of the processing. 
 
‘Information theory and technical actualization are perfectly 
attuned to each other. The theoretical unit of information is 
mirrored in the switching elements, which are either ‘open’ or 
‘closed’ and which can thus assume two theoretically equal 
positions independent of each other. The technical 
coherence and the mutual interaction of the switching 
elements, which together constitute the so-called logic 
system of the machine, can be constructed with the help of 
Boolean algebra. The “open” or “closed” positions of these 
switches function in this algebra as variables.’ (1980: 22) 
 
2.1.2.2. The application of computers  
 
Schuurman (1980: 22) argues that the application of the computer is 
principally twofold: it can serve as a ‘thought apparatus’ which delivers infor-
mation to people (in a certain sense it is then lingually destined) while it also 
serves as a control mechanism.  
‘...in the latter it is interpolated between people and a fact or 
process, the destination of which need not be technological. 
In full automation, the computer is wholly integrated into the 
technological fact or process.’ (1980: 22) 
 
Schuurman indicates that the computer as a control mechanism has great 
significance; one can think here of automation and the programming of many 
machines in our daily lives. He argues that the structure of the computer is 
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dependent on the destination of its application.   
 
Schuurman stresses that although people may never be able to achieve 
these results by themselves, we are not to jump to the conclusion that the 
computer is independent of people. This refers to the idea that any technical 
fact or object requires a technical event. 
 
In a certain sense this indicates that techno-practice and specifically the 
computer, as technical object, is not independent of humanity. Furthermore 
the computer also indicates a link between science and techno-practice that 
needs to be noted.  
 
2.1.3. The Technical Versus Techno-practice 
 
Firstly, we come across a position where the technical is confused with 
techno-practice as if techno-practice encompasses all technical activity. 
 
Bunge (1999: 1, 2) argues that technology is the sector of human knowledge 
concerned with the design, repair, and maintenance of artificial systems and 
processes, with the aid of basic science and mathematics. The systems and 
processes in question may be physical, chemical, organic or social. To him 
even formal organizations qualify as artefacts, along with machines and high 
yield grain. Likewise, management, healing, and teaching qualify as artificial 
  
 
 
 
 
48 
processes, along with steel lamination, construction and computation. 
 
He argues that technology is about designing, planning, maintaining and 
repairing. So are moral philosophy and praxiology. In fact, facing a moral or 
praxiological problem, taking responsibility for it and reflecting on the means 
to solve it in the light of available knowledge and resources is regarded as a 
technological problem by Bunge. Conversely, exploring a technological 
problem in any depth necessitates invoking general praxiological concepts 
and principles, and dealing with a problem concerning social responsibility 
requires some ethical concepts and principles. 
 
To Bunge the key to the classifying of technologies is that we should add 
philosophical technology to the extant branches.  
 
His list looks like this:  
• Physical technologies: e.g. mechanical, electrical, and mining engineer-
ing.  
• Chemical technologies: industrial chemistry and chemical engineering.  
• Biological technologies: e.g. agronomy and genetic engineering.  
• Biosocial technologies: e.g. bio economics and normative epidemiology.  
• Social technologies: e.g. management science and the law.  
• Epistemic technologies: computer science and artificial intelligence (AI).  
• Philosophical technologies: moral philosophy and praxiology.  
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From the above it is clear that technology is, in a certain sense, idolized34. 
Even a moral problem may be regarded as a technological problem. The 
transcendental issue here would be to indicate what is not a technological 
problem so that non-technology and technology can be distinguished from 
each other. Bunge sees all practical problems, solutions and artificial actions 
as technological problems and solutions. Secondly, the difference between 
the technical and technology is not clarified35; furthermore, management 
science, law and moral philosophy all become technology because 
technology has to do with the design, repair and maintenance of artificial 
systems in which all artefacts could be included. This also highlights the 
misconception that all artefacts are technological, which means that the inner 
structure of the artefact is ignored36. 
  
                                            
34
 Idolization or absolutization implies that something is serving as the primary principle of 
explanation of everything else. This may lead to a one-sided over-emphasis. By viewing 
management and problem solving as technologies instead of techniques is a manifestation of 
such an over-emphasis. 
35
 This could indicate a confusion. 
36
 Just recall our remark concerning the realization of the internal structural destination of a 
book – meant to be read – and the multiple ways in which it can be used for other purposes 
not actualizing its typical qualifying function.  
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Bunge does not realize37 that each artefact has its own structure that pre-
vents it from being wrongly classified. For instance, he classifies organiza-
tions as artefacts whereas they could more correctly be indicated as social or 
societal subjects, instead of social objects, since they are active or subject in 
the social or societal sphere38. 
 
2.1.4. Praxiology 
 
Quintanilla (1998: 2) explains that, within the framework of establishing the 
kernel of a standard theory of technological progress, philosophy offers three 
possible views of technology. He calls them cognitive, instrumental and 
                                            
37
 In other words, he does not distinguish between the typical and a-typical possibilities of 
objectifying (utilizing) an artefact.  
38
 It is important to highlight that the theory of the author, in its wider context, is not under 
consideration. Only the usage of the description is evaluated against certain ontical 
conditions and distinctions (such as the difference between typical and a-typical usages of 
artefacts). The observation that the author did not consider these basic ontic distinctions is 
not meant to be an evaluation of his whole theory and its consistency against its own 
assumptions. Such an analysis exceeds the confines of this study. It is also important to 
notice that the issues discussed thus far do not merely concern alternative definitions set in 
opposition to each other, because the ultimate appeal is the states of affairs, to what is given 
in an ontic sense and in that givenness make possible every meaningful analysis and 
definition. The expression transcendental-empirical captures precisely this correlation 
between those conditions making something possible (such as technique and artefacts) and 
their variable manifestations within the limits of these constant (enabling) conditions. 
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praxiological views.  
 
According to the cognitive view, technology is a form of science-based 
practical knowledge that allows us to design efficient artefacts to solve 
practical problems. Technological change is mainly effected through applied 
scientific research and the improvement of technological knowledge. 
Technical progress consists of the increase of technological knowledge and 
depends on scientific progress. In this case technology is linked to techno-
knowledge, but more specifically that part of techno-knowledge that is linked 
with techno-science. Cases in which techno-knowledge is acquired through 
non-scientific methods are ignored. 
 
According to the instrumentalist view, technology is a set of artefacts 
intentionally designed and produced to perform some definite functions and to 
satisfy some human needs. Technological change consists of the increase in 
the quantity and variety of artefacts, and technological progress is defined as 
a function of the range and importance of the human needs that can be met 
by the available technological equipment. In this specific case technology is 
equated with artefacts without taking into consideration that not all artefacts 
are technological or technical and that human formative power is not limited 
to techno-practice only. 
 
According to the so-called praxiological approach, the basic technological 
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entities are neither knowledge systems nor sets of artefacts, but complex 
systems formed by the artefacts plus their users or intentional operators. 
Quintanilla argues that we can characterize technological systems as action 
systems intentionally oriented toward transforming concrete objects in order 
to obtain, in an efficient way, a valuable or useful result. Technological 
change is effected by ‘designing and producing new technical systems and 
improving their efficiency’. This is what is specifically meant by the term 
techno-practice in the guiding model.  
 
Quintanilla (1998: 2) furthermore argues that technological progress may be 
interpreted as an increment of human power to control reality: new and more 
efficient technical systems applied to new and larger parts of reality mean a 
greater capacity to adapt reality to human desires. Here complex systems of 
artefacts and users hint at techno-literacy, especially when it is focused on 
the use of the system for better control. 
 
The problem39 with these approaches is that they do not take cognizance of 
the transcendental conditions of the technical and presuppose the technical 
or artefactual on the one side and human ability or knowledge on the other 
side as prerequisites in a relational perspective. These assumptions might not 
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 In this context the conditions for ontic (factual reality), as explained in the evaluative model, 
are not considered. The applicable critique about the focus of a relationship does not 
concentrate on any one specific element constitutive for the relationship. 
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be defensible because they exceed contexts and no distinction is made 
between the technical and technological. They also do not differentiate 
between techno-practice and techno-knowledge or between techno-literacy 
and techno-science40. 
 
2.1.5. Technology fulfils basic needs and is an inherent element of culture 
 
Rapp (1999: 1) begins by asking some questions about the purpose of 
technology. Questions like: Why is it brought about? What is the reason for 
putting it to use? Which function does it perform?  The answer usually given 
to these questions is that technology fulfils basic human needs. 
 
He requests us to consider the famous saying that technology is the art of 
guiding the forces of nature according to human purposes. This implies that 
technology is meant to reshape the physical world in order to attain certain 
desired results or to perform specific functions. In this statement, the ‘physical 
world’ refers to the natural aspect and the ‘functions to be performed’ refer to 
the cultural aspect. It becomes evident that technology, by its very nature, 
involves material as well as cultural aspects, and that these are inseparably 
woven together  
 
Rapp (1999: 2) argues further that the cultural aspect of technology is the 
                                            
40
 All elements of factual (ontic) conditions required in the technical process. 
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most important one. Since modern technology has created a Second Nature, 
as it were, it is inevitably also shaping our view of the world and our way of 
life: in short, it is shaping our culture. According to him, it is impossible to 
speak in a reasonable way about technology without at least tacitly taking into 
account the natural as well as the cultural perspective.  
 
He concludes that in this context one has to remember that technological 
artefacts are designed to extend, in one way or another, the natural capacities 
of humans: the car and the airplane multiply the efficiency and the range of 
locomotion; television extends the capacity of sight; and the telephone 
extends the reach of hearing. Taken in this sense he believes technology 
does indeed relate to basic needs, since a certain minimum of locomotion, 
sight, and hearing is indispensable for survival.  
 
In the light of the proposed model Rapp misses some transcendental 
distinctions. He regards cars, airplanes, television and telephones all as 
technological artefacts. Do these artefacts indeed have an inner structure that 
will make them technological? It seems as if Rapp links technology with the 
production of artefacts in general and not just with techno-practice. 
 
The art (or technique) of guiding the forces of nature could be indicated as 
human formative power. This formative power can be utilized in various 
contexts: forming words in language, forming art in aesthetics, forming laws in 
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jurisprudence and forming artefacts through techno-practice. Equating 
technology with all formative activities and products implies that all forming is 
essentially linked with techno-practice, which does not take into account the 
contextual significance of the different types of human form giving41.  
 
People have a wide range of abilities that could be used in various contexts. 
This means that our abilities could be recontextualised. Human analysis, for 
example, could be channelled in scientific, technical, lingual, economic, legal 
or aesthetical ways, depending upon the context. 
 
The fact that people have created an artificial (artefactual) world as second 
nature does not make that world technological but rather artefactual, implying 
that artefacts are not only technological but also scientific, historical, lingual, 
social, economic, artistic, religious and so forth. The term artefactual therefore 
embraces all normatively qualified cultural objects, including technical objects. 
In that sense an artefact not only fulfils a basic need but is inherently part of 
culture. 
 
Lastly, to argue that technology fulfils a basic human need does not explain 
anything about the unique transcendental conditions of technology. What is 
interesting is the fact that Rapp inquires into the ‘function’ or ‘purpose’ of 
                                            
41
 As argued above human form giving could be historical, lingual, logical, economic, religious 
or artistic as well as technical. All types of form giving can therefore not be seen as technical. 
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technology (as fulfilling basic human needs) and places it in a social-human 
context42 but does not inquire into the transcendental conditions or unique 
nature of technology.  
 
2.1.6. Summary 
 
Various frameworks have been noted in which technology is interpreted and 
categorized as variations of techno-practice.  
 
The interest in technical sciences (engineering sciences) and the difference 
between techno-practice and techno-science require some insight into 
engineering practice and an engineering perspective on the philosophy of 
techno-practice; in these cases Schuurman has been consulted as 
philosopher and engineer. 
  
This highlights the fact that techno-science or engineering science in the first 
place conserves knowledge recorded in theoretical formulations. Secondly, it 
clarifies the intuitively grasped insight of techno-practice as technical forming 
and its link with techno-science. Finally, it acts as the basis on which technical 
forming can be systematically (techno-scientifically) managed and controlled. 
                                            
42
 This is what can be expected of a socially orientated scholar, as the worldview of 
sociologists is typically a physical-social reality. The ontical perspective transcends the focus 
of social scientists. 
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The engineer is therefore the builder and the elaborator of technical science. 
This also highlights the fact that, as far as modern techno-practice is 
concerned, ‘science’ or ‘scientific activity’ plays a crucial part that would have 
to be accounted for in a model of the technical activity. Technical science is a 
cultural activity because free human beings play a decisive role in its field of 
inquiry, namely the whole terrain of techno-practice. 
 
To Schuurman, the most striking characteristics of modern techno-practice 
are the modern array of tools and instruments, technical forming, technical 
design, the independent technical operator, the scientific foundation and the 
techno-scientific method. 
 
Next will be an account of variations of descriptions, definitions and notions of 
‘technology’ of the next ontical, condition of the evaluative framework namely 
artefacts. 
 
2.2. Variations on artefacts 
 
Various authors have referred to artefacts as ‘technological’ or as 
‘representative of technology’.  
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2.2.1. Technofacts 
 
Ihde (1990a: 18) indicates artefacts and technofacts as technologies that 
interact with the human in various ways. He explains the ambiguity of objects 
through an example of the Acheulean hand axe - an oval-shaped stone that 
served as an axe but could also serve as paperweight or object of art. He 
stresses that an object finds meaning in the context in which it is used. 
 
To Ihde the ambiguity of the Acheulean object is the ambiguity of technology 
in general. A technological object becomes what it ‘is’ through its uses. He 
stresses that this is not to say that the technical properties of objects are 
irrelevant, but rather that such properties in use become part of the human-
technology relativity. Nor is it to deny that there is a specific type of history to 
the development of technical properties. 
 
Ihde stresses that higher order or more complex transformations also 
occurred in the past but have been accelerated in today's high-technology 
contexts. He calls a technofact an object in which the very materials 
themselves have undergone levels of transformation. Plastics, now pervasive, 
simply do not occur in nature. 
  
To summarize: stone, when formed or shaped, enters human praxis; on the 
one hand, all objects can be shaped into use-objects in various contexts, on 
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the other hand, the contexts in which they are used can shape objects. This 
illustrates the interactivity of humans with artefacts in general. 
 
Ihde also illustrates technology transfer with the example of the Spanish 
Conquistadors who took hawks’ bells (small brass bells used in falconry) and 
mirrors, both designed for different purposes, as fascinating baubles to trade 
with the Arawaks and Caribs of Central America and the Caribbean. When 
the object is transferred, its use may be very different from what it has been in 
its previous cultural context. 
 
The question arises whether it is valid to equate technology with artefact.  
Although it is possible to gauge the level of techno-practice from the artefacts 
produced by the activity (for example glasses and windowpanes relating to 
glassmaking as activity), it would be incorrect to assume that artefacts are 
equal to or represent such an activity. Thus, the artefact has an identity of its 
own, characterized by its own typical inner structure43. 
 
Another issue is the assumption that artefacts are technological. This 
assumption rests on the link between techno-practice and artefacts. If an 
artefact is technological because it is produced by technical activity, various 
problems arise: 
                                            
43
 Please refer to 1.5.3.5 where artefacts are described and where it is indicated that 
everything is characterized by a (multi-aspectual) typical structure. 
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Firstly, why is an artefact not technical in contradistinction to technological if it 
is produced by technical activity? What is the difference between technical44 
and technological? 
 
Secondly, not all objects in ontic reality are indicated as technical or 
technological because one also finds economic objects, religious objects, 
social objects and art objects although they might have involved human 
technical activity. If all artefacts were only technical or technological, no other 
kind of objects could exist. This construct clashes with empirical experience45. 
The implication is that artefacts are not technological on the basis that they 
are artefacts; they can in fact only be regarded as technological if they are 
proved to be technological in contra-distinction to, for example, artistic or 
scientific artefacts46. 
 
The transcendental issue here is that no distinction is drawn either between 
non-technological and technological artefacts or between what is technical 
                                            
44
 The lack of a distinction could indicate confusion. 
45
 Please remember that the elements of the evaluative framework are ontical conditions. Any 
definition that does not account for all the conditions, lacks some conditions and can thus 
only be improved or discarded. 
46
 Please refer to 1.5.3.5 where it is indicated that material things could be physical subjects 
but objects in all the non-material aspects. One can thus get different types of objects like 
logical objects, lingual objects, technical objects, economic objects, aesthetic objects, etc. 
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and technological47. It is simply axiomatically assumed that artefacts equal 
technology. Not even the term technofact saves the issue as refined material 
or alloys could be part of both non-technological (for instance economic 
objects like coins) and technical artefacts. What Ihde indicates as technology 
transfer could also be indicated as artefactual transfer. Furthermore his 
interest in human-technology relationships could be indicated more correctly 
as human-artefactual relationships. (Ihde 1990b: 126) 
 
A relationship between humans and technology (or artefacts, for that matter) 
presupposes humans on the one hand and technology (or artefacts) on the 
other hand as two essential parts in this relationship. Any transcendental 
questions about either humans or technology (or even artefacts) transcend 
the focus or perspective of the relationship itself and cannot be answered 
from the relational perspective only48.  
 
                                            
47
 At this stage the ‘technical’ can be described as an aspect or function of things in reality 
that aims to form or control the forming of things in reality. The ‘technological’ is viewed as a 
‘mis-construction’ of the technical or of the ‘study’ of the technical or even equated to 
artefacts as illustrated in the text, found in the work of most authors of specialised sciences. 
Please refer to p3. 
48
 If one assumes a ‘relationship’ between A and B, one ‘has’ to assume the existence of both 
A and B and can therefore NOT query the existence of either A or B without ‘losing’ the 
assumed relationship. Furthermore, by concentrating on either A or B separately the focus on 
the relationship is suspended for that moment. 
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2.2.2. Artefacts, activities and know-how 
 
Bijker (1990: 3, 4) indicates that technology is a slippery term, and concepts 
such as technological change and technological development often carry a 
heavy interpretative load. To Bijker it seems unfruitful and indeed 
unnecessary to devote much effort to working out precise definitions, at least 
at this early stage of the research in progress. 
  
He believes that the word technology has three layers of meaning. Firstly, 
there is the level of physical objects or artefacts; for example, bicycles, lamps, 
and Bakelite. Secondly, technology may refer to activities or processes, such 
as steel making or moulding. Thirdly, technology can refer to what people 
know and do; examples are the know-how that goes into designing a bicycle 
or operating an ultrasound device in the obstetrics clinic. He argues that 
because in practice the technologies cover all three aspects, it is not sensible 
to separate them further. 
 
Again the transcendental issue is whether artefacts can be equated with 
technology. This could only be true if the artefacts were empirically proved to 
be technological. It is not clear why the above-mentioned artefacts are 
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regarded as technological instead of technical49, for instance.  
 
Secondly, none of the specific examples display a specific technical or 
formative nature that would qualify them to be indicated as technological (or 
technical) instead of non-technological (non-technical) artefacts. None of 
these artefacts are specifically utilized in the technical design, production or 
maintenance functions of techno-practice, and so cannot even be regarded 
as technical tools in the technical process. To call them technical (or 
technological) is to ignore the transcendental conditions or the empirical 
experience relevant to the issue50. 
 
Bijker’s notion of technology as processes or activities can be linked with 
techno-practice, and more specifically with the formative function of techno-
practice. To equate technology with forming, however, is to equate 
technology with the technical, or more specifically, an aspect of the technical, 
namely only the forming or production, and not the designing, maintenance or 
servicing that could empirically be highlighted in modern techno-practice. In 
this specific case, technology is thus equated with the technical, but it is not 
explained why it is equated with only the formative process, instead of with all 
                                            
49
 Here the issue arise again. Except for the explanation of the differences, as explained in 
previous notes, this inability to distinguish could also indicate the conceptual confusion that 
was found in the literature. 
50
 It should be noted that an artefact is a result of techno-practice. Not all artefacts are 
technical, only those that will be used as tools. 
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the processes of the technical. The use of the term technological instead of 
technical or techno-practice is not explained either. 
 
The third layer of meaning of technology – what people know as well as what 
they do – implies both techno-knowledge and techno-literacy. The examples 
of know-how given are actually of different natures. Designing is an aspect or 
function of techno-practice, whereas operating is a function of techno-
literacy51. Ignoring the fundamental distinction between techno-literacy and 
techno-knowledge means that two entirely different sets of knowledge are 
equated. But empirical experience shows that someone who can drive a car 
may not be able to fix or service it – in other words, techno-literacy does not 
necessarily imply techno-knowledge52. 
 
2.2.3. Technology as system 
 
Tiles (1995: 7-9) indicates that, from a historical perspective, techniques 
included the whole ‘complex of ways’ of ‘doing and making’ in which a 
technological device has a place. She uses a plough as example: different 
kinds of ploughs may be best suited to the demands of different kinds of soil 
conditions, terrain, and crops grown, or to the size of farms and fields. Grain 
                                            
51
 Refer to 1.5.3.4 
52
 It should be kept in mind that this is not just a terminological analysis but an ontical 
(factual) analysis. The evaluative model identified factual (ontical) categories.  
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farming on the scale practiced on the plains of the American mid-west 
requires large tractors pulling multi-furrow ploughs, but such machinery would 
be of no use to a hill farmer in North Wales. 
 
The transcendental issue involved here is whether a plough as artefact can 
be equated with a technological device as is done above.  The question could 
be rephrased as follows: Do ‘complex ways’ of ‘doing and making’ mean that 
it is techno-practice? Complex ways of doing have been identified before as 
techno-literacy. Driving cars, flying airplanes, working on computers or using 
complicated equipment does not mean one has the techno-knowledge to 
service, design or manufacture them as is required in techno-practice. 
Furthermore, ‘complex ways of making’ could be equated with techno-
practice, but in that case a plough would be the result of this activity and be 
an artefact, which would not necessarily be technological. It would be 
possible to designate a plough as a ‘technical’ tool or instrument in the 
farming process. Although strictly speaking correct, the following 
misconception should be avoided. All artefacts could be indicated as 
‘instruments’ or tools; for example, a chair is an ‘instrument’ (to sit on) or a 
knife and fork are instruments (to eat with). Furthermore one can argue that 
pots and pans are instruments (for cooking) and cars are instruments (for 
travelling). Such an ‘instrumentalist’ view that takes neither contexts nor inner 
structures into account would see all these artefacts as ‘technologies’ on the 
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basis that they are ‘technical instruments’53. 
 
Empirically, a plough could be a ‘technical’ tool in farming, but farming is an 
activity that could be described as an economically guided biotic-production 
process where plants and animals are reared for food production. This should 
not be mistaken for techno-practice where design, manufacture and servicing 
of artefacts are done. If this difference were disregarded, it would be easy to 
mistakenly equate farming with techno-practice and even to speak of farming 
technology instead of farming techniques.54 It is important to realize that all 
human activity has a technical aspect. In art the artist employs a specific 
technique, in cooking the cook employs specific techniques, and in sport the 
coach teaches the team specific techniques, but none of these cases 
transform the (specialized) ‘technical’ activity into techno-practice where we 
specifically design and produce artefacts for various uses. 
 
                                            
53
 If contexts and typical structures were taken into account, then one would realise that a pot 
is a cooking ‘artefact’ and a rifle a hunting ‘artefact’ and they are not ‘technologies’, whatever 
‘technologies’ might mean. In 1.5.3.5 it was indicated that any cultural object has a typical 
qualifying function. When it is utilized in accordance with this function its internal destination 
is disclosed, but if it is employed or used in an a-typical way it is still objectified but not any 
longer according to its internal destination as a cultural object. 
54
 With the advantage of a totality view of philosophy one would realise that each speciality 
has its own space, agricultural science and agricultural practice are different from technical 
science and technical practice or medical science and medical practice. 
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From a systems perspective Hughes (1990: 51) describes the development of 
(what he calls) large technological systems and the impact of these systems 
on society. He indicates that technological systems contain messy, complex, 
problem-solving components. He stresses that they are socially constructed 
as well as society shaping. Among the components in technological systems 
are physical artefacts, such as the turbo generators, transformers and 
transmission lines in electric light and power systems. Also included are 
organizations, such as manufacturing firms, utility companies and investment 
banks, and they incorporate components usually labelled scientific, such as 
books, articles, university teaching and research programmes. 
 
Because they are socially constructed and adapted in order to function in 
systems, natural resources (such as coalmines) also qualify as system 
artefacts. An artefact - either physical or non-physical - functioning as a 
component in a system interacts with other artefacts, all of which contribute 
directly or through other components to the common system goal. 
  
Hughes (1990: 54) also stresses that inventors, industrial scientists, 
engineers, managers, financiers and workers are components of, but not 
artefacts in, the system. Not created by the system builders, individuals and 
groups in systems have degrees of freedom not possessed by artefacts.  
‘Because they are invented and developed by system builders 
and their associates, the components of technological systems 
are socially constructed artifacts’ (Hughes, 1990: 52). 
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Furthermore Hughes highlights that technological systems solve problems or 
achieve goals using whatever means are available and appropriate. He states 
that this partial definition of technology as problem-solving systems does not 
exclude problem solving in art, architecture, medicine, or even play, but the 
definition can be focused and clarified by further qualification: it is problem 
solving usually concerned with the reordering of the material world to make it 
more productive regarding goods and services. 
 
Unfortunately, the above description of technological systems does not clearly 
identify the nature of the technological and even confuses it with social 
systems. The following transcendental issues arising from the assumptions 
made above should be considered. Where Ihde (1990a: 1) argued that 
artefacts are technological because they are technologically constructed, 
Hughes’s view is that socially constructed artefactual components become 
social artefacts, while the system remains a technological system artefact. 
  
To summarize, Hughes states that ‘large technological systems’ have three 
types of components: firstly, physical artefacts like turbo generators which 
might more correctly be indicated as technical components; secondly, 
organizations which incorporate books, articles and research programmes 
which could be indicated as societal artefacts, but which he indicates as non-
physical artefacts; and thirdly, inventors, engineers and managers which 
could empirically be interlaced into the various totalities of societal organi-
  
 
 
 
 
69 
zations above, but which he indicates as non-artefacts because they have a 
‘degree of freedom not possessed by other artefacts’ (Hughes, 1990: 54). 
 
From these distinctive components – physical artefacts, non-physical 
artefacts and non-artefacts – he concludes that, because they are ‘invented 
and developed by system builders’, all these different natured components 
are ‘socially constructed’ artefacts (Hughes, 1990: 52).  
 
The first question, in the light of the fact that artefacts can lose their ‘identity’55 
and change from ‘non-social’ to ‘social’ artefacts, is why Hughes still refers to 
‘technological systems’ and not simply to ‘social’ or societally constructed 
systems. The issue therefore is whether a ‘technological’ system becomes a 
‘social’ system because system builders developed it. Can system builders 
create only ‘social’ systems or can they also create economic systems, 
technical systems, electrical systems and transport systems, and do all of 
these become social systems automatically? 
 
Nowhere in his description of the components of these large technological 
systems does he refer to or identify any technological components. He 
                                            
55
 Please remember that everything in reality has a persistent structure that cannot be 
overridden by contexts. Although a pen is a lingual object it can simultaneously have various 
other functions in different contexts without losing its nature as pen. This concerns opening 
up its typical, internal destinational function as opposed to deepening its other object-
functions. Please refer to 1.5.3.5. 
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identifies physical, non-physical and non-artefacts only. Furthermore, 
technically speaking, these components will in any case become a socially 
constructed artefact if combined with other types of components by system 
builders, which implies that it should then be called a social artefact. 
 
The second question concerns the nature of the technological. What exactly 
is meant by what is called the technological? How does it differ from the 
technical? Hughes argues that system builders invent and develop social 
artefacts or systems. Creating a social or even societal structure might be 
more accurately identified as a societal competency and not as a technical or 
technological competency. Hughes’s bias towards the social or societal does 
not allow for the technical as technical but only for the technical as social or 
societal. 
 
There are various societal structures56 – for example economic, political, 
juridical, religious, and scientific or technical structures; but their unique 
nature transcends the focus of sociology. Sociology is only interested in the 
societal perspective on these structures. This explains Hughes’s social 
perspective on technical systems. He does not contribute much to a 
                                            
56
 It might be important to note that society is concerned with subject-subject relations where 
human subjects relate to each other in organizations that are subjectively (active) in their 
destinational function like (certitudinally qualified) churches, or (economically qualified) 
businesses where-as techno-practice concerns itself with subject-object relations where an 
active (technical qualified) process produces an artefact.  
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perspective on technical activity – only to our understanding of how the 
technical is interlaced with societal systems. The term socio-technical could 
serve to indicate this. 
   
It is important to stress that the term socio-technical cannot be used to 
highlight anything of the technical as technical, because that transcends the 
focus of the social-technical relationship. In principle the social-technical 
relationship presupposes both the social and the technical as prerequisites 
and thus its focus is limited to the relationship itself57. However, the 
transcendental conditions regarding the nature of each of these components 
transcend the focus of any discipline that is merely directed towards this 
specific relationship58. 
  
The same holds true of a study focusing on socio-economic or socio-political 
relationships; it will not reveal anything of the nature of the economic or the 
political as such since both the economic or the political transcends the 
specific relevant relational perspective. 
 
2.2.4. Dimensions of the technical world 
 
                                            
57
 This has been discussed extensively in previous sections. 
58
 Since the concrete entities and processes involved are multi-aspectual in nature they 
exceed the specific focus of any aspectually delimited scholarly discipline. 
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Tondl (1999: 1) argues that we live in a world of human beings (which he 
indicates as the social world and could arguably be indicated as the societal 
world), a natural world (i.e. the geosphere and biosphere), and a world of 
artificial human constructs (i.e. the world of artefacts). In this world, 
sometimes called ‘our second nature’, a key position is occupied by those 
artefacts that manifest our knowledge and, of course, our values, and that are 
sometimes collectively referred to as technology or the technical world. 
  
He believes that stressing the knowledge- and value-related conditioning of 
technological constructs actually corresponds to the original meaning of the 
Greek word techné, i.e. abilities, skills, or knowledge for solving a certain 
problem by seeking, and especially creating, adequate means for such a 
solution.  
  
He elaborates on the technical world, indicating that it contains objects, i.e. 
different human-made means, tools, machines, automation and artificial 
intelligence, and events and processes that transform the material, energy, 
and information aspects of our situation and that are disseminated and 
initiated by us, including processes of automatic regulation. We should realize 
that this technical world leads its own specific ‘life’, which continues to be 
enlivened by human knowledge and the development of that knowledge, by 
accepted value structures, and also by changes in those structures (Tondl, 
1999: 1). 
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He argues furthermore that we should emphasize the usefulness of a global 
approach to individual segments of the technical world, and he stresses the 
need to adopt a systems approach – one which takes into account intellectual 
and value dimensions, as well as mutual interactions between intellectual, 
material, knowledge and humanitarian aspects of those components. 
  
This means that individual components (of the technical world as well) 
mutually affect and condition one another. Furthermore, these components 
have their own life, development, birth and extinction. They occur within a 
certain temporal rhythm and develop in a certain direction. The different 
stages or phases of this life are described in biological metaphors drawn from 
ontogenesis and phylogenesis, with the emphasis on the dimensions of the 
intellectual and material, and of energy and information.  
 
He lastly argues that we create a technical world in order to achieve our 
goals, creating a system of means to harness nature's resources and 
capacities and to put those resources to a better use, while remaining an 
integral part of nature and striving for a more perfect utilization of our 
resources and capacities. 
  
From the above it seems that a very convincing case could be made for a 
technical world, technology and a systems approach that would enable one to 
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deal with the situation. The argument is unfortunately based on assumptions 
with major transcendental flaws59. 
 
Firstly, equating the world of artefacts with technology implies that all 
artefacts are somehow technological. This position is confusing, as has been 
demonstrated above60.  
If we realize that artifacts which can be described by the term 
technology include the modest tools of primitive humans—for 
instance, flint or simple hammers—as well as the 
instrumentation in today's chemical or biological laboratory or 
the control room of a large power-generating facility, we must 
come to the conclusion that any search for a single all-
encompassing description offers no hope of success. 
(Tondl,1999:3) 
 
Secondly, equating the technical world with technology and indirectly with 
artefacts, implies that all artefacts are technical instruments.  
                                            
59
 An assumption that has a transcendental flaw would be an assumption that does not take 
ontical (factual) conditions into account. To assume that water flows upwards or that a 
triangular circle can be drawn is contradictory to physical or spatial reality. 
60
 It is of course not the same thing to state that all artefacts have a technical aspect or even 
a technical (sub)structure in contradistinction to stating that all artefacts are technical in 
nature. Whether there is or is not a ‘technological’ world is also another matter. 
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Viewing the technical world as a system, then, this system is 
made up of interactions involving three basic subsystems, 
namely:  
—a subsystem of technological knowledge;  
—technical actions; and  
—technological artifacts. (Tondl, 1999: 2) 
 
The contextual limitations involved in such an assumption are not taken into 
account, and the technical and the technological are treated as synonyms. 
Furthermore, artificial human constructs become technological constructs61.  
 
Neither of these assumptions is defendable62. 
 
Thirdly, stressing the knowledge and value conditions and defending them 
with the Greek word techné implies that all knowledge applications and 
problem solving are technological, which disregards the fact that techno-
practice is specifically associated with the designing and forming of artefacts, 
and excludes other formative activities (art, science and societal) from 
                                            
61
 If all human artefacts are the result of technical activity, it still does not mean they all 
become technical. This adds to the confusion surrounding technical artefacts and non-
technical artefacts. 
62
 Viewed from a transcendental point of view taking account of ontical conditions. 
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techno-practice63. 
 
Fourthly, although the systems perspective especially allows a focus on the 
interaction between individual components, it assumes these components as 
a prerequisite and therefore does not consider more transcendental questions 
about any part or component as such, because that transcends the 
perspective of the original specific focus of the interactive relationship. In 
other words, it would be a mistake to believe that more could be discovered 
about the unique nature of a specific component (like technology in the 
technology-human relationship, for example) in an interactive systems 
framework where the specific focus is the interaction of the components and 
not the nature of the specific components64. 
 
2.2.5. The dual nature of technological objects 
 
Peter Kroes (1998: 1) argues that a technological object such as a television 
set or screwdriver has a dual nature. On the one hand, it is a physical object 
with a specific structure and physical properties, the behaviour of which is 
governed by the laws of nature. On the other hand, a physical object is also 
the carrier of a function and it is by virtue of this function that the object is a 
                                            
63
 The evaluative model identified an activity as factual and labelled it as techno-practice. It 
was limited within a technical (manufacturing) context and might not be valid in other 
contexts. Thus conclusions are provisionally only drawn within the technical context. 
64
 Extensively discussed in previous sections. 
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technological object. Function and physical carrier together constitute a 
technological object.  
 
Usually a technological object is the embodiment of a human design and is 
specifically made to perform a certain function. This function means that, 
within the context of human action, it can be used as a means to an end. The 
function cannot be isolated from the context of use of a technological object: it 
is defined within that context. Since that context is a context of human action, 
Kroes calls the function a human (or social) construction. Therefore a 
technological object is a physical construction as well as a human/social 
construction.  
 
This dual nature of technological objects is reflected in two different modes of 
description, namely a structural and a functional mode of description. In so far 
as it is a physical object, a technological object can be described in terms of 
its physical or structural properties and behaviour. This structural mode of 
description makes use of concepts from physical laws and theories and is 
free from any reference to the function of the object. The language of modern 
physics has no place for functions, goals or intentions. With regard to its 
function, a technological object is described in an intentional or teleological 
way: the function of a television set is to produce moving pictures, of a 
screwdriver to tighten or loosen screws.  
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Polanyi (1978: 330) confirms the above and states: 
‘The first thing to realize is that a knowledge of physics and 
chemistry would in itself not enable us to recognize a machine. 
Suppose you are faced with a problematic object and try to 
explore its nature by a meticulous physical or chemical analysis 
of all its parts. You may thus obtain a complete physico-
chemical map of it. At what point would you discover that it is a 
machine (if it is one), and if so, how it operates? Never. For you 
cannot even put this question, let alone answer it, though you 
have all physics and chemistry at your finger-tips, unless you 
already know how machines work. Only if you know how clocks, 
typewriters, boats, telephones, cameras, etc. are constructed 
and operated, can you even enquire whether what you have in 
front of you is a clock, typewriter, boat, telephone, etc.’ 
 
Purely functional descriptions of an object have, from a structural point of 
view, a black box character in the sense that they do not specify any physical 
properties of the object: a television set is something (whatever it may be) to 
produce moving pictures, a screwdriver is something to tighten and loosen 
screws.  
 
Some transcendental problems arise from the above description. Firstly, to 
state that a technological object has a function does not clarify whether this is 
a social, economic, scientific or even technical function. Saying that an 
artefact is ‘usually the embodiment of a human design’ indicates that it is the 
result of techno-practice – not that it is technological: there are many artefacts 
with different individual inner structures – not only artefacts with solely 
technical structures. 
 
From this it follows that function and physical structure could constitute an 
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artefact, but not necessarily technology or technological objects. Secondly, 
the idea that the context in which the artefact will be used is a social construct 
and that the object itself is therefore a social construct does not recognize 
that the artefact has an own identity and is not identical with the context of 
use. On the other hand, all artefacts are formed by human intervention and 
are therefore cultural objects in contradistinction to natural objects. But to 
equate that with social constructs and to view all artefacts as social constructs 
imply that the variety of types of artefacts that exist in reality is disregarded. It 
loses sight of the fact that the existence of economic artefacts, religious 
artefacts, artistic artefacts and scientific artefacts does not yield an 
‘artefactual’ mode of distinguishing between them. 
 
The division between functional and structural modes does explain that a 
physical structure could be studied by physics, that physics does not study 
the purpose of the object, and that the purpose implies a functional (cultural) 
approach that is more than just the physical structure. This holds true for all 
artefacts, technical and non-technical. 
 
The transcendental criticism of the above description would be that no 
distinction is made between technological and non-technological artefacts; 
between the terms technical and technological, and between social and non-
  
 
 
 
 
80 
social artefacts65. 
 
Kroes (2002: 1,2) indicates that on the one hand, the problem is how physical 
structure and function are related to each other in artefacts and what the 
precise role of intentions is in relating them. On the other hand, it is equally a 
matter for further inquiry how technical artefacts are related to social objects 
and what the role of physical realizations is in identifying them. There are 
numerous social entities created by man, e.g. codes of law or universities. 
Kroess argues that it seems that artefacts are always tangible, while such 
social artefacts are not, and asks whether this means that physical realization 
is irrelevant to social artefacts. Moreover, there is also a category of artefacts, 
such as computer programs, that seems to share some features with 
technical artefacts and others with social artefacts.  
 
He proposes two 'triangles' of basic concepts: The first is structure - function - 
intention, and the second is technical artefact - physical object - social 
artefact. The relations between these triads and between the elements 
making up each triad are to be further analyzed and clarified. He explains that 
his interest mainly focuses on artefacts that are designed by engineers. His 
primary aim is to understand the type of artefacts that engineers design and 
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 If one cannot distinguish between technical and technological it could either mean that 
there is no distinction or that confusion reigns, the same applies to the distinction between 
social and non-social as well as technical and non-technical.  
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develop, as part of an effort to understand engineering practice better. 
 
At this point it must be emphasised that artefacts are not necessarily either 
technological or technical simply because they were designed by engineers. 
The unique intended function and unique inner structure of the artefact 
distinguish social from economic or artistic artefacts. This was also noted by 
Mitcham (2002: 1) when he commented on the dual nature project. He argued 
that in this project the comparison may suggest the need to make some 
conceptual distinctions between different types of artefacts: tools, utilities, 
structures, machines, appliances, works of art, poems, concepts, and more. 
He queries whether the purported dual character of artefacts is the same in 
each case. It would perhaps still be useful to distinguish different types of 
material objects, and to consider how they may come to be engineered and/or 
utilized in quite different ways. 
 
At this point it might be useful to recap the position taken that all entities are 
in fact ‘totalities’ allowing the interlacing of various structures into an 
enkaptical66 unit. If we take a coin as an example, this in fact means that its 
physical structure, consisting of various metals and alloys, and its specific 
spatial form, lingual symbolism, economic value and juridical legitimacy (to 
                                            
66
 Enkapsis is linked to ‘capsule’ indicating a unit that consists of an interlacement of distinct 
structures and or elements. In particular the interlacement of entities (or structures) is such 
that in spite of their shared domain of operation they also retain a distinct inner sphere of 
functioning – such as atoms and molecule within living entities. 
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mention just a few) are interwoven to form a specific, unique identity. That is 
why a coin can be studied in various contexts; for example, as physical 
subject, subject to physical laws, but also as economic, historical or even 
political object. It is, however, important to realize that in all these contexts, 
the fact that it was originally intended to serve as an economic object is still 
what qualifies or characterizes the coin as a coin. The other contexts are 
concerned with specific aspects of the coin, for example, the date or the 
political figure depicted on the coin, what it is called, its economic value, or its 
legitimacy. 
 
Kroes’ triangles of basic concepts do not serve to identify the transcendental 
conditions of artefacts because some of the underlying assumptions could be 
unfounded.67 
 
2.2.6. Summary of conclusions 
 
As illustrated above, labelling an artefact as technological or technology 
without taking cognisance of the inner structure of the artefact and 
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 It does not seem to be able to explain the ontical reality of a consistent structure as well as 
different meanings in different contexts that still recognise the structural integrity of artefacts. 
The triangles of structure – function – intention, and technical artefact – physical object – 
social artefact do not for instance regard the fact that an artefact is a physical subject with a 
qualifying inner structure that could be actualised in a different object function than its 
qualifying object function and therefore different than its original intention. 
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concentrating only on the context in which it is described, could lead to a 
‘contextual fallacy’ as the context cannot override the inherent inner structure 
of the artefact. This does not mean that artefacts cannot be used in a-typical 
ways, but then their inner destination is not actualized – such as when a book 
is utilized as a doorstop. This use does not override its internal destination – a 
book is made to be read – it merely actualizes a non-typical object-function of 
the book. 
 
The distinctive characteristic or the unique structure of artefacts has not been 
considered - neither in a technical nor a technological sense.  This could also 
be indicated as a transcendental (ontic) flaw. 
 
The next section will investigate variations of descriptions and definitions 
(notions) on what was identified as techno-science.  After that the following 
distinctions of the evaluative framework will follow. 
 
2.3. Variations on Techno-science 
 
Poser (1998: 2) explains that it is common among scientists to distinguish 
sciences from each other by their topics, and, depending on these topics, by 
their methods. He states that the simplest kind of difference between science 
and engineering could be a distinction between a science of nature and a 
science of artefacts. According to him, enquiring into the ontic status of the 
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entities of a discipline would be consistent with one of the classical methods 
of the philosophy of science, since ontological conventions constitute the 
categorical framework of a science. 
 
He further argues that in traditional technology the science of artefacts seems 
to be true. He recalls the standard example – that there are no wheels and 
axes at all in nature. He argues that it might not be defensible to link 
technology with artefacts, especially with respect to the newest kinds of 
technology, which he calls the third technological revolution. 
 
He argues that traditional engineering aimed at mechanical or chemical 
artefacts and at processes produced by these artefacts, but today we are 
confronted with technologies where it is not adequate to speak of artefacts in 
the traditional way. He inquires whether a cloned sheep could be classified as 
an artefact. He also asks whether a heart transplant or the implantation of a 
cardiac pacemaker turns a person into an artefact, and whether natural 
enzymes or resistant tomatoes produced by means of gene-mutated plants 
are artefacts.  
 
He argues that the switch from physicalistic to biological technologies 
demands a meta-theoretical view, which differs from the traditional one in 
philosophy of science.  
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He further argues that experiments are the cornerstone of every empirical 
science. In all laboratories the objects of experience are manipulated, and all 
contain extended ‘technologies’ for experimentation and measurement. He 
argues that in many cases humans even produce the objects of the sciences, 
whether they are isotopes or macromolecules, polarized or monochromatic 
light. He concludes that all of this shows that we have to concentrate on 
methods, not on an ontology of artefacts, in order to mark the difference 
between science and engineering. 
 
Of interest here, is that from a different angle, namely sociology of science, 
Pickering68 (1995) links to the same issue of a ‘mangle’ in the practice of 
science. Here not from a ‘technical-to-science’ perspective (or techno-science 
as the original term in the orientating model) but from ‘science-to-the-
technical’ perspective. Pickering is concerned with scientific practice, 
understood as the work of cultural extension (1995:3).  
My problematic thus includes the traditional one of understanding 
how new knowledge is produced in science, but goes beyond it in 
its interest in the transformation of the material and social 
dimensions of science, too. (Pickering, 1995:3) 
 
Quite correctly, Poser indicates that both science and engineering have links 
with artefacts. To indicate method alone as distinctive could raise other 
issues, for example, if economics borrows a method from mathematics, does 
it then become mathematics or is it still economics?  
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 My thanks to Prof Mouton for highlighting this link.  
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To describe engineering as the science of artefacts raises the question 
whether other sciences could not also study artefacts. Engineering could be 
better described as the science of techno-practice where the design, 
maintenance and production methods of artefacts and systems are studied69. 
 
An interesting transcendental issue arises from the examples of sheep 
cloning and heart transplants. Is the cloning of sheep techno-practice? If not, 
how should it be categorized? Furthermore Poser axiomatically links 
technology with engineering; he argues that in engineering new technologies 
exist that do not result in artefacts. 
 
Poser suggests that people produced objects of science that can be 
distinguished from objects produced by techno-practice. Isotopes, 
macromolecules, cellular cloning, polarized light and laser beams could be 
scientific objects at first. The transcendental70 issue is whether a scientific 
technique in biology such as cross breeding or even cloning should be 
equated with techno-practice or even techno-science. Is this not a 
transgression of contexts? It seems as if the scientific technical is equated 
with the engineering technical or techno-practice under the umbrella term of 
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 This is based on the suggestion of Schuurman as described above. 
70
 Our concern here regards a factual distinction: Is a technique in biology (cloning) to be 
seen as ‘technology’? Why? 
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technology. 
 
In the other examples of heart transplants or pacemaker implants the 
transcendental question is whether medical techniques can be equated with 
engineering techniques or techno-practice. Does the fact that there could be 
co-operation between medical practice and techno-practice negate the 
distinction between the two? Does the umbrella term technology in this case 
indicate a new totality that consists of an interlacement of techno-practice and 
medical practice to fulfil a basic human need? 
 
Empirically, this new relationship is still guided by medical needs or 
requirements. Even if the initiative for a specific project originates from 
techno-knowledge, the results are still called medical equipment. All medical 
equipment, ranging from a stethoscope to obstetrics sonar and from X-rays to 
a heart-lung machine, are viewed as medical artefacts even though they are 
produced in co-operation with techno-practice. More advanced medical 
practice stays medical practice and does not become techno-practice. Heart 
transplants or pacemaker implants are indicators of advanced medical 
practice and not of techno-practice only. To confuse medical practice with 
techno-practice through the use of the umbrella term technology is to 
transgress contexts. This should be indicated as a contextual fallacy. 
 
In his appeal for a new meta-theory because of a move from physicalistic to 
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biological technologies, Poser assumes that technology is whatever it is 
without contexts. 
  
The transcendental critique here would be that this view cannot distinguish 
between scientific practice (biological techniques) and techno-practice 
(engineering) and (mistakenly) assumes that biological techniques and 
artefacts become techno-practice or techno-science within techno-practice 
under the umbrella term technology. From the factual evaluative model’s point 
of view this assumption is another example of a contextual fallacy. 
 
2.3.1. The technology-science issue 
 
Queralto (1998: 1) argues that the meaning of technology in scientific 
research has totally changed in recent decades. In the beginning, the 
classical relationship between science and technology established a 
subordination of technology to science. In a certain sense technology was 
regarded as applied science that helped the scientific process by 
manipulating the natural conditions of the scientific object. He argues that the 
influence of technology in the search for scientific objectivity did not bring 
about any significant changes regarding the epistemological framework of 
scientific knowledge.  
 
Nevertheless, he argues that this conception is no longer applicable because 
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the relevance of technology has become much greater than before, 
quantitatively and qualitatively considered. To him the role of technology is no 
longer subordinate to the instrumental requirements of science, but occupies 
a central position in the development of scientific knowledge and largely 
determines the progress of science. He states that in all scientific fields the 
use of sophisticated technological means is a conditio sine qua non for the 
development of the scientific enterprise. In this respect, he argues that it is 
possible to assert that technology is undoubtedly a condition of the possibility 
of scientific knowledge. Without technology it is impossible to develop science 
today. To him this new situation has relevant consequences that are to be 
taken into account in any attempt to understand the present epistemological 
status of technology.  
 
He argues further that the influence of technology has become a determining 
feature of the epistemological constitution of scientific objects – as in nuclear 
physics, cosmology, biochemistry, etc. The point is not that science uses 
technology as an instrument: this is indeed true, but in his view a trivial 
remark. He stresses that the present use of technology modifies the 
traditional relationship between the theoretical and the pragmatic goals of 
scientific reason. To him technology is an ‘epistemological mediation’ of 
science and not only an instrument required by the present complexity of 
scientific research. 
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Pickering (1995: 22) argues for the practice of science where scientists 
constructs new machines to assist in the dialectic of resistance and 
accommodation, where resistance denotes the failure to achieve an intended 
capture of agency in practice and accommodation an active human response 
to resistance.  Looking at his idea of reality or in his terms “the metaphysics 
that informs it” (1995: 5) he contrasts two paradigms or ‘idioms’ for thinking 
about science namely the representational and the performative. 
The representational idiom casts science as, above all, 
an activity that seeks to represent nature, to reproduce 
knowledge that maps, mirrors, or corresponds to how 
the world really is. (1995:5)  
 
He argues that when one go beyond ‘science-as-knowledge’ to include the 
material, social and temporal dimensions, in an expanded conception of 
scientific culture, it becomes possible to imagine science not just as 
representative.  He proposes the idea that the world is not filled with facts and 
observations but with agency. The world is continually (physically) doing 
things that bear upon us as forces upon material things. 
 
He suggests is that we should view science as a continuation and extension 
of this ‘coping’ with material agency. He also believes we should see 
machines as central to how scientists cope.  
Scientists, as human agents, maneuver in a field of material 
agency, constructing machines that, as I shall say, variously 
capture, seduce, download, recruit, enrol, or materialize that 
agency, taming, and domesticating it, putting it at our service, 
often in the accomplishment of tasks that are simply beyond the 
capacities of naked human minds and bodies, individually or 
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collectively. (1995: 7) 
 
He thus sees science in a performative idiom in which science is regarded as 
a field of powers, capacities and performances, situated in machine captures 
of material agency. (1995: 7)  
 
The question can be raised, from a transcendental viewpoint, what is 
technology then if science is (technically) forming machines (as technical 
operators?) to accomplish tasks simply beyond human capacities? In a 
sense, he accommodates the technical into science.  
 
The interesting transcendental issue is whether in the co-operation between a 
scientific technique and engineering technique (techno-practice) either one is 
subsumed under the other. Although it is true that scientific techniques are 
required to practice science, the question is whether it is correct to equate 
these techniques with technology or techno-practice. On the other hand, even 
if techno-practice is called upon to develop a scientific artefact or instrument, 
does that imply that science becomes techno-practice or is subordinate to 
techno-practice? The ontic uniqueness of techno-practice in contra-distinction 
from other techniques in various fields of human endeavour like art, science, 
economics and language should be recognized71. If understood correctly and 
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 Remember that things require a uniqueness to be identified and distinguished in the 
process of analysis. This implies that types of techniques differ in their types and not their 
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if the contexts involved are considered, the various scientific techniques 
would not mistakenly be seen as techno-practice under the umbrella term of 
technology. 
 
It should also be noted that no distinction between technical and technological 
has been made above and furthermore, that the ontic nature of the technical 
would transcend the perspective of a theoretical view or paradigm that 
concentrates on the interaction between science, which has its own technical 
or scientific techniques, and techno-practice. This implies that science 
employs its own techniques instead of relying on technology or engineering 
(techno-practice). Scientific techniques within a discipline retain their identity 
and do not change into techno-practice under the umbrella term of 
technology72. 73 
                                                                                                                            
‘technique-ness’. Scientific techniques and technical techniques should therefore not be 
confused as all ‘techniques’ or (even worse) ‘technologies’. 
72
 This follows from the idea of the identity of a thing or entity to persist over time in spite of 
changes occurring on the basis of what is constant. Only the acknowledgement that change 
can only be established on the basis of constancy safeguard us against the impasse present 
in the thought of Heraclitus and the Sceptics. For that reason Einstein postulated the velocity 
of light (in a vacuum) to be constant – and whatever moves is moving relative to this 
constant. Einstein did not even claim that such a light signal actually exists, explaining why 
the physicist Stafleu can say the empirical confirmation of the fact that the velocity of light 
satisfies this assumption is comparatively irrelevant (Stafleu, M.D. 1980. Time and Again. A 
Systematic Analysis of the Foundations of Physics. Toronto: Wedge1980:89). 
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2.3.2. From technique to technology 
 
Another variation of the issue regarding science and the technical is found in 
Aggazzi’s argument (1998: 1) that two opposite positions characterize the 
present way science and technology are perceived. In his opinion the most 
widespread view renders them identical, as being practically one and the 
same thing (the so-called technoscience). According to one approach, the 
intellectual features of modern science dominate the traditional manual 
features of technology. Consequently technology itself has become scientific 
to such an extent that it is impossible to distinguish it from science. He argues 
that this view is tacitly presupposed in the way the progress of science is 
commonly understood. Examples of technological achievements are almost 
inevitably cited as instances of scientific progress. 
 
According to another approach, modern science has in its turn been deeply 
affected by the spirit of technology, as constituting the proposal of dominating 
and utilizing nature. In consequence modern science has become 
indistinguishable from technology (Aggazzi, 1998: 1). This second view is 
common to several instrumentalist trends in contemporary philosophy of 
science that propagate an essentially negative judgment of science, because 
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 Other philosophers of science – such as Popper, Kuhn and Stegmüller – wrestled with the 
problem of continuity and discontinuity, constancy and change.  
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modern science was allegedly born of the same pretension toward 
manipulating being that is at the core of technology, and this implies, as a 
consequence, that an attitude of violence underlies technology. (Aggazzi, 
1998: 1) 
 
As argued previously, the scientification of technology or the technologization 
of science does not change the identity or transcendental conditions of either 
of them. The creation of techno-science to subsume science and technology 
loses sight of relevant contexts. Even though techno-practice utilizes scientific 
knowledge it does not become a science. On the other hand, scientific 
techniques could be enhanced by techno-knowledge but still remain science. 
 
Aggazzi argues that, contrary to the above two views, there is the position of 
those scholars who stress the different aims of science and technology: 
science aims at attaining objective knowledge and is therefore characterized 
by a strictly cognitive attitude; technology aims at producing concrete results 
(in the form of objects, commodities, tools, or procedures) and is therefore 
characterized by a pragmatic attitude.  
 
According to Aggazzi (1998: 1), both positions contain some truth, but both 
are affected by certain misunderstandings. In order to evaluate them critically, 
he starts by proposing a distinction between technique and technology, 
although conventional, it is not arbitrary. It is not based upon a simple 
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linguistic analysis but reflects certain conceptual differences that may suitably 
be appended to a double terminology that happens to exist in language.  
 
He states that by technique we usually mean a display of practical abilities 
that allow one to perform easily and efficiently a given activity (be it purely 
material or bound to certain mental attitudes). But (perhaps less often) we 
also use technique as a collective noun, indicating the very wide spectrum of 
such simple techniques. In such contexts, these are sometimes indicated by 
the old-fashioned term technics. He feels that all the many effective concrete 
procedures  - for example, producing certain objects, performing certain 
operations, and attaining certain goals - are summed up by the word 
technique.  
 
Technique, in this sense, is the collective term for technics, and in this sense 
we usually speak, for example, of the ‘technical skill’ of a craftsman, lawyer or 
pianist. He argues that any such technique is essentially the skilful application 
of a certain know-how, which has been constituted through the accumulation 
and transmission of concrete experiences (that in particular also entails 
careful exercise), without being necessarily accompanied or supported by 
knowing why such concrete procedures are especially effective.  
 
At this point it might be important to stress that although Aggazzi illustrates 
‘technics’ in different contexts, like the technique of a pianist or craftsman, he 
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does not stress the importance of contexts to techniques.74  
 
Aggazzi (1998: 2) refers to the suffix, ‘-ology’ found in the word technology, 
which he believes invites us to take advantage of the theoretical aspect of its 
use. He urges us to compare theology, sociology, philology and ethnology. 
These words suggest the presence of some kind of ‘scientific’, or at least 
theoretical, dimension. He argues that the Greek term techné includes this 
theoretical aspect, since it was used to indicate the capability of justifying, of 
‘knowing why’, a certain procedure was efficient.  
 
He proposes that the modern concept of technology can be interpreted as a 
new way of expressing the conceptual content of the Greek term techné. To 
him, perhaps the most decisive element distinguishing Western civilization 
from other great civilizations in history is its introduction of the theoretical into 
the domain of practice and doing. What he calls the ‘invention of the why’, 
arising from within Hellenic civilization in the sixth century B.C., led in that 
same context to the birth of both philosophy and science. He believes the 
very demand that moved philosophers to ask for the reasons for the existence 
and constitution of the cosmos (and to postulate principles and first causes to 
provide such an explanation) was also what moved the first mathematicians 
to provide the reasons (by means of demonstration) for the properties of 
numbers and figures. He argues that other peoples discovered them only 
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 That is to say, he does not account for ontical conditions as such.  
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empirically, translating them into practical rules of calculus. He believes that it 
was inevitable that a search for the ‘why’ should eventually take up the 
different kinds of efficient knowing that men had used in various fields; and 
that this gave birth to the notion of techné: efficient action where we know the 
reasons for its efficiency and what it is founded upon. 
 
Aggazzi notes that the term techné is often translated as ‘art’, but today this is 
imprecise, since to us art essentially concerns aesthetic expression. The 
characteristics of techné are also parallel to those of epistéme, that is, 
science, since both are types of knowledge that demonstrate the reasons for 
what is observed empirically. Epistéme focuses attention on the truth of what 
is known; with techné, the focus is on efficiency. For him, the first concerns 
pure knowledge; the second, knowledge of doing or making. 
 
He argues that if it is true that the domain of pure and simple knowledge of 
doing or making (that is, knowing how to do something but not necessarily 
knowing why the end is achieved) can be called the domain of technique, 
then we ought to find another term to designate that further dimension 
wherein efficient operation is conscious of the reasons for its efficacy and is 
founded upon them; that is, where operation is nourished by its grounding in 
theoretical knowledge. To him this new term is technology, which the guiding 
model would indicate as techno-science.  
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Aggazzi believes that a few useful points of reflection can be derived from 
these considerations. In the first place, he points out that a separation 
between science and technique is plausible (in the sense that we can 
characterize science as an eminently cognitive enterprise, and technique as 
an eminently pragmatic one). But technology can at most allow of a 
conceptual or an analytic distinction, without any real separation from 
science, since they are concretely intertwined and, so to speak, 
consubstantial. Here the maxim ‘technology cannot exist without science, and 
science cannot exist without sophisticated technology’ seems to apply. This, 
in his view, justifies the use of the term techno-science for designating this 
new reality. In the second place, he points out that an appeal to an ethical 
dimension strongly emerges from within techno-science itself; this is true 
because the particular form of creativity that characterizes this domain does 
not provide us with criteria for steering, directing, limiting, or orienting the 
growth of techno-science. 
 
The development from technique to technology in the above explanation 
creates a few problems. If the ‘-ology’ of technology indicates theory or 
science as in the examples given, it would mean that technology is equal to 
technical science or techno-science. Then it would be tautological to speak of 
science and technology, because technology in that case would be (the same 
as technical) science or techno-science. 
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But he also argues that technology is not a science: a science has a cognitive 
focus whereas technology has a pragmatic focus. They are inseparable, 
however – hence his notion of techno-science. Although he does distinguish 
between technique and science he confuses contexts when he states that 
technology (instead of techniques) cannot be separated from science 
because they are too strongly interconnected. He also overlooks75 the 
possibility that asking transcendental questions can reveal some fundamental 
contexts. The first transcendental question is whether an engineering 
technique (in techno-practice) would lose its identity (as techno-practice) if it 
borrows some knowledge or insights from some scientific discipline like 
physics or mathematics. One can also ask whether ‘physics’ will become 
‘engineering’ if it borrows some techno-knowledge from engineering to 
develop some kind of artefact or instrument for an experiment in physics.76 
 
If their respective identities are not lost when sciences co-operate with other 
sciences – or with techno-practice, for that matter – or, on the other hand, 
when techno-practice co-operates with any of a number of sciences, then the 
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 It is important to note that these do transcend his frame of reference and would thus in a 
certain sense not be expected. 
76
 Scientific activities concern issues of theoretical knowledge – what we can know. The 
techniques involved in techno-practice, by contrast, concern what we can do. In both cases 
distinct and persistent realities are at stake. It also settles any attempt to ‘confuse’ scientific 
techniques with technical techniques in a new notion of techno-scientific techniques or any 
technologies. 
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particular creation of ‘techno-science’ to indicate a new totality within which 
science and techno-practice lose their identities is untenable. 
 
Furthermore it must be pointed out that the question of ‘the invention of the 
why’ could be answered by philosophy and not by an examination of the suffix 
‘-ology’. No clear argument has been presented to justify the use of the term 
technology instead of technical or technics. When the case is made for a 
development of the notion from a (contextual) technique to the umbrella term 
of technology, a transgression of context occurs77. 
 
2.4. Variations on Techno-knowledge 
 
In this section attention will be given not only to the techno-knowledge of the 
engineer but also to the subject currently offered in schools. 
  
2.4.1. Scientific versus engineering knowledge 
 
Pitt (2001: 5) argues that engineering knowledge is a more secure form of 
knowledge than scientific knowledge. He argues that scientific knowledge is 
transitory – it changes as theories change. He further argues that scientific 
method too is not only transitory, but also unstable, depending on the area of 
science being discussed. According to him there is no single scientific method 
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 Also indicated as a contextual fallacy. 
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that can be used for all the sciences; he also believes that different methods 
might be appropriate for a science and the objects investigated by the 
science. 
 
Finally, he argues that if scientific knowledge is to be appraised through a 
pragmatic theory of knowledge, and given that the objective is explanation, 
then as theories change, explanations fail. The history of science then 
becomes the history of failed theories and unsuccessful explanations. 
 
In contrast, he argues that engineering knowledge is task oriented. If the 
application of engineering knowledge, consisting of information in books and 
task-specific methods and techniques, results in the production of objects and 
the solutions of problems which meet the criteria of those for whom the jobs 
are done, then it is successful. Furthermore he states that it is task oriented, 
and because real world tasks have a variety of contingencies to meet – e.g. 
materials, time frame, budget, etc. – one knows when an engineering project 
is successful or not. It is universal, certain and, if it works, must be true in 
some sense of the word ‘true’. So, according to the criteria he advocates for 
science, engineering knowledge seems more secure and more permanent. 
What engineers know, therefore, is how to get the job done – primarily 
because they know what the job is. 
 
If human knowledge is developed through experience and study, it always 
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develops and one never stops learning. The implication is that our knowledge 
is in a state of flux and, as Pitt indicated, a history of failed theories and 
explanations. But this would also be true of technical solutions in the different 
scientific practices, because newer or more novel solutions appear every day. 
It therefore follows that our techno-knowledge is also in a state of flux and 
cannot be more secure than any other type of knowledge. The ‘successful’ 
engineering project mentioned earlier is only successful within a certain 
context and might cause other problems not apparent in the first solution, 
indicating that techno-knowledge, too, is impermanent. Lastly, on a lighter 
note, the engineer might have solved what has never been a problem – like 
extracting pure water from champagne. 
 
2.4.2. Curricula in schools 
 
Black (1998: 2) focuses on school curricula and specifically on the new 
subject of technology. He supplies an overview of the curricula in different 
countries, outlining a number of approaches. 
 
He starts his argument by indicating that technology is a peculiar subject in 
that its status and its nature have been subject to radical changes in recent 
years. The subject is seen to serve several aims, which are assigned different 
relative priorities in different countries. There are many traditions associated 
with competing pressures in the re-definition of the subject. The different 
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curriculum models within which the redefined subject is meant to fit and play a 
specific role, further complicate these changes and varieties.  
 
Black listed the different approaches as follows: 
• a technical skills approach, seeking emphasis on craft 
skills in treating resistant materials, food, and textiles, or in 
electronics and automatic control (e.g. Finland);  
• a craft approach, in which the cultural and personal value 
of the combination of manual skill, aesthetic sensibility, 
and traditional design is to be preserved (e.g. the Swedish 
tradition);  
• a technical production approach, seeking emphasis on 
skills appropriate to modern mass production and its 
control and organization (Eastern European - formerly 
socialist  - traditions);  
• an engineering apprentice approach, seeing the school 
subject as a preparation ground for specialist technicians 
and engineers in tertiary education;  
• a ‘modern technology’ approach, which looks to the nature 
of ‘work’ in the next century and focuses strongly on 
information technology (some even interpreting the word 
technology to mean computers - a strong tendency in the 
French approach);  
• a ‘science and technology’ approach in which it is assumed 
that these two subjects are, or ought to be, studied in 
close association with each other (as in Denmark);  
• a concentration on design, seen by some as a central 
concept in the study and practice of technology (Northern 
Ireland);  
• a problem-solving emphasis, focusing on an understanding 
of the nature of social needs in the definition of ‘problems’ 
and of the need for a cross-disciplinary approach to 
dealing with issues (Scotland, United States);  
• a ‘practical capability’ approach, emphasizing personal and 
active involvement by pupils in dealing with realistic 
problems to offset the passive and receptive ethos of most 
of school education;   
• an emphasis on the technology-society nexus, which calls 
for the study of technological or technical innovation as a 
driving force for social change and of its interaction with 
other forces that also drive change (the STS movement). 
(Black, 1998: 2) 
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He also points out that policy is mainly driven by one of these approaches in 
some countries, while in others there is an attempt to adopt several of them in 
concert. He states that some of them are closely linked with an emphasis on 
'technology as a component of general education for all'. It is not quite clear 
what this means. In terms of the guiding framework it could mean: 
 techno-practice as a component of general education for all; 
 techno-knowledge as a component of general education for all; 
 techno-literacy as a component of general education for all. 
It seems that the latter option makes the most sense as the previous options 
are too specialized for general education. 
 
He further states that in others, the emphasis is on vocational preparation, 
which is far removed from the 'technical'. He states that assuming that this 
emphasis is dominant, there can still be arguments about which of them 
provides the best preparation for employment.  
 
Black indicates that this wide range of differences makes it difficult to 
communicate in discussions between countries. To complicate matters the 
school subject can have a variety of names; in the U.K. the terms technology, 
design and technology, technology and design, and craft design and 
technology have all been used, and each signifies a different rationale.  
 
He argues that the differences are often associated with competing interests 
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struggling to exert their influence on the school curriculum. He realizes that 
lack of consensus can inhibit policy development and he states that in the 
United States, groups have been in operation for several years, trying to draw 
up and achieve consensus on statements of national standards in most of the 
main school subjects.  In technology the group assigned this task was one of 
the last to be set up and has yet to report.  
 
It seems as if schools experience the same difficulty of arriving at a 
standardized notion of the technical and should possibly concentrate on 
aspects of techno-knowledge, techno-literacy and techno-practice. 
 
2.4.3. Dual nature of techno-knowledge? 
 
Kroes (2001: 1) argues that the dual ontological nature of artefacts has its 
counterpart at the level of technological (or technical) knowledge. According 
to him, technological knowledge therefore also has two faces. On the one 
hand, it concerns the physical (or structural) properties of technical objects. 
He uses a car to explain. It has all kinds of physical properties that are of 
crucial technical importance, such as its mass, the fuel consumption per 
kilometre, its shape, its air resistance, its breaking power, the shape of its 
combustion chambers, the temperature and pressure in the combustion 
chamber during a combustion cycle etc. Knowledge of these physical 
properties, of how they hang together and of the physical/chemical processes 
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taking place in, for instance, the engine of the car during operation, is part 
and parcel of what he calls standard technological knowledge of cars. He 
further argues that, on the other hand, technological knowledge also concerns 
the functional properties of objects. Apart from knowing that a certain object 
has a round shape, is made of steel etc., we also know that it is a steering 
wheel – in other words, that it performs a certain function in a car. Car 
designers, mechanics and users express at least part of their knowledge of 
technical objects like cars by means of functional concepts. They say, for 
instance, that object X performs function Y, and assume that such a claim 
about object X may be true or false, just like any claim about a physical 
property. Technological knowledge, he concludes, consists of statements 
concerning not only the physical structure of technical artefacts, but also their 
functions. 
  
He states that from the point of view of engineering design, the idea that 
technological knowledge involves knowledge of structures as well as of 
functions is rather obvious. The engineering design process may be 
interpreted as a problem-solving process in which a function is translated or 
transformed into a structure. 
 
In Dutch, scientific thinking is distinguished from technical skills and know-
how by two terms: ‘kennen’ and ‘kunnen’. In a certain sense the engineering 
design process, as Kroess sees it, is therefore the movement from ‘kennen’ to 
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‘kunnen’. 
 
Although what is indicated above as technological knowledge could be called 
technical knowledge, techno-practice is involved not only in designing, but 
also in forming and maintaining artefacts; in that sense it is a totality with 
interlaced structures, which could create the mistaken impression that it has a 
dual nature. An artefact could have a ‘technical’ substructure and yet be part 
of a totality with a different inherent qualifying structure, a cell phone, for 
instance, has a technical substructure, but serves as a lingual object or 
communication instrument. It should therefore not be seen as a technical 
artefact but rather as a communication artefact.78  
 
2.5. Techno-literacy 
 
Jenkins (1996: 2) explains a certain notion of techno-literacy that he calls 
‘technological’ literacy. He explains that technological literacy is a term of more 
recent origin than scientific literacy. He explains that this is the case partly 
because the institutionalised study of technology as an activity is of more 
recent origin than the history and philosophy of science and partly because, in 
                                            
78
 Of course it cannot be denied that artefacts may also be objectified in a-typical ways but 
that does not change the inherent typical nature (structural principle) of the artefact. It is 
therefore misleading to refer to it as if its internal structure changed. Alternatively this 
constant inner structure of entities that qualify their nature should be acknowledged when 
they are discussed in alternative (a-typical) contexts. 
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most advanced societies, the theoretical and scientific have come to be 
favoured at the expense of the practical and technological.  
He believes that this preference may owe something to the fact that an 
essential element of technological capability is tacit rather than explicit. He 
argues that if tacit knowledge were indeed central to technological capability, it 
would not only be unlikely to yield readily to scholarly scrutiny but would also 
present problems concerning the accommodation of knowledge within 
educational systems.  These systems are, for the most part, committed to 
imparting knowledge and understanding that is explicit, and of cognitive, rather 
than practical, significance. This seems to be an interesting attempt to explain 
why technology is so difficult to define. 
 
He states that it should also be acknowledged that to those who regard 
technology as mere applied science, technology does not have its own 
knowledge base, and technological literacy reduces the ability to apply 
scientific knowledge. The important point, to him, is that some clarification of, 
and ideally consensus on, the nature of technological activity is fundamental 
to defining technological literacy and, consequently, to devising relevant 
educational programmes for technology. 
 
Jenkins reminds us that, like scientific literacy, technological literacy is a 
slogan, not a demand for action. It serves as a rallying-cry to which individuals, 
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governments, groups, organizations, and associations can positively respond 
since they perceive it as advancing their own interests. 
He believes it is also useful to consider how individuals and societies 
understand technological change, to which technological literacy is, 
presumably, in some way related. It is now common to refer to the information 
revolution and to compare it with the industrial revolution in an attempt to 
signal the major social, economic, and other changes associated with it. Any 
revolution based on technological change makes some groups of workers 
redundant while simultaneously creating new forms of employment.  
 
He believes that technological literacy offers the hope of disseminating to the 
wider public a better understanding of their day-to-day work and, thereby, of 
strengthening public, and in a broad sense, political  support for technological 
activities. From this perspective, technological literacy is essentially 
concerned with an understanding of, and sympathy towards, technological 
capability. 
 
Although techno-literacy could be made a slogan for a campaign and 
although it is linked with a clear understanding of the technical and techno-
practice, it is actually more than just ‘propaganda’ for new artefacts or the 
importance of techno-practice. Techno-literacy also hints at the ability of 
individuals to use artefacts that have a technical substructure or that requires 
some skill to operate. This should not be confused with techno-knowledge or 
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techno-practice.  
 
Unfortunately, Jenkins does not succeed in clarifying the distinction between 
the terms technical and technological and what he indicates as technological 
could rather be designated as technical. 
 
2.5.1. Thing knowledge? 
 
Baird (2002: 1) makes a case for a materialist epistemology that he calls 
‘thing knowledge’. This is an epistemology in which the things we make bear 
our knowledge of the world, on a par with the words we speak. It is an 
epistemology opposed to the notion that the things we make are only 
instrumental to the articulation and justification of knowledge expressed in 
words or equations. He believes our things do more than this. He argues that 
they bear knowledge themselves and, frequently enough, the words we speak 
serve instrumentally in the articulation and justification of knowledge borne by 
things. 
 
It might be true that things reveal their meaning in different contexts and 
relationships. Identifying this meaning or ‘knowledge from artefacts’ requires 
as presuppositions a ‘literacy’ to ‘read’ this meaning or ‘knowledge from the 
artefact’ and its contexts of use, as well as the capability to know and interpret 
this meaning. The knowledge is therefore not in the artefact but in the ‘eye of 
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the beholder’. To know presupposes as a transcendent precondition an ‘I’ 
who must have a capacity for knowledge. Passive objects, like books for 
example, cannot ‘know’; only the active ‘I’ can know or not know what is 
written in the book. 
 
2.6. Summary and some preliminary conclusions 
 
Firstly a short summary of distinctions so far and then some preliminary 
conclusions. 
 
2.6.1. Summary 
 
If one views the technical process from a transcendental point of view, it was 
found that thus far five elements were identified. These were indicated as 
techno-practice, techno-knowledge, techno-science, techno-literacy and 
artefacts. In a preliminary study it was found that different authors identified 
some of these above elements, in different combinations, in their notions, 
definitions or examples in their arguments. These authors were categorized 
under each of these elements as headings.  
 
Obviously, these categorizations are not cast in stone and some authors were 
much more complex to be boxed-in under just one heading. It is important to 
note that the theory of the author itself, and its conclusions in terms of his/her 
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own assumptions were never evaluated as that was never the intension. Only 
the author’s assumptions and ‘theoretical constructs’79 in terms of the 
technical were tested against a (factual) ontic given. The fact that a specific 
element was indicated was automatically credited as confirmation of the 
factually given and thus was not even highlighted.  The content and the 
assumptions were further compared to try to refine and improve our own 
understanding.  
 
It was also accepted that an analysis of the technical in an ontic context 
transcends the perspective or focus of any disciplinary context. This implies 
that none of the authors would be expected to supply a totality view of the 
technical and only partial descriptions of significance to the disciplinary 
perspective could be expected. 
 
2.6.1.1. Variations of techno-practice 
 
Under this heading various authors were interrogated to illustrate some 
variations and interesting highlights.  Schuurman described from an 
engineering point of view the difference between modern and classical 
practice and that the ideal is to control the production process from a 
distance. Where the classical practice were dependant on material, skill, and 
                                            
79
 Here definitions, notions, suggestions and conclusions about the technical or one of its 
elements are implied. 
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experiential knowledge the modern were freed from these limitations and also 
divided the design from the production. 
 
Bunge, also an engineer, agreed with Schuurman that technology is the 
sector of human knowledge concerned with the design, repair, and 
maintenance of artificial systems and processes, with the aid of basic science 
and mathematics. Unfortunately he did not take into consideration that each 
entity has a typicality and transgressed, so to speak, contexts in such a way 
that he wanted to classify non-technical processes under technical processes. 
 
Quintanilla argued that technological change is effected by ‘designing and 
producing new technical systems and improving their efficiency’. This is what 
is specifically meant by the term techno-practice in the guiding model, 
therefore confirming such an activity. Unfortunately he also did not reveal a 
totality view of the technical relationship. 
 
Rapp links technology with the production of artefacts in general and not just 
with techno-practice, confusing the general human technical capability with 
techno-practice. This confirmed that human form-giving is multi-aspectual, 
and consequently could also be focussed on techno-practice as such, 
although Rapp did not realise that. 
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2.6.1.2. Variations on artefacts 
 
Ihde indicated artefacts and technofacts as technologies that interact with the 
human in various ways. Furthermore he believed a technological object 
becomes what it ‘is’ through its uses not realising that the inner typical 
structure actually persists and that artefacts themselves cannot be 
‘technologies’.  This will be explained further in the next chapter. 
 
Bijker believes that the word technology has three layers of meaning. Firstly, 
there is the level of physical objects or artefacts; for example, bicycles, lamps, 
and Bakelite. Secondly, technology may refer to activities or processes, such 
as steel making or moulding. Thirdly, technology can refer to what people 
know and do; examples are the know-how that goes into designing a bicycle 
or operating an ultrasound device in the obstetrics clinic. He argues that 
because in practice the technologies cover all three aspects, it is not sensible 
to separate them further. On the one hand this confirms artefacts, techno-
practice and techno-knowledge in the orientation model but on the other hand 
it confuses techno-literacy and techno-knowledge as well as the nature of 
artefacts produced by techno-practice. This will be discussed further in the 
following chapters. 
 
Tiles and Hughes stressed technological systems, as also to be seen as 
artefacts.  Tondl on the other hand argues that we create a technical world in 
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order to achieve our goals, creating a system of means to harness nature's 
resources and capacities and to put those resources to a better use, while 
remaining an integral part of nature and striving for a more perfect utilization 
of our resources and capacities. In a certain sense this confirms our technical 
formative power to form culture in general. We form cultural things like art, 
tables and chairs, language, laws, values and even theories. This 
unfortunately does not indicate the typical uniqueness of the technical forming 
process in techno-practice. 
 
Peter Kroes argued that a technological object such as a television set or 
screwdriver has a dual nature. On the one hand, it is a physical object with a 
specific structure and physical properties, the behaviour of which is governed 
by the laws of nature and on the other hand it performs a function. This in a 
sense confirmed the existence of artefacts as result of techno-practice. Why 
he called it an technological object instead of technical could indicate 
confusion, especially if he does not indicate that each artefact has a typical 
inner structure which implies that not all artefacts is necessarily technical. 
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2.6.1.3. Variations on Techno-science 
 
Poser indicates that both science and engineering have links with artefacts 
and therefore he argued that the difference is in method. To indicate method 
alone as distinctive could raise other issues, for example, if economics 
borrows a method from mathematics, does it then become mathematics or is 
it still economics?  Only if one accepts that each entity has a typical 
uniqueness can one agree that mathematics and economics are distinct 
although they may both use mathematical formulas. Techno-science will thus 
also have an own uniqueness as a technical science different from other 
sciences and also different from techno-practice. 
 
Pickering sees the ‘science’ part of techno-science and argues that science 
developed into a ‘techno-science’. He thus sees science in a performative 
idiom in which science is regarded as a field of powers, capacities and 
performances, situated in machine inter-actions with material agency. The 
technical is thus incorporated into science.  
  
Aggazzi summarised that two opposite positions characterize the present way 
science and technology are perceived. In his opinion the most widespread 
view renders them identical, as being practically one and the same thing (the 
so-called techno-science). In the other approach, modern science has in its 
turn been deeply affected by the spirit of technology, as constituting the 
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proposal of dominating and utilizing nature. In consequence modern science 
has become indistinguishable from technology. From an ontic viewpoint the 
scientification of technology or the technologization of science does not 
change the identity or transcendental conditions of either of them. 
 
Aggazzi also tried to argue for the term ‘technology’ instead of ‘technique’, 
where he argued for another term to designate that further dimension wherein 
efficient operation is conscious of the reasons for its efficacy and is founded 
upon them; that is, where operation is nourished by its grounding in 
theoretical knowledge. To him this new term is technology, which the guiding 
model would indicate as techno-science. 
 
2.6.1.4. Variations on Techno-knowledge 
 
As illustrated Pitt held the view hat engineering knowledge is a superior type 
of knowledge in comparison with scientific knowledge. He followed that route 
in an effort to give engineering a more dominant position or importance in 
society over science for example. From a transcendental point of view the 
argument was not supported. 
 
Black started his argument by indicating that technology was a peculiar 
subject in that its status and its nature have been subject to radical changes 
in recent years. The subject is seen to serve several aims, which are 
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assigned different relative priorities in different countries. This confirmed that 
techno-knowledge might be required but it also indicated major confusion 
between techno-knowledge, techno-literacy and techno-science. He states 
that some of the approaches are closely linked with an emphasis on 
'technology as a component of general education for all'. It is not quite clear 
what this means. In terms of the guiding framework it could mean: 
 techno-practice as a component of general education for all; 
 techno-knowledge as a component of general education for all; 
 techno-literacy as a component of general education for all. 
It seems that the latter option makes the most sense as the previous options 
are too specialized for general education. 
 
Kroess  argues that the dual ontological nature of artefacts has its counterpart 
at the level of technological (or technical) knowledge. According to him, 
technological knowledge therefore also has two faces. On the one hand, it 
concerns the physical (or structural) properties of technical objects, on the 
other hand, technological knowledge also concerns the functional properties 
of objects. This unfortunately still could not distinguish between techno-
knowledge and techno-science. 
 
2.6.1.5. Variations on Techno-literacy 
 
Jenkins argued that some clarification of, and ideally consensus on, the 
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nature of technological activity is fundamental to defining technological 
literacy and, consequently, to devising relevant educational programmes for 
technology. He believes that technological literacy offers the hope of 
disseminating to the wider public a better understanding of their day-to-day 
work and, thereby, of strengthening public, and in a broad sense political, 
support for technological activities. From this perspective, technological 
literacy is essentially concerned with an understanding of, and sympathy 
towards, technological capability. This in a sense confirmed the existence of 
such an element as techno-literacy although it was confused with techno-
knowledge by various other authors. 
 
Baird lastly, makes a case for a materialist epistemology that he calls ‘thing 
knowledge’. This is an epistemology in which the things we make bear our 
knowledge of the world, on a par with the words we speak. Identifying this 
meaning or ‘knowledge from artefacts’ requires as presuppositions a ‘literacy’ 
to ‘read’ this meaning or ‘knowledge from the artefact’ and its contexts of use, 
as well as the capability to know and interpret this meaning. Also this insight 
contributed to the realisation that a separate techno-literacy element should 
be identified. 
 
2.6.1.6. Preliminary conclusions 
 
Before proceeding with an analysis of specific interpretations of the technical 
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as presented by various authors, the following preliminary conclusions can be 
drawn: 
 
The term technology cannot be equated with artefacts. Not all artefacts are 
technical; they could have a technical structure encapsulated in its totality, but 
that would not automatically make them technical. 
 
No clarity has been reached regarding the distinction between the technical 
and the technological. It turns out that technological has been employed as 
an umbrella term to categorize all technical activity like techno-practice, 
techno-science, techno-knowledge and techno-literacy under one heading 
without recognising the contextual limitations of each activity. 
 
It has been also argued that the so-called human-technology relationship can 
more precisely be indicated by the term human-artefactual relationship.  
 
Furthermore transcendental questions about the technical transcend the view 
or perspective of an approach that concentrates or focuses on a relationship 
(society and technology, for example) in order to study the interactions in the 
relationship80. 
 
Although the technical could be described as formative power controlled by 
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 Previously argued extensively. 
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humans, this does not imply that all formative actions occur only in techno-
practice. The umbrella term technology suggests that all technical forming is 
technology, but forming or designing and creating also occur in other spheres 
of life. Artists can form, design and create, as can scientists. This does not 
make them technologists or subject to techno-practice, techno-science or 
techno-knowledge. 
 
This explains how scientists can clone sheep as a scientific experiment 
without changing science into ‘techno-practice’. To equate scientific 
techniques with techno-practice under the umbrella term of technology is to 
discount the identity of scientific techniques as different from techno-practice.  
This negation of identity also contributes to the negation of contexts, leading 
to a contextual fallacy.  
 
In the next three chapters three leaders in the field of Science and 
Technology Studies will be investigated. The purpose is to explore whether 
any further elements for the technical relationship might have been 
overlooked on the one hand and whether these notions already identified 
could explain their notions. If the elements are ontically based, and these 
leaders are scientifically busy with reality, at least some elements must be 
confirmed by both parties. As special scientists do not focus on an ontical 
totality view, they might not be familiar with all the elements, only those they 
found useful in their own theory.
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3. Analysis of the position of Don Ihde 
 
In this section an analysis of the theoretical models and notions of Don Ihde81 
will be attempted.  The purpose of the whole thesis is to arrive at a heuristic 
model of ontical elements of modern technology. Although a specialised 
(disciplinary) focus is not equipped to supply a totality view of ontical features 
that transcends its focus, it might still identify certain elements that might have 
been overlooked or might confirm certain elements that are proposed. It is 
self-evident that leaders in the field could contribute significantly in this 
regard82.  
 
Ihde is identified by Mitcham (1994: 97) as one of the proponents of the 
Pragmatic Phenomenology of Technology, a school of thought that adopted 
the point of view of the humanities, in contradistinction to that of engineering. 
                                            
81
 My thanks to Prof Walther Ch. Zimmerli who suggested Ihde as a worthy candidate to be 
studied. 
82
 It should be stressed that an analysis of notions and models relevant to the technical only 
will be attempted. It will serve no purpose to even attempt to evaluate his sociological-
philosophical theory as such and neither to try and evaluate its impact on the current theory 
or his standing or critique of others or by others on his theory. This study stands and falls by 
the assumption that he has ‘standing’ and his notions are worthwhile to analyse. This study is 
only interested in the ontical logic behind his notions. None of his critics attempted a 
transcendental empirical analysis of his work, meaning no contribution towards an ontical 
logic can be expected. It also transcends their theoretical framework. 
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In the preface to his Technology and Lifeworld: from garden to earth, Ihde 
indicates that his contribution is one of a trio that concentrates on the 
philosophy of technology. Here the focus is on a systematic reformulation of a 
framework and a set of questions regarding technology within culture83 (Ihde, 
1990a: ix). 
 
Don Ihde begins by distinguishing between what he calls ‘idealist’ and 
‘materialist’ attitudes towards technology. The first sees technology as applied 
science; the second sees science as theoretical technology. Siding with the 
latter approach, he sketches a phenomenology of human-technology-world 
relations. He argues for a historic-ontological primacy of technology over 
science and further uncovers a basic amplification-reduction structure to all 
technology-mediated relations84. 
 
He aims at avoiding the extremes of both utopian and dystopian 
interpretations of technology, which have intermittently dominated the field of 
technology. He focuses on two issues, namely human–technology relations 
and the cultural embeddedness of technologies. 
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 It is important to highlight that he wants to look at ‘technology in culture’, this implies a 
relationship of technology with something else, implying the existence of both are pre-
supposed.  
84
 Examples of his ideas will follow. 
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Ihde (1990a: 117) argues that humans are social beings. He believes we 
thrive only if we participate in a wide range of social and cultural activities. 
Life in a community, according to him, is our natural milieu. He states that 
those who see community life as a burden that limits freedom misunderstand 
our relation to our community and the culture it embodies. We cannot live well 
without culture - any more than an otter can thrive without swimming. He 
regards culture as essential - not mere decoration; he believes our nature as 
human beings demands that we create a culture if we do not have one and 
that we sustain it if we do.  
 
He elaborates on this view by stating that ‘culture’ can also be defined as a 
historically transmitted pattern of shared meanings embodied in symbols, 
beliefs, language, societal and ethical relations, tools and praxis – a system of 
inherited conceptions and praxis expressed in symbolic forms by means of 
which people communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge of and 
attitudes towards life. According to him, focusing on concepts only stresses the 
mentalistic while underplaying the materiality of culture and the extent to which 
culture is embedded in and sustained by everyday practice. To him, culture 
refers to ways in which we express ourselves in religion, narrative myths, 
language, sports and even body language, but it also includes characteristic 
ways in which people dress, farm, organize their society, make and use tools. 
Within this broader characterization he distinguishes various cultural forms, e.g. 
religious, political and aesthetic. ‘Culture', however primitive, would therefore 
  
 
 
 
 
125 
include all those societal and symbolic practices – artistic, religious, sporting, 
linguistic, political, labouring and child-rearing – in which people participate and 
which they recognize.  
The above description of Ihde places ‘the technical’ squarely in the cultural 
domain. He believes that we do not live in a ‘culture' per se: we live in 
communities of various sizes and degrees of complexity, from small, nomadic 
villages to enormous mega-states. These communities embody, structure and 
reflect culture, which consists primarily of a set of practices, power relations, 
institutions, habits, traditions, values and attitudes. 
At this stage, a comment needs to be made on the distinction between the 
factual (what is) and normative values (what ought to be) in the description of 
communities (society) and culture. One is tempted to link it with the Kantian 
dualism of nature (what is) and freedom (what ought to be). The question can 
be raised whether sociologists see society as factual, and culture as 
representing value, and whether this perception explains why they distinguish 
between society and culture. This can lead to a distortion of these notions in 
the sense that culture might be more than only the abstract norms and beliefs 
of society and might therefore include factual structural relations and sets of 
practices and traditions. 
Ihde continues by pointing out that living practices change. He states that 
change is not only brought about by external pressures, but is also generated 
internally as standards, approaches, ways of thinking and feeling are found 
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wanting. According to him, technology plays no small part in both external and 
internal changes. He argues that the move from realism to abstraction in art 
was hastened by the invention of the camera (which should be noted as an 
artefact) and the invention of tubes of paint (also artefacts), which allowed of 
greater spontaneity and demanded less in terms of training. He believes 
technologies (as artefacts) can also transform a practice from within. He cites 
the example of instruments that, becoming more finely calibrated, enables 
engineers to raise standards of tolerance, which, in turn, enables them to 
design and build increasingly fine and economical devices. In terms of the 
model this can be explained as artefacts that aid techno-practice and possibly 
techno-knowledge. 
 
He further argues that although the human-through-technology impact on 
today's world is clearly greater than at any time in history, it is not necessarily 
a change for the better. He states that, regardless of cultural differences, all 
ancient civilizations surrounding the Mediterranean effected  (a) deforestation, 
(b) over-grazing by sheep and goats, and (c) irreversible erosion, resulting in 
the present aridity of the Mediterranean basin (Ihde, 1990a: 119). 
 
3.1. Technology 
 
Ihde begins with a broad notion of technology as  
‘… those artifacts of material culture that we use in various ways within 
our environment …’ (Ihde, 1990a: 1) 
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Credit could be given to Ihde for the indication that the technical process 
brings forth artefacts like cameras and tubes of paint that changed art 
techniques, and that it is part of culture. Unfortunately, artefacts do not 
become technical, technological or technology because it is the result of a 
technical production process. To indicate artefacts as technology some ontic 
(factual) conditions are ignored. 
 
The issue can be summarized as follows85:  
 
Artefacts might be the result of a technical process but their inner structure, 
goal or use might not be technical. If all artefacts were technical because 
‘technological’ or ‘technical’ processes produced them, then all artefacts 
would have to be technical and no non-technical possibility would exist. This 
would raise questions about artistic, social, lingual, economic and even 
religious artefacts.86 
 
The phrase ‘artifacts of material culture that we use in various ways’ does not 
account for non-technical artefacts. Furthermore, it implies that the usage of 
                                            
85
 This was already widely discussed in the previous chapter and is just summarised here. 
86
 Remember that although an artefact can have different uses in different contexts it still 
does not lose its persistent unique structure. 
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an artefact is also only technological or technical.87 The use of a car or cell 
phone is not technological but artefactual88. A contextual fallacy arises if all 
artefacts are equated with technology. Artefacts have their own identity or 
structures that can be distinguished from the manufacturing process or the 
knowledge needed to design and produce them.89 
 
To designate all artefacts as technological is to absolutize or give undue 
preference to the technical aspect of reality. It amounts to an argument that 
does not adequately account for the ontically founded distinction between the 
technical and the non-technical, not to mention technological and non-
technological. In order to arrive at the transcendental conditions of cultural 
objects, the relation between what is technical and non-technical or the 
technological and non-technological should also be considered.  
                                            
87
 In other words, if all artefacts of a material nature are technology, then it means all 
artefacts have the same unique structure namely ‘technological’. But if all artefacts have the 
same uniqueness, namely technological, then no other types of artefacts (non-technological) 
can exist. However, we do experience different types of artefacts, such as economic 
artefacts, religious artefacts, societal artefacts, historical artefacts, etc. The (onto-)logical 
conclusion therefore is that not all (material) artefacts are technological in nature. 
88
 With artefactual is meant according to the typical structure of the artefact. Cell phones are 
communication artefacts, etc. 
89
 This fairly extensive critical reaction to the view of Ihde finds its background in the 
discussion of previous chapters. Its focus is on different types of things and the argument is 
that Ihde’s distinctions do not account for these states of affairs in a satisfactory way. In other 
words, the analysis is transcendental-empirical and not “transcendent-uncritical”.  
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If the transcendental perspective is neglected, difficulties may arise in the 
attempt to understand different societal contexts in which technical objects 
are embedded, and in distinguishing technical from non-technical artefacts90.  
 
 
Ihde holds that animal technics involves the temporary use of found objects 
(thorns, sticks, etc.), and this was no doubt the case with early man as well. 
But to man, sticks do not remain sticks; they become spears or arrows. Found 
objects are shaped and thus become technological artefacts.  
 
The comment needs to be made that spears and arrows could be technically 
manufactured and shaped, but they are not necessarily technological 
artefacts. Their inner structure or destination would be societal, since hunting 
was important in the socio-cultural context. It might also be borne in mind that 
the structure of the artefact should be empirically identified and should not be 
confused with purpose or intention of usage. That arrows and spears are 
societal in destination rather than technological does not imply that they were 
not technically formed – they are still the result of a technical forming process. 
                                            
90
 This is of course the case because Ihde did not (never had the intention to) consider the 
ontical characteristics of the technical. That this is typical of all specialised (disciplinary) 
theory is obvious and does not make his contributions to the theory invalid. In his own words 
he is interested in the interaction of technology with society and made valuable contributions 
there. 
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Ihde’s notion of these weapons as technological artefacts is therefore 
misleading. 
 
Lastly, the anthropologist, Karl J. Narr (1974: 99), distinguishes between 
animal technics and human creativity. He stresses that in the case of human 
artefacts (artificially produced implements), the shape is not predetermined. 
Unlike a stick that can be turned into an implement by the removal of 
superfluous branches and leaves, the shape of flake tools, for example is not 
pre-established by the natural shape of the stone. Furthermore, the functions 
are not predetermined either as they are not extensions or enhancements of 
the human body; implements are used, for example, for cutting - an important 
new function that does not pre-exist in the human body. 
‘Evidently they are products of real invention in the sense of 
establishing a new principle of technique and manipulation 
based on true insight into conditions and relations’. (Narr, 1974: 
99-100) 
 
The method of manufacturing is not predetermined either since the 
implements are not simply made by means of hands or teeth, but by using 
other implements like hammer stones. 
 
It seems that human technics (to use Ihde's term) and animal technics are 
clearly distinguishable on the basis of insights and creativity and even new 
principles. 
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3.2. Assumptions of experience and the life-world 
 
Ihde explains that phenomenology takes the structure of experience itself as 
one of its primary phenomena.  He further links this with a relativistic ontology 
of human existence but he stresses that it is not relativism, but rather an 
account of relations, for example an account of human–world relations, which 
determines and outlines the dimensions of human existence. He suggests 
that a metaphorical model for understanding phenomenology is precisely that 
of a ‘relativistic’ science.  
‘A simple way of stating this model is to indicate that the 
‘primitive’ of the system (the smallest or simplest unit) is itself 
a set of relations’ (Ihde, 1990a: 23).  
 
One example is the relation between an observer and the world around him. 
In a modified illustration of Einstein’s relativity theory, he describes two trains, 
A and B, with an observer positioned in train B. If train A moves backwards, 
then from the observer’s point of view three possibilities exist: 
• B is stationary and A moves backward; 
• A is stationary and B moves forward; 
• Both trains move in opposite directions. 
Ihde sees in each case ‘stability’ within the observer–observed relationship. 
 
‘The relationality of human–world relationships is claimed by 
phenomenologists to be an ontological feature of all knowledge, 
all experience. Negatively, it would be claimed that there is no 
way to “get out of” this relativistic situation…’ (Ihde,1990a: 25). 
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Ihde (1990a: 27) stresses that this process is structural in the sense that it 
undertakes to understand the structure of the relationship as it exists in the 
life-world. He believes the function of the notion of life-world is to combine the 
elements in a unified system. His life-world is perceived through his senses 
and he experiences concrete ‘bodily’ entities around him. He calls this micro 
perception. Abstraction, notions or ideas arise from this practical (pre-
scientific) perception. To him it is a cultural acquisition that can be repeated 
and, once sedimented in cultural experience, becomes taken for granted. This 
cultural or hermeneutic perception is referred to as macro perception. He 
believes both belong equally to the life–world, and both dimensions of 
perception are closely linked and intertwined.  
‘There is no micro perception (sensory–bodily) without its 
location within a field of macro perceptions and no macro 
perception without its micro perceptual foci’. (Ihde, 1990a: 29) 
 
He sees the relation between these perceptions not as derivative but as 
figure-to-ground. Micro perception occurs within its hermeneutic–cultural 
context and all such contexts are actualised within the range of micro 
perceptual possibility. 
‘The histories of perception teach us that every version of micro-
perception is already situated within and never separated from 
the human and already cultural macro perception which contains 
it’. (Ihde, 1990a: 42)  
 
He illustrates this by showing how different cultures group the stars in 
recognizable patterns (macro perception), in their limited experience (micro 
perception) of ‘their part’ of the sky.  
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Ihde assumes: 
‘a double-sided analysis of the range of human–technology relations’. 
(Ihde, 1990a: 30) 
 
The implication for Ihde (1990a: 30) is that one of the sides of the perception 
remains within the limits of micro perceptual and bodily experience whereas 
the other side must remain that of a cultural hermeneutics that orientates our 
existential life.  
 
He (Ihde, 1990a: 23) explains that the structure of experience is subjective, 
but that it has a context of constancy or ‘objectivity’ such as peer review 
(inter-subjectivity), experimental design (context constraints), and so forth. 
The same structure of experience belongs to all of the sciences. He illustrates 
this with an example from physics where the ‘behaviour’ of atoms and their 
constituents is not directly observable, but must be made available through a 
technologically mediated (instrumental) observation situation. 
‘The bubble chamber, accelerators, electron– and computer-
enhanced microscopes, all bring into mediated or indirect 
presence the micro-phenomena which are of interest to the 
physicist’. (Ihde, 1990a: 23) 
 
As indicated above, Ihde assumes a ‘relativistic’ ontology where the ‘smallest’ 
unit itself is a relationship. Its ontological nature could probably be better 
expressed by the term ‘relational’. An interesting point arises: if the ‘smallest’ 
unit itself is a relationship, it presupposes at least two ‘elements’ ‘related to’ 
each other which could themselves not be in a relationship if they are already 
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part of the ‘smallest’ unit-as-relationship. This implies that the smallest ‘unit’ 
cannot be a relationship. 
 
He does not elaborate on this ontology91 and does not realise that another 
principle involved is the principle of orderedness, implying order for and 
orderliness of, which is required by ontology to make experience and 
knowledge possible.92 
 
Ihde (1990a: 31) then proceeds to the anthropological framework where he 
concentrates on human experience. He states that experience is relational. 
He actually expands the basic principle of meaning in context by indicating a 
micro perception situated in a cultural macro perception, and applies it to 
human experience of technology. Ihde highlights a double-sided analysis of 
the range of human–technology relations where one side is within the limits of 
                                            
91
 I think this is significant. For a disciplinary focus, a lot of ontology is assumed or borrowed 
and it is not the task of such a focus to go and ‘re-invent the wheel’. It would be a pity if the 
idea were created that because this project is only interested in ontical (factual) elements in a 
totality, it therefore does not bother to engage with disciplinary theorists. The engagement will 
obviously be limited to identifying and distinguishing ontical elements. The elements were 
either observed and incorporated or missed and left out. No evaluation of the disciplinary 
theory as such (meaning not only the assumptions but as disciplinary theory within the 
discipline itself, as opposed to other theories in the discipline) could possibly be attempted. It 
is outside the focus of this thesis. 
92
 This was discussed in chapter one where the orderliness of reality was indicated as a 
transcendental condition. 
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micro perceptual and bodily experience, while the other side must remain that 
of a cultural hermeneutics that situates our existential life. 
 
From this framework he indicates the possibilities of technologically mediated 
observation of human experience. Because he reduces technology to 
artefacts93, one could refer to artefactually mediated experience.  
 
What is of interest in the above is Ihde’s interpretation of ‘meaning in context’ 
where he realises that perception (micro perception, that is,) is always 
situated within a bigger framework (macro perception) or paradigm. He then 
uses this framework to indicate how artefacts interact and change paradigms. 
Although he realises that there are transcendental conditions for perception, 
he does not indicate that there might also be transcendental conditions for 
technology94.  
 
Ihde elaborates on technology’s role in artificial perception: 
 
                                            
93
 Remember his own definition was technology is all artefacts of material culture. 
94
 As stated before, this technically transcends the disciplinary focus of the interaction 
between technology and society. 
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3.2.1. Artificial perception through technology 
 
He (Ihde, 1990a: 42) argues that if there is no simple seeing, but only situated 
seeing – that is, both seeing as (macro perception, relating to a framework) 
and a seeing from (micro perception, relating to the body) – then a structure 
of perception is implied.  
 
Ihde (1990a: 43) argues further that although we perceive the sky from a 
distance, we can also take a closer look by using a telescope or other 
instruments. This technologically embodied perception distinguishes the 
modern person from the ancients who did not have these instruments. 
‘Not only have our perceptions changed – those embodied 
through instrumentation are incommensurate with naked 
observation in however small degrees – but so also have our 
praxes’. (Ihde, 1990a: 44) 
 
To him this implies that when Galileo looked through his telescope, a 
paradigm shift was possible. Micro perception and macro perception shifted 
through the involvement of technology (or more correctly an artefact). Artificial 
revelation enabled a newly technologically (or artefactually) embodied 
science that stood in contrast to and far beyond the reaches of ancient Greek 
science. As far as he is concerned, perceptual instrumentation places the 
observer in ever new relations to the universe at micro and macro levels: first 
though the use of the telescope, then through the use of the radio telescope. 
‘To cement the point inversely, take all instrumentation away 
from the scientific community and then ask what it would and 
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could do. Its limits would very quickly reduce to precisely those 
admirable, but at best speculative notions of our Greek 
forefathers’. (Ihde, 1990a: 57) 
 
It must be pointed out that scientific techniques and techno-practice are not 
the same and to equate ‘scientific instrumentation’ with ‘technology’ is a 
contextual fallacy95 as argued in the previous chapter.  
 
Ihde (1990a: 59) also mentions the example of a clock. Once developed, it 
transformed the perception of time because time measurement became 
possible. To him the clock was the ‘key-machine’ of the modern industrial 
age. He reminds us that it was an automatic machine, measuring the motion 
of heavenly bodies; even nature was read as though it were a clock. 
 
Spatial perception is also technologically (or rather, artefactually) mediated. 
Hermeneutic maps and instruments are used to mediate perceptions. The 
magnetic north pole and the compass replaced the North Star, and today the 
modern satellite-based GPS systems replace the older systems. 
 
From the above it is clear that Ihde views ‘technology’ as the instrument that 
makes paradigm shifts possible: it shifts micro and macro perceptions, it 
supports or even enables science and scientific discoveries, and it changes 
                                            
95
 Again here it might seem an insensitive or unfair conclusion but unfortunately cannot be 
ignored BUT it should be remembered that this technically falls outside the focus of a 
disciplinary perspective. 
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the perceptions of time and space of our life-world. Without it we would not be 
able to experience and know and develop more than the ancients. In that 
sense it is a tool for development and perception. The technical, however, 
might be ‘more’ than the mere ‘artefacts’ that Ihde highlights. 
 
3.2.2. Contextual Complexity 
 
Ihde (1990a: 68) also points out that not only do we perceive with 
technological objects, we also perceive different uses for objects. He 
illustrates this statement with an example of a symmetrically shaped, oval 
stone, which can be viewed as an object of art, a paperweight or an 
Archeulean hand axe from a Stone Age toolkit. Because, phenomenologically 
speaking, there is no ‘thing-in-itself’, only things in context, it must be borne in 
mind that contexts are multiple. Ihde concludes that the object is or could be 
any of the things named, or its identity could be determined by how it is used. 
He regards this as an ambiguity that is part of technologies. The ambiguity of 
the Acheulean object is the ambiguity of technology in general. 
 
Don Ihde states that our actions are embedded in the multiple ways we 
interact with and presuppose our technologies, yet the human–technology 
juncture displays a puzzling ambiguity:  
‘A technological object, whatever else it is, becomes what it ‘is’ 
through its uses. This is not to say that the technical properties 
of objects are irrelevant, but it is to say that such properties in 
use become part of the human–technology relativity’ 
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(Ihde,1990a: 70). 
 
Even technical properties are significant in the context of use. Stone, once 
shaped, enters praxis. Thus what is ‘natural’ in the stone becomes artefactual 
within the relation. 
 
With this statement Ihde reveals the origin of a possible contextual fallacy96. 
On the one hand he acknowledges the technical properties of objects, which 
are obviously consistent within a structure (from a transcendental point of 
view) and which he indicates as relevant; but then he moves to the 
anthropological framework and makes this subject to the relativity of that 
framework, which he calls the human-technology relativity.  
 
To make it practical: while the structure of reality is consistent, our insight into 
reality is obviously subject to various conditions like our intelligence, 
experience, paradigms and various other factors. Fortunately, our variable 
insight into reality still does not make the consistent structure of reality 
inconsistent and cannot negate this consistent structure. When one places an 
artefact within a framework and attaches some meaning to it, it still implies 
                                            
96
 As explained that no specialised (disciplinary) context can obtain a totality (overview) view 
of the ontical characteristics of the technical unless it departs from the disciplinary 
perspective and moves towards an ontical totality perspective. True to a limited disciplinary 
perspective he tries to solve the problem within his disciplinary context, namely the human-
technology framework. 
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that one attached only a limited view of the object within a limited context; the 
nature of the artefact in its totality might transcend the focus of the framework 
of this context.97 
 
Furthermore, the structure of the artefact itself also limits usage, which makes 
the statement that it ‘becomes what it is through its usage’ valid in only a very 
limited context98, with the result that contextual transgressions could easily 
arise. The following example may serve to illustrate this statement: a pen is 
primarily used as a lingual object or writing instrument. If one person uses a 
pen as a weapon to defend herself against a pickpocket in one specific 
instance, it does not follow that soldiers should be issued with pens instead of 
rifles. The structure of the pen severely limits its use as a weapon. This 
implies that the (typical) structure of an artefact determines its use - its use 
does not determine its structure or identity. Overlooking this implication will 
result in contextual fallacies99.   
                                            
97
 This point seems difficult to swallow for all disciplinary orientated readers. They somehow 
believe that they do possess a totality view; they confuse it with the idea that their view is 
theoretical and therefore just as legitimate as any other theoretical view. Although a totality 
view is theoretical, not all theoretical views are totality views. 
98
 This must be stressed. It is valid up to a point. Granted for the purposes of a disciplinary 
approach possibly close enough. The purpose of this thesis is to go beyond a disciplinary 
view to a totality view. 
99
 Although Ihde does not go as far as the example given the position had to be stated. A way 
of interpreting his view is that he is saying that objects (such as pens) have no meaning or 
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The problem could be clarified by referring to the consistent structure of reality 
where every entity has a typical structure. It is important to realize that 
although such entities have a consistent structure, they could be used for 
different purposes without the purpose influencing the structure. A book is 
meant to be read. Its structure is that of a lingual object. However, books can 
be sold, which implies that not their qualifying lingual function but their 
economic object function is actualised. In a sense this is not a typical function 
of books. Other examples of a-typical functions would be the use of books as 
doorstops or paperweights. The point is that in all these cases the structure 
does not change: it is still a book that is sold, a book that is used as a 
doorstop and a book that is used as a paperweight.  
 
Ihde overlooks the various relationships in which an artefact could reveal 
meaning100, just as he misses the different subject-object relations that are 
                                                                                                                            
function (and even identity) unless we use them. Strictly speaking that is not true either, even 
if I do not use a pen, it stays a pen. Even if I use it as a weapon it stays a pen. The structure 
of the pen determines that. All the other meanings in all the different contexts still do not 
change its pen-structure.  
100
 Remember that Ihde never used the terms ‘meaning in contexts’; it is an insight of the 
philosophy of the cosmonomic idea, a constant structure and different meanings in different 
contexts. Ihde used the terms ‘becoming what it is by its uses’ not indicating a constant 
structure but indicating a ‘changeability’. Granted for his disciplinary approach it was sufficient 
to indicate that artefacts ‘changes’ (identity?) in different contexts. 
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possible. He does identify some relationships of artefacts, but only in terms of 
cultural contexts. Although the structure of an artefact limits its usage, there 
are still relational contexts for usage. Ihde identifies these as different cultural 
contexts. 
 
3.2.3. Cultural context of artefacts 
 
Ihde (1990a: 138,140,141) states that there are no universal technologies. 
Instead, he argues that technologies bear the scars of conflicts, compromises 
and social solutions reached by the particular society in which they have been 
developed. 
 
He explains that latecomers to the development process have perceived the 
particular technology that originated in Europe as universal and a-historical. 
He stresses that this is not the case, and that one consequence of the 
absorption of technologies by a developing country will be cultural 
dependence and a form of cultural colonialism. He concludes that, by 
indiscriminately absorbing a technology from another culture, a developing 
nation is often burdened with the social and power relations that are 
inextricably bound up with it. 
 
He states that one might as well speak of social transplants, for transferring a 
technology from one society to another resembles organ transplantation. 
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There is the immediate ‘post-transfer' phase when attention is lavished on it in 
an attempt to make sure that it ‘takes'. Results vary from the beneficial to the 
comic and catastrophic (Ihde, 1990a: 140, 141). 
 
The problem is that artefacts could be transplanted but not necessarily the 
technical infrastructure to produce these artefacts. Is it then technology 
transfer or just artefactual transfer? Here one sees the cultural/societal 
change brought about by artefacts and not technology per se. The essential 
ambiguity of human-artefactual relations has been revealed, and along with it, 
the phenomenon of variant cultural embeddings.  
 
At the complex level of a cultural hermeneutics, Ihde believes that 
technologies may be embedded in various ways, since the same technology 
in another cultural context becomes a quite different technology. Ihde (1990a: 
144) refers to the nature of this technology-cultural structure with the term 
multi-stability. 
 
In the relationship with humans and humans-in-culture, artefacts transform 
experience and its variations. Indicating that an artefact could have different 
uses in different cultural milieus concurs with the epistemological principle of 
‘meaning in context’ or, according to Ihde, micro and macro perception or 
experience. This holds true for all artefacts, not only so-called technological 
artefacts (or technology). 
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Secondly, no unique description of what technology or technological artefacts 
are in distinction to non-technological artefacts has been given yet101. As a 
result, it is proposed that this explains why Ihde confuses technologies with 
artefacts. 
 
3.3. Transfer or transplant 
 
Ihde (1990a: 126) states that, just as there is no such thing as an equipment, 
there is no equipment separate from the culturally constituted values and 
processes of a specific society. He stresses that in addition to an object tying 
in with a new set of cross-cultural exchanges, the context of the previously 
familiar object changes value and position. 
 
Ihde (1990a: 127) finds that the adaptation of a transferred technology – 
initially, at least − depends upon its being able to fit into an existent praxis. 
Realizing that this ‘fit’ also depends on the structural limitations of the artefact 
could refine this statement. Nevertheless, Ihde states that, even when it is 
                                            
101
 The difference ought to be indicated in some kind of ontology. If no distinction is indicated, 
it indicates that the problem of the difference or similarity between the two is not solved. 
Again this falls outside the focus of any particular (special science) discipline, and should be 
solved by ontology. As this thesis is at this stage focussing on ontic characteristics, a 
possible solution will be given in the last chapter where a possible ontological explanation will 
be proposed. 
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adapted, the context of meanings may differ radically relative to the 
sedimented type of praxis in the recipient culture. One need not go into the 
more exotic cultural examples to take note of this phenomenon. 
 
His (1990a: 127) example of the Indian prayer wheels used as windmills in 
the West is also an example of two different cultural embeddings. He reminds 
us that in the West, where nature was already regarded as a resource, wind 
power was adapted for a variety of power uses such as pumping water, 
grinding grain and sawing lumber. Interestingly enough the windmill was also 
invented in the Islamic countries Iran and Afghanistan but in spite of the 
obvious need of power for irrigation, these windmills were never used in other 
Islamic countries and so did not become what they were in Europe. 
 
Ihde (1990a: 128) explains that a double context exists. First, he argues, 
there is the involvement of the artefact in its immediate use-context. It ‘is’ 
what it ‘is’ in relation to that context. In so far as such contexts, particularly at 
the simplest levels, may be widespread in cultures, a transfer is a relatively 
simple matter (hawks’ bells used as baubles). In each case two things 
determine the identity of the transferred artefact: 
• the kind of transfer 
 
• the overlap of cultures.  
 
The overlap may be minimal. But, he continues, there is also the juxtaposition 
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of larger cultural contexts, which may not overlap at all. In this case the 
artefact is what it is in relation to this cultural field. He concludes that there is 
therefore a sense in which the windmill as windmill was not transferred. He 
argues that the mere technical aspects of the prayer wheel do not constitute a 
windmill until reconstituted within the new cultural context. The following 
contrasts have been noted in studies of artefacts developed in China but not 
in Europe: using gunpowder and fireworks in celebrations is very different 
from using the same materials in siege and warfare. 
 
Ihde (1990a: 128) indicates that the temptation may be strong here to jump to 
a ‘context less’ conclusion that the technology as such is neutral but takes on 
its significance dependent upon different ‘uses.’ But he regards such a 
conclusion as a kind of disembodied abstraction.  
 
Ihde (1990a: 129) argues that in historical explorations the objects that could 
easily be transferred could be steel knives and axes, together with hawks’ 
bells, beads, mirrors and the like, but in today's neo-colonialism these are 
more likely to be wristwatches, radios, televisions, calculators and computers. 
The characteristics of transfers from both eras are similar. Radios and 
watches have particularly fascinating features. The watch, even in a 
community that does not practice strict timekeeping, becomes a coveted 
fashion accessory. The fashion praxis into which a watch fits is virtually 
universal; the radio even more so. It can transmit sounds already familiar to 
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the recipient. 
 
The new artefacts, though complex infrastructures of high-technology culture 
are involved in their production, do not at this level transcend the simple use-
object transfer of praxis. There can therefore be a flow of artefacts and 
techno-facts that do not massively transform the cultures. Could this be 
indicated as artefactual transfer in distinction to technology transfer that 
transfers the technical production and maintenance processes as well? Ihde 
does not distinguish between ‘artefactual’ and ‘technological’ transfer; his 
examples all indicate artefactual transfer.  
 
3.3.1. Cultural Resistance 
 
Ihde points out that the present march of high-technology culture across the 
globe is a fact about which both proponents and critics would agree. One 
result of this march is the decreasing ability of traditional (primitive or 
relatively undifferentiated) cultures to withstand radical change or possible 
cultural extinction. These cultures are the most vulnerable to the impact of 
technologization. 
 
What Ihde (1990a: 151) is suggesting is a crude categorization of cultural 
response to technologies carried by foreign sources to indigenous groups:  
• There are what he calls ‘monocultures’ of a more primitive or traditional 
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type which are normally dominated by the culture of the incoming 
group;  
• Secondly, he identifies so-called middle or compromised adaptations in 
which selected technofacts are accepted into the indigenous culture or 
either adapted into a new cultural context 
• Thirdly he mentions cultures that can successfully resist most of the 
elements of the incoming culture 
• Finally there are cultures that adopt and modify themselves, from the 
incoming group. 
 
Ihde (1990a: 153) supplies examples of monocultures, which include the 
inland Aborigines of Australia, the Inuit and the Tasaday, to which could be 
added any number of the disappearing groups of South American tribes of 
Brazil or Peru. He states that monocultures are marked by a relatively high 
degree of cultural isolation that protects their cultural integrity.  
 
Ihde believes (1990a: 155) that technology has allowed contemporary man to 
‘inherit’ the entire earth. To him the ‘ontic’ conditions (that makes it possible) 
for monocultural existence have been breached. These conditions of a 
monoculture are like that of the habitat of a specialized species. If the habitat 
is destroyed, the condition making it possible is removed and it either dies or 
adapts. 
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In the current context, Ihde (1990a: 151) is suggesting that only equal 
cultures with the sense of self-confidence are likely to be able either to reject 
or to adopt what is met within a cross-cultural exchange of the sort that 
occurred during the historical voyages of discovery. 
 
Ihde (1990a: 154) reasons that contemporary communications technologies 
(artefacts) are as powerful as they are because of the multiple sets of 
dimensions they embody. He cites the example of mini-cassettes used during 
the Iranian Revolution. Although the Shah's government was relatively 
successful in controlling the media,  propaganda  was communicated through 
the distribution of the small, easily concealed tapes for cassette players. 
 
This, according to Ihde, is an example of the essential pluricultural pattern 
made possible by that contemporary technology. He argues, however, that it 
is an inclination, not a determination of technology, as the degrees of 
resistance against a pluricultural result continue to illustrate. He realizes that 
a pluricultural pattern is not neutral either.  
 
He stresses that today's array of desktop publishing technologies, cassette 
recorders and the video camera provides an opportunity for decentralized 
minority expression. A claim of police brutality - almost always difficult to 
prove and usually dismissed by review boards - was given a new angle by 
using a video camera during a dispute in New York City.  
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The results were so dramatic that the police commissioner 
acted promptly to dismiss and rearrange high-ranking persons 
in the chain of command. (Ihde,1990a: 156,7) 
 
Similarly, he points out that television is changing the role and position of 
referees in sport for example, because decisions can be reversed or 
confirmed. 
 
Here again Ihde does not distinguish between artefacts and ‘technology’. 
What he claims is in fact true for artefactual transfer, which does not 
necessarily imply technological transfer per se. Even in the clock as an 
example of selective adaption he does not realize that what he indicates as 
technological adaptation is essentially artefactual adaptation. He refers to the 
clock as an artefact that is differently used or adopted by various societies. 
 
Ihde (1990a: 129) argues that ancient Chinese civilization was amazingly 
sophisticated and, like most ancient civilizations, had a highly developed 
knowledge of astronomy or heavenly phenomena. As in many other ancient 
civilizations, an observation of the heavens revealed much more than 
mechanical ‘movements’ of stars and planets. A near universal for ancient 
astronomy is some version of astrology in which the positions of stars and 
planets is (hermeneutically) thought of as related to existential processes. 
Chinese astronomy was accurate enough to make the oldest-known 
prediction of an eclipse, recorded in 1361 B.C. The hermeneutic instrument 
that records and reflects these movements is the calendar; and, as we shall 
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see, it is an accurate calendar, which in turn relates to the first Chinese clock. 
 
That clock, invented by the Imperial Astrologer Su Sung some time shortly 
after 1077 was not for telling hours but for creating an astrological calendar: 
the Emperor had to know the movements and positions of the constellations - 
in precisely the way Su Sung's Heavenly Clockwork made possible. In China 
the ages of individuals and their astrological destinies were calculated not 
from the hour of birth but from the hour of conception. 
 
To Ihde (1990a: 130) the clock ‘is’ what it is in relation to its embedded 
cultural matrix, which, in China, until modern times, remained very different 
from that of the West. A brief glimpse at some of those contrasting values 
may be instructive:  
• Official centralization in the office of the Emperor kept all calendars the 
property of the imperial house.  
• Emperors were kept hidden from the public and, while powerful as 
decree givers, isolated from public life.  
• Calendar-keeping was related to the astrological features important to 
social predictions. So long as the clock was kept particularly focused 
within the imperial confines, it too was isolated. 
 
Ihde (1990a: 131) stresses that each of these factors stands in direct contrast 
to the Latin Western introduction of a clock that was public, kept time, and 
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was socially adapted. He stressed that it should be noted that as a 
hermeneutic device, a clock clearly has a multidimensional set of possibilities, 
which, in turn, may fit easily into a number of cultural, multi-stable structures. 
In that respect, Ihde believes, the clock is an example of the essential, 
although non-neutral, ambiguity of technology.  
 
To correct the contextual limits one should rather postulate that the clock is 
an artefact (the result of techno-practice but itself not technological) that has a 
multidimensional set of possibilities in the human-artefact relativity. The 
human-artefact relationship is but one dimension of artefacts and the totality 
of artefacts as artefacts cannot be limited to this one dimension, nor can it be 
uniquely defined by this one-dimensional representation of ‘technology’.  
 
A transcendental description of the structure of artefacts can only be made in 
a wider ontic context and not in the limited anthropological-interaction-with-
artefacts framework that Ihde uses. The various possibilities of clockness or, 
as Ihde’s puts it, is what it is in various cultures is also limited by its structural 
restrictions, which implies that it cannot become anything other than some 
sort of clock, although it might have different impacts on different cultures.  
 
Without the benefit of the wider ontic framework, Ihde attempts to structure 
technology only within the human-artefact relativity. The result can only be a 
limited description that does not indicate any uniqueness and does not take 
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the consistent structural characteristics into account. This is the result of the 
limitations of the framework because any transcendental issues would 
transcend the focus of the human-artefact relational framework that assumes 
both humans and artefacts as essential presuppositions of the interactive 
framework.  
 
3.4. Ihde’s attempt to structure technology 
 
In opposition to what he calls an objectivist account that would attempt to 
describe or define technologies by the characteristics of objects that involve 
some combination of physical and material properties, he wants to discover 
the various structural features of the ambiguous human– technology relations. 
His purpose is to reduce the open ambiguity to a structural analysis that acts 
across and accounts for the range of possibilities that occur within the 
essential ambiguity of technology.102  
 
It needs to be noted that an ambiguity does indeed exist in human-artefacts 
relations. However, it does not follow that it is valid for technology only 
because not all artefacts are technological. Furthermore, the analysis of the 
ambiguous human-technology relations will only supply one dimension of 
                                            
102
 What is remarkable is that he realises that artefacts have more than just physical and 
material properties, and then searches for an answer in a relationship between humans and 
artefacts, instead of analysing the structure of artefacts as enkaptical totalities and latent 
normative object functions. 
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technology (or rather artefacts) and will neither give an overall view of 
technology in all its consistent structural dimensions nor reveal its unique 
characteristics.  
 
From this follows that within his own chosen framework Ihde would not be 
able to pose truly transcendental questions regarding technology, since within 
his framework notions of technology and humans are already presupposed. It 
seems to be difficult to answer questions like what technology or its intrinsic 
meaning is within this framework.103 That is also the reason why he cannot 
differentiate between artefacts and technology. In every instance where he is 
quoted, the term ‘technology’ could be replaced by the term ‘artefact’.  
 
Within this limited framework of human interaction with artefacts he discusses 
three programmes of analysis. The first programme is called Phenomenology 
of Technics, in which he concentrates on the micro perception of humans with 
technology. In his second programme, called Cultural Hermeneutics, he 
concentrates on the macro perception or cultural context of technology, and in 
the third programme, called Life-World Shapes, he tries to describe the wide 
overall life-world influence of technology.  
                                            
103
 Note that the phrase “intrinsic meaning” does not refer to the ‘meaning’ of a word, but to 
ontic states of affairs, to their intrinsic structural traits. Disciplines with a limited scope (the 
special sciences) do not always explicitly put forward an articulated total view of reality. For 
that reason the ‘meta-theoretical’ level of our analysis restricted itself to a “pre-disciplinary” 
underlying perspective. 
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3.4.1. A phenomenology of technics 
 
In this programme Ihde concentrates on micro perception, where I-as-body 
interacts with the environment by means of technologies.  
‘To embody one’s praxis through technologies is ultimately 
an existential relation with the world’ (Ihde, 1990a: 72). 
 
He identifies and argues for various sets of existential relations. The first is 
called embodiment relations between the ‘I’ and the ‘world’; examples are 
seeing by means of spectacles or hearing by means of a hearing aid. As with 
Galileo, observing the moon through his telescope, the ‘technology’ is in a 
mediating position. This pre-supposes a relative transparency, a technical fit 
and it’s being appropriate for the proposed use: 
‘Embodiment relations display an essential magnification / 
reduction structure which has been suggested in the 
instrumentation examples. Embodiment relations simul-
taneously magnify or amplify and reduce or place aside what 
is experienced through them’ (Ihde, 1990a: 76).  
 
A second existential human–technology relation is called hermeneutic.  In a 
sense it is associated with the macro perspective of cultural interpretation or 
enframement. He relates it to interpretation or reading. Writing transformed 
the perception and understanding we have of language. To him, writing is a 
technologically embedded form of language, instead of a technically formed 
(objectified) lingual object. 
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‘In the case of the printed text, however, the referential 
transparency is distinctively different from technologically 
embodied perceptions. Textual transparency is hermeneutic 
transparency, not perceptual transparency’ (Ihde, 1990a: 
82).  
 
Another example is the ‘interpretation’ or  ‘reading’ of the dial of an instrument 
in a nuclear power station where the heat cannot be personally checked. The 
dial reading must then be ‘interpreted’. 
 
Alterity relations are relations to a technology where technological ‘otherness’ 
is a ‘quasi-otherness’, stronger than mere ‘object’ but weaker than the 
‘otherness’ found within the animal kingdom or in other humans. As an 
example Ihde uses a spinning top. Once the top has been set to spin, it 
imparts of the embodiment relation between human and artefact.  What 
makes it fascinating is this property of quasi-animation, a life of its own.  More 
modern examples are video games and computer games where one 
‘competes’ against an interactive machine as ‘quasi-other’. 
 
Another relationship identified is called background relations. Here attention 
shifts from ‘technologies’ in the foreground to ‘technologies’ in the 
background. Technologies designed to be in the background are automatic 
and semi-automatic machines; for example, a heating/cooling system that is 
automatically controlled with a thermostat, or a semi-automatic toaster that 
remains in the background while functioning.  
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‘Background technologies, no less than focal ones, transform 
the gestalts of human experience and, precisely because they 
are absent presences, may exert more subtle indirect effects 
upon the way a world is experienced’ (Ihde, 1990a: 112). 
 
Horizon or boundary issues are highlighted as borderline examples. When a 
tooth is crowned, one may initially experience the strangeness of something 
added, but after a time the tooth becomes almost totally embodied. Other 
examples are implants like hip joints of stainless steel and Teflon which elicit 
only a fringe awareness. Even more extreme examples, like the birth-control 
pill, arise from chemical transformations. Ihde calls them edible technologies.  
‘The pill, once taken, functioned as a kind of internal 
background relation of the most extreme fringe type’ (Ihde, 
1990a: 113). 
 
Although Ihde systematically identifies various relationships a human has on 
the micro-perceptual level, namely embodiments, hermeneutic, alterity, 
background relations and boundary relations, this only highlights the various 
interactions between humans and artefacts and obviously104 does not help to 
answer the transcendental question of technology as such. He has, however, 
made a contribution to an understanding of how humans experience artefacts 
on the micro-perceptual level. The indeterminate nature of human experience 
and freedom of choice is well accounted for and will contribute to this specific 
aspect of the final model. From an ontical perspective, which transcends the 
specific disciplinary perspective that he uses, Ihde unfortunately still 
(mis)uses the term ‘technological’ instead of referring to what is ‘artefactual’. 
                                            
104
 This is because it transcends his specific focus as argued before. 
  
 
 
 
 
158 
 
In his next programme he more clearly transgresses contexts105 by 
anticipating transcendental issues regarding ontic conditions within an 
anthropological context. 
 
3.4.2. Cultural Hermeneutics 
 
This is Ihde’s second programme in his attempt to ‘structure’ technology. 
Again his approach is not transcendentally orientated or geared to ontic 
conditions; he still operates within an anthropological perspective and is, 
more specifically, concerned with humanity’s interaction with technology. This 
has a bearing on the ways in which cultures embed technologies. Ihde’s aim 
is to suggest a framework of interpretation that can provide a perspective on 
some contemporary questions concerning ‘technological’ culture. 
 
Technologies as instruments of culture in technology transfer are investigated 
first. Ihde found that the acceptance of a transferred technology depends on 
its ability to fit into a praxis. When the technology is adopted, its context may 
change radically in the new culture. A double set of contextual involvements 
is at stake. 
 
                                            
105
 Obviously from an ontical perspective. 
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Firstly, he identifies the involvement of the artefact in its use-context. It is 
what it is in that specific context106. If these contexts overlap with those of 
other cultures, a transfer is a simple matter – for example, a steel axe or knife 
easily replaces a stone axe or knife. 
 
Secondly, when the larger cultural contexts do not overlap but remain in 
juxtaposition, the adopted technology is recontextualized,  
 
Ihde warns: 
‘The temptation may be strong here to leap to a context less 
conclusion that the “technology” as such is “neutral” but 
takes on its significance dependent upon different ‘uses’. But 
such a conclusion remains at most a kind of disembodied 
abstraction. The technology is only what it is in some use-
context’ (Ihde, 1990a: 128).  
 
It is therefore possible that easily transferable objects, like watches and 
radios, while implying complex infrastructure, do not massively transform 
cultures. Cultural interface occurs between instrument involvement and 
cultural values and their related complexes.  
‘It may make little immediate difference if a wrist watch is worn 
as a fashion object, but if it successfully carries in its wake the 
transformation of a whole society into a clock-watching society 
with its attendant social time, then a large issue is involved’ 
(Ihde, 1990a: 129). 
 
 
                                            
106
 As already indicated many times, it was argued that the structure determines that 
something ‘is what it is’ and the context just reveals certain additional meaning possibilities. 
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Ihde identified varieties of technological experiences.  He categorizes cultural 
responses to technologies carried to indigenous groups as follows: 
 Monocultures are overwhelmed by new technologies; 
 compromise adoption with the technologies used in new cultural 
contexts; 
 rare instances of successful resistance; 
 adoption through approximation of the new cultural shape. 
 
It is clear that at the complex level of cultural hermeneutics, technologies may 
be differently embedded; the ‘same’ technology in another cultural context 
becomes a ‘different’ technology.  In opposition to a bi-stability of paradigm or 
gestalt switch, Ihde prefers the term multi-stability, indicating an essential 
pluricultural pattern made possible by that contemporary technology.  Ihde 
stresses that it is an inclination and not a determination of technology. 
 
Here again the fact that ‘artefacts’ play different ‘cultural’ roles in different 
cultures has been exposed and placed in a system or structure. Whether the 
transfer of an artefact like a steel axe to replace stone axes can be viewed as 
technology transfer is questionable. Only the artefact is transferred, not the 
techno-practice to make or produce these axes. As it has also already been 
argued that artefacts are not the same as technologies, the whole idea of 
technology transfer must be questioned. 
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Furthermore, the argument that technology ‘only becomes what it is through 
use’ loses sight of what is ontically given107. A transcendental method is 
required to account for the ontic conditions and the ontic principles (therefore 
it is once again a contextual fallacy). The fact that an artefact could be used in 
a typical or an a-typical way does not invalidate any ontic conditions. An 
analysis of the ontic character of technology is required. To put it differently, 
even if technology as such (and not only artefacts) were utilised in different 
ways by different cultures, it would still not imply that it is not technology or 
that technology is only one-dimensional. All it implies is that humanity with its 
freedom of choice put a positive construction on the fact that technology can 
vary in different contexts, which are determined108 by ontic conditions. 
 
Ihde’s non-transcendental approach and non-ontological framework obviously 
do not allow him to obtain a clear transcendental and ontological totality view 
on the technical as demonstrated in his understanding of ‘technology’ as 
having no constant structure, that indicates an ontical persistency109.  
                                            
107
 This is of course because it transcends his frame of focus, but also allows for 
improvement. 
108
  This thesis argues that the ontic conditions identified in the evaluative framework from 
theory and by factual observation obviously determines our understanding or insight into 
these conditions. One of these insights is that artefacts have a constant structure that 
determines their ontic character, although additional meanings (object functions) in different 
contexts are possible. 
109
 This was extensively argued before. 
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In terms of transcendental considerations110, meaning can only be ascribed to 
reality. This implies that if something is real, it has to have meaning – or 
essence, which is not to be confused with substance. If it does not have 
meaning (or essence, in a certain sense), it is not real. If Ihde concludes that 
technology does not have essence or meaning, it therefore implies, from a 
transcendental perspective, that technology does not ‘exist’ (or is not real), 
which implies that his whole explanation of the relationship between humanity 
and artefacts (or technology, as he uses the term) refers to a relationship 
between humans and something that does not exist111.  
 
3.4.3. Life world shapes 
 
Here Ihde tries to analyse ‘life world’ technologies or, more correctly, 
artefacts, that shape or influence our life world. The task Ihde sets himself is 
distinctly contemporary. He intends to read the life world primarily in terms of 
important and new ‘image-technologies’ or image-artefacts. This includes 
television, cameras, photography and computers. He again tries to avoid both 
utopian and dystopian interpretations of technology. 
 
                                            
110
 In line with the assumptions indicated in the beginning of an orderly reality that reveals 
meaning through relationships, or structure or aspects. 
111
 This is in a sense transcendent critique and only valid from outside Ihde’s point of view. It 
is of course a result of transcendental considerations as well. 
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He refers to the first curvature of the contemporary life world as 
pluriculturality.  
 ‘It is a life form arising out of the use of image-technologies 
catching up to cultures’ (Ihde, 1990a: 164).  
 
He states that it is a distinctly post-modern form of multiculturality. He argues 
that contemporary television is not neutral. It creates something of an own 
subculture. Engaging with another culture is not a one-way relation, but an 
interrelation. Image-technologies are communicative and communications are 
always implicitly bi-directional. It is part of their essential ambiguity, their 
unique form of non-neutrality. The array of image-technologies that have 
transformed cultural perception are producing the same effects as those 
technologies that earlier expanded the cosmos and the micro world. 
‘Pluriculturality is in fact a proliferation of ways of seeing’ 
(Ihde, 1990a: 174). 
 
The second and related curvature of the ‘high-technology’ life world is the 
increasing importance of decisions. Digits leave out the durational flow of 
motion and replace it with digital ‘jumps’ in a digital watch, implying inferences 
or mini-decisions. 
‘Part of the institutionalisation of calculative reasoning comes 
in the elevation of the varieties of utilitarianism employed in 
most forms of risk or evaluative assessment practices’ (Ihde, 
1990a: 178).  
 
He feels that technology assessment is dominated by such versions of 
(quantitatively oriented) utilitarian ethical methods. Technology also ‘allows’ 
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decisions to be made concerning life and death - a decision can be made not 
to use birth control technology, and not to accept life-sustaining technology, 
especially in terminal cases. 
 
Oscillatory phenomena are another curvature of the contemporary life world. 
These are related to the omnipresence of image-technologies and are the 
mass responses that exaggerate reactions and aggrandize actors in society. 
Some examples are:  
• the student uprising in 1968;   
• higher education inundated with students striving to be investigative 
reporters after Watergate, and  
• the recent flood of MBAs. 
 
Ihde also points out that technological catastrophe also carries with it an 
oscillatory response. Chernobyl, Three Mile Island and Challenger led to 
immediate and strong public response that had political implications for the 
technologies involved.  
‘They are illustrations of the greater powers of contemporary 
(as compared to any pre-modern) technologies’ (Ihde, 1990a: 
189). 
 
To conclude, Ihde highlights the fact that contemporary ‘technology’ or 
artefacts have greater powers than older artefacts. Especially newer image 
artefacts have been able to provoke stronger reaction from societies than 
ever before. He places artefacts and the possibilities that these artefacts 
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create squarely within post-modern pluriculturality. He also highlights the fact 
that artefacts are non-neutral.  
 
This fits in with the sociological theory of a ‘knowledge society’ in which 
‘science and technology’ as knowledge producing activities have significantly 
increased the capacity of society to act (Stehr, 1994: 105) and react, 
increasing the indeterminacy, fragility, malleability and volatility of society in 
the future (Stehr, 1994: 158, 9).  
 
This analysis of human artefactual relations highlights the new possibilities of 
artefacts and the impact of artefacts in modern society but unfortunately still 
does not highlight the ontic conditions112 of technology. 
 
3.5. Conclusions 
 
Although Ihde has concentrated on human-artefactual relations, described the 
different structures of these relations, and revealed valuable insights in this 
relationship, the transcendental questions of ‘the technical’ transcend this 
framework. His framework presupposes a notion of the technical and of 
humanity as prerequisites to the framework and is therefore unsuitable for 
studying the transcendental questions of technology as technology. As clearly 
                                            
112
 Granted that it hints to certain ontic conditions as a contribution to the ontic characteristics 
of the technical. 
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indicated various times, Ihde did not intend to get to grips with the technical 
from an ontical point of view as it transcended his specific framework. Getting 
to grips with the nature of technology implies asking about its ontic character. 
 
The conclusions Ihde arrives at are from an anthropological framework and 
contains various contextual fallacies113, as has been pointed out above. Given 
the limitations of the framework, various problems arise. The most prominent 
problem is found in his confusing of artefacts with ‘technology’. 
 
 
3.5.1. No unique description of technological artefacts 
 
The notion of technology as ‘those artefacts of material culture that we use in 
various ways in our environment’ (referred to in 3.1) should be reconsidered. 
This definition does not distinguish between other ‘non-technological’ cultural 
artefacts such as artistic, lingual or religious artefacts, and technical or 
‘technological’ artefacts.  Although it is accepted that ‘technological’ artefacts 
are cultural, they surely differ from other ‘non-technological’ cultural artefacts. 
Conversely, if technological cultural artefacts could not be distinguished from 
non-technological cultural artefacts, it would either mean no distinction were 
possible or that what is truly distinctive had not been identified. 
 
If no distinction were possible, so-called ‘technological’ and ‘non-
technological’ artefacts would be essentially similar and the difference would 
                                            
113
 As argued from an ontic perspective. Explained in previous chapters. 
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only be a matter of semantics. In that case all artefacts would be 
‘technological’. They would all be a product of a ‘formative technological 
process’. It unfortunately has a further implication. All culture would then be 
‘technology’. This would be so because everything ‘made’ by humans would 
then form part of technology. A work of art – a painting or statuette, for 
instance – would be ‘technological’ in nature because its creation required 
techniques (the techniques of art) embodied in a ‘technical’ process.  
 
But if ‘making’ (or forming) and the resultant artefact were technology, it would 
imply that the ‘making’ (or constructing) of a theory in scientific activity would 
also be technology. According to this argument, a theory would be a ‘type’ of 
artefact114. By implication the ‘making’ of a scientific theory would then also be 
technology, implying that science would be a special kind of technology115. If 
everything that is ‘made’ were technology, all of culture (in contradistinction to 
nature) would be technology. This line of argument will fall into an antinomy 
as it negates all contexts in which ‘forming’ has different meanings, as well as 
the different modes of ‘forming’. The alternative, transcendental-empirical 
argument is that the technical does have an ontic uniqueness that must be 
highlighted in a unique definition or description.  
                                            
114
 Normally artefacts are objects and insofar as theories are objectified in written articles and 
books they may also, metaphorically, be designated as “artefacts”. 
115
 The fact that science has specific scientific techniques is of course true, but the 
misinterpreting of that as technology indicates that the problem originates from outside the 
disciplinary framework of sociology. 
  
 
 
 
 
168 
 
Although Ihde opposes any objectivist attempt to describe or define 
technology by referring to the characteristics of objects, which involve a 
combination of their physical or material properties, he implicitly accepts 
technology as artefacts of ‘material culture’. He attempts to structure 
technology by a ‘structural’ analysis of what he regards as an ‘ambiguous 
human-technology relationship’. His purpose is to reduce the ambiguity to a 
‘structural’ analysis. This assumes either a structure for technology or for the 
interaction of humans with technology. 
 
In this attempt he does not concentrate on what is distinctive about 
technology but merely makes assumptions about technology116. By not 
distinguishing technology from non-technology he cannot distinguish 
technological artefacts from non-technological artefacts. The result is that 
whatever relationship he identifies also holds for non-technological artefacts.  
 
An interesting issue here is that it might not be technology that influences our 
perceptions but our artefacts. What he attributed to technology should be 
attributed to artefacts or culture. It is not human-technology relations but 
human-artefact relations or general artefactual relations that are involved.  
 
                                            
116
 As can be expected from any disciplinary approach. 
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The term artefactual transfer could be used for what Ihde indicates as 
technology transfer. An artefact becomes ‘what it is’ (within its structural 
limitations) in the context of its use and could therefore become something 
different in a new context in another culture. In that case the issue here is to 
distinguish between non-technological and technological artefacts. To Ihde all 
material artefacts are technological: the wristwatch and the compass and the 
axe. They all are created through technological activity117. 
 
Another problem identified here is that the term ‘technics’ seems to be used 
for all ‘technical artefacts’. This seems to indicate all artefacts that have a 
‘highly’ technical structure. This still disregards the context of the artefact. This 
seems to indicate the combination of physical or technical qualities that Ihde 
specifically tried to resist. A redefinition of terminology might be called for.  
 
Lastly, if technology does not have a typical structural meaning, the 
implication is that it would be difficult to relate it to ontic conditions. 
 
                                            
117
 As argued, this may lead to what was indicated as a ‘contextual fallacy’. 
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3.5.2. An effort to find a unique definition 
 
As no unique ontic characteristic of technology has been identified118. This 
problem might be solved by analyzing the structural relationship of technology 
with what is distinct from technology in an ontological perspective, which 
would in principle be a different framework.  
 
All artefacts have various aspects, and all have a technical side or aspect. 
They are all the result of a technical formative process.  Different artefacts 
can be identified by their different qualifying or characteristic or destinational 
functions or their typical structure. This does not mean we ‘limit’ an artefact to 
a single application. It only means that in line with a transcendental approach 
each entity displays an identifiable uniqueness. 
 
The term ‘destinational’ does not imply any sinister determinism referring to a 
‘bigger scheme of things’ but only designates an identifiable distinctiveness 
and consistent structure. If an artefact were to be scrapped, it would obviously 
lose its identifiable structure and could be ‘harvested’ for other later artefacts: 
a broken wine glass could be melted down and become part of a beer bottle. 
The social or cultural usage of the glass and the diversity of its uses in 
different cultures are not disputed. In that sense the entities are identified or 
                                            
118
 It was obviously also not in Ihde’s project, as he expressedly indicated his interest in the 
human-technology relationship. 
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classified into relatively broad categories. The categories in which artefacts 
are classified give meaning to the artefacts and this allows of different uses in 
different contexts. 
 
The destinational function or typical structure is actually indicated by the 
names given to the different artefacts. A musical instrument like a piano is 
primarily created to ‘produce’ music. Although it has a highly technical 
structure, it is designed to be not a technological operator but rather a musical 
instrument. A pen is primarily a lingual object (artefact) used as a tool in the 
lingual communicative process, even though it is the result of a technical 
forming or production process and more technically advanced than some 
pencils. Likewise my computer (as word processor) is a lingual artefact used 
as a writing tool to complete this thesis. It is, technically speaking, more 
complex than a pen, but remains primarily a lingual artefact and does not 
become a technological artefact – not, of course, if technological means, as in 
techno-practice, the process of making artefacts, as performed by a technical 
operator or machine. 
 
Claims that computers are tools of communication, expression, artistic 
creation and entertainment are all provided for by this interpretation. If the 
term ‘lingual’ is interpreted in terms of ‘signification’, communication could be 
seen as socially deepened signification. The computer could also have 
additional uses as controller of a technical process, but then one would have 
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to agree that in that specific case, it is not a PC used in an office but a 
specialised product like the computer that monitors processes on board a car.  
 
It seems that only artefacts that are placed in a technical context can become 
technical artefacts. Artefacts placed in a social context become social 
artefacts and artefacts placed in an artistic context become art. It is therefore 
wrong to designate all artefacts as technological on the basis that they are the 
product of a technological process – this overlooks the context and the 
structure of the artefact. 
 
The relationship of an artefact to its destinational function, in a certain sense, 
identifies its ontic meaning. The result is that only technical artefacts are 
technical; not all artefacts.   
 
Technical operators seem to have technical forming as their destinational 
function. All artefacts that act as technical operators, like machines and 
computers that control a forming process, seem to be technical artefacts. 
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4. Analysis of the position119 of Bruno Latour120 
 
Bruno Latour is professor at the Centre for the Study of Innovation at the 
School of Mines, Paris. Accessing his website revealed the following (Latour, 
2003): 
 
He was born in 1947 in Beaune, Burgundy, to a wine grower family. He was 
trained first as a philosopher and then as an anthropologist. After field studies 
in Africa and California, he specialized in the analysis of scientists and 
engineers at work. In addition to work in the philosophy, history, sociology 
and anthropology of science, he has collaborated in many studies in science 
policy and research management.  
 
There is always some uncertainty about presenting Latour’s disciplinary 
                                            
119
 As indicated with the title an analysis of his position, that is assumptions and notions on 
the technical only will be attempted. Similar to the case with Ihde no attempt to evaluate his 
total social theory or the critique on his theory as such will be attempted. As explained before, 
to evaluate the rest of his theory as well as his critiques falls outside the frame of this study. 
The study is interested in the ontical logic of the assumptions and notions of the technical and 
not in an evaluation of his theory. None of his critics involved the ontical logic of the 
transcendental empirical method and furthermore it transcends the focus of their interests. To 
expect such an engagement misunderstands the scope and purpose of this study. This study 
thus holds the assumption that he is ‘worth while’ to take note of. 
120
 My thanks to Prof Mouton who identified Bruno Latour as an author of standing worthwhile 
to be studied. 
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affiliation. He was trained as a philosopher and could be presented as such 
— in the continental, not the Anglo-American, sense of the word. However, he 
was afterwards trained as an anthropologist and, finally, he is professor of 
sociology at the Ecole des Mines and has taught that discipline for twenty 
years — a special sociology to be sure since his students are engineers. The 
PhD programme he is directing is called ‘socio-economics of innovation’. So 
one can present him as a philosopher, an anthropologist or a sociologist, 
knowing full well that none of these would like to have him join their club 
(Latour, 2003). 
 
4.1. Introduction to Ontology  
 
In his series of essays on the reality of science studies called Pandora’s Hope 
(1999), Latour gives an overview of his thinking on various topics, including 
science and technology. He indicates that what he would call adding realism 
to science is actually seen by fellow scientists as a threat to science, a way of 
diminishing the truths it represents and its claims to certainty.  According to 
them he is undermining science and the power it has. Latour tries to rectify 
this misunderstanding and highlights the new or ‘different’ form of radical 
realism that science studies have uncovered.  
 
In his effort to rectify this, he has to start with, the classic philosophical 
question about the nature of reality.  He points out that in this ontology the 
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first problem to consider is the strange invention of an outside world. To ask a 
question like, ‘Do you believe in reality?’ assumes a ‘distance’ from reality and 
the possibility of losing contact with reality. Latour points out that Descartes 
raised a similar issue when he asked how an isolated mind could be 
absolutely, as opposed to relatively, sure of anything about the outside world:  
‘Descartes was asking for absolute certainty from a brain-in-
a-vat, a certainty that was not needed when the brain (or the 
mind) was firmly attached to its body and the body thoroughly 
involved (i)n its normal ecology’. (Latour, 1999: 4) 
 
 
Latour argues that this division was never resolved. Descartes tried by 
detouring through God, Hume tried a shortcut to associated stimuli of reality, 
excluding God. Kant’s ‘a priori’ started a form of constructivism where the 
outside world now had the mind-in-the-vat as its centre.   
‘Instead of retracing their steps and taking the other path at the 
forgotten fork in the road, philosophers abandoned even the 
claim to absolute certainty, and settled on a makeshift solution 
that preserved at least some access to an outside reality’. 
(Latour, 1999: 5) 
 
He argues that the universal ‘a priori’ of Kant was the link with reality. Later a 
more reasonable candidate, namely ‘society’, replaced the ‘transcendental 
Ego’ or mythical mind put forward by Kant. Now the prejudices and paradigms 
of a group determined the representations of every one of its members. 
 
Latour points out that this view does not represent a ‘retracing’ of ‘steps’, but 
goes even further in distancing the individual’s vision, which becomes a ‘view 
of the world’ for the group. Latour argues that this ‘society’ was itself just a 
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series of ‘minds-in-a-vat’ – ‘many minds in many vats’, as he puts it (Latour, 
1999: 7). 
 
Latour also hints at another solution that consists of taking only part of the 
mind out of the vat, offering it a body again and putting the assembled 
aggregate back in relation with a world that is a self-evident and unreflexive 
extension of ourselves. 
‘The real world, the one known by science, is left entirely to 
itself. Phenomenology deals only with the world-for-a-human-
consciousness’. (Latour, 1999: 9) 
 
This he also finds unsatisfying for solving the dilemma. He states that this 
teaches us a great deal about how we are always immersed in the world’s rich 
and lived texture; we will never be able to escape from the narrow focus of 
human intentionality – we will always be restricted to the human point of view. 
He indicates that for all its claims of overcoming the distance between subject 
and object, phenomenology leaves us with the most dramatic split between a 
world of science, left entirely to itself, absolutely inhuman, and a world of 
intentional stances entirely limited to humans. 
 
Latour proceeds by asking why we do not choose the opposite solution and 
forget the ‘mind-in-a-vat’ altogether. (Latour, 1999: 9). If science can invade 
everything, it can surely put an end to Descartes’ long-lasting fallacy and 
make the mind a wriggling and squiggling part of nature again. 
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The answer, according to Latour, is the fear of mob rule: an age-old fear, 
prevalent since the time of ancient Greece, that generated the fallacy of 
absolute truth and of a brain-in-a-vat not dominated by unreasonable brute 
force, but ruled by the power of reason. 
‘It is because we want to fend off the irascible mob that we need 
a world that is totally outside – while remaining accessible! – and 
it is in order to reach this impossible goal that we came up with 
the extraordinary invention of a mind-in-a-vat disconnected from 
everything else, striving for the absolute truth, and, alas, failing 
to get it’. (Latour, 1999: 13) 
 
Latour argues from within a combined anthropological and epistemological 
framework. He highlights the relativity of the knowledge process, indicating 
that the ‘absolute’ mind-in-a-vat cannot eliminate the problem of absolute 
truth without ‘subjective contact’ with reality. Although the interaction between 
humans and reality is relative or relational, a constant or orderly structure of 
reality, which also applies to humans, is still a pre-requisite in the 
relationship121. The transcendental issue of the nature of this orderliness and 
order for reality transcends the focus of his specific framework. The 
relationality of this relationship between reality and humankind, and 
humankind and knowledge (or experience) does not imply that reality itself is 
not constant or consistent or orderly (indicating orderliness) or that no order 
for reality exists. 
 
                                            
121
 This is a consequence of the idea that an orderly reality exists. 
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This requires a specific transcendental focus on the nature of reality. Latour 
tries to give an account as summarised in the next section. 
 
4.2. Latour’s Ontology 
 
To Latour the modernist settlement, illustrated below, is the division or 
distinction of nature ‘out there’, mind ‘in there’, God ‘up there’ and society 
‘down there’. Latour sees it as a settlement that can be replaced by several 
alternative ones (Refer to Fig. 2): 
 
 
 
Fig.2. Illustration of the Modernist settlement by Latour. (1999: 14). 
 
Latour argues that science studies made some discoveries in this connection: 
firstly, that the objective existence is not inhuman, cold, isolated or a-historical 
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because it has been labelled that way in order to combat the mob with a so-
called indisputable objectivity. Secondly, that when he says science is social, 
he does not mean that certainty is compromised and that the existence of 
reality is denied. 
‘We do not need a social world to break the back of objective 
reality, nor an objective reality to silence the mob’ (Latour, 
1999: 15). 
 
Latour believes that we live in a hybrid world made up at once of peoples, 
stars, electrons, nuclear plants, markets etc., and that humanity is responsible 
for turning it into either an unruly shambles or a cosmos. (Latour, 1999: 16) 
 
He believes that he is caught between two ‘cultural’ battle lines as drawn by a 
division of labour between the two sides of the campus, namely natural 
science and the humanities. He indicates that natural scientists deem the 
sciences accurate only when they have been purged of any taint of 
subjectivity, politics or passion. On the other hand he argues that the 
humanities deem humanity, morality, subjectivity and reality worthwhile only 
when these have been protected from any contact with science, technology 
and objectivity. Latour believes that he fights against both camps and is 
therefore seen as a traitor by both. 
‘To put it even more bluntly, science studies has become a 
hostage in a huge shift from Science to what we could call 
Research.  While Science had certainty, coldness, aloofness, 
objectivity, distance and necessity, Research appears to 
have all the opposite characteristics: it is uncertain, open-
ended; immersed in many lowly problems of money, 
instruments, and know-how; unable to differentiate as yet 
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between hot and cold, subjective and objective, human and 
nonhuman’ (Latour, 1999: 20). 
 
He also refers to another dispute. Just as there is a dispute in the scientific 
disciplines between the model of Science and the model of Research, so 
there is also a fight in the social sciences and humanities between two 
opposing models, namely what he loosely calls post modernism and what he 
calls ‘non-modern’. 
‘Everything the first takes to be a justification for more 
absence, more de-bunking, more negation, more decon-
struction, the second takes as a proof of presence, 
deployment, affirmation and construction’. (Latour, 1999: 21) 
 
Latour argues that Post Modernism is descended from the series of 
settlements that have defined modernity.  
It has inherited from these the disconnected mind-in-the-vat’s quest 
for absolute truth, the debate between Might and Right, the radical 
distinction between science and politics, Kant’s constructivism and 
the critical urge that goes with it. (Latour, 1999: 21) 
 
He states that it feels the same nostalgia as modernism, but tries to take on 
the failures of the rationalist project and therefore its rejoicing in virtual reality 
and its debunking of ‘master narratives’, its over-emphasis on reflexivity, and 
its claim that it is good to be stuck inside one’s own point of view, but it has 
not retraced the path all the way to the point that started this impossible 
project in the first place. 
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Latour argues that science studies are engaged in non-modern tasks.  To 
him, modernity has never been the order of the day. Reality and morality have 
never been lacking.  
‘The fight for or against absolute truth, for or against multiple 
standpoints, for or against social construction, for or against 
presence, has never been the important one.  The program 
of debunking, exposing, avoiding being taken in, steals 
energy from the task that has always seemed much more 
important to the collective of people, things, and gods, 
namely the task of sorting out the ‘cosmos’ from an ‘unruly 
shambles’. We are aiming at a politics of things, not at the 
bygone dispute about whether or not words refer to the world’ 
(Latour, 1999: 22).  
 
From the above we can conclude that Latour assumes an ‘objective’ reality 
consisting of a hybrid of things. He points out that this reality is not ‘cold’, as 
science would like to believe. Furthermore, to strive for absolute certainty 
does not seem feasible; to realise that ‘the mind in the vat’ is actually part of a 
body and of reality, and to sort out ‘cosmos’ from this reality is the task of 
science studies.  He wants to be involved in the politics of things and not in 
arguments over words and their meanings like the linguistic philosophers.  
 
What Latour indicates as ‘sorting out’ the cosmos from an unruly shambles 
has two phases. The first phase concerns the transcendental issue of the 
orderliness of reality that answers to an order for reality as part of the 
structure of the ontical and is accounted for by an ontological theory. This 
phase of the ‘identifying of order in reality’ should rather be assigned to 
ontology as part of philosophy and not to science studies, as Latour indicates. 
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The second phase would assume the order of reality and work towards the 
greater detail of specific sciences and their relationships in reality. The 
framework and focus of science studies is not the order of reality or the nature 
of science but the relationships of science in society. Science studies would 
assume an ontology but might not focus on it. The transcendental issue of the 
‘order of the ontical’ as expressed in ontology transcends the framework of 
science studies. 
 
The fact that he wants to be involved in the ‘politics of things’ indicates his 
specialised focus that assumes ‘things’ and their (political) interaction as 
prerequisite presuppositions and which therefore does not really consider 
ontic issues in terms of a truly transcendental perspective. This could lead to 
contextual fallacies where a conclusion reached within a certain context is 
invalidly applied in other contexts without taking the contextual limitation of the 
conclusion into consideration.  
 
He specifically indicates his opposition to ‘arguments over words’ and he tries 
to explain his epistemology, which differs from that of the linguists. (Latour, 
1999: 69) 
 
4.3. Latour’s Epistemology 
 
Latour developed his argument when he first began to study scientific 
practice, which enabled him to offer a more realistic account of ‘science-in-
  
 
 
 
 
183 
the-making’, grounded firmly in laboratory sites, experiments and 
paradigmatic preferences of groups of colleagues. In this study of the 
research process, he counters the model offered by the philosophy of 
language: two disjointed spheres – words and world – separated by a vague 
and radical gap that must be reduced through the search for correspondence 
or reference. (Latour, 1999: 69) 
 
Latour argues that  
‘... knowledge, it seems, does not reside in the face-to-face 
confrontation of a mind with an object, any more than 
reference designates a thing by means of a sentence verified 
by that thing.  On the contrary, at every stage we have 
recognized a common operator, which belongs to matter at 
one end, to form at the other, and which is separated from 
the stage that follows it by a gap that no resemblance could 
fill’. (Latour, 1999: 69) 
 
Latour thus rejects the ‘Gegenstand-relation’ of a knowing subject versus a 
knowable object and the linguistic reference or denotation of an entity by a 
term for that entity. He recognises an operator that is linked with form and 
matter, the two contrasting notions of Greek dualistic thought. 
 
The question is whether this reference process does not still occur in the 
relation between the knowing subject and an external subject/object122. 
 
                                            
122
 This could be indicated as a subject/subject and/or subject/object relationship and not 
necessarily the Gegenstand-relationship. 
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Latour (1999: 70) developed a model of transformation for the reference 
process which may be pictured as a trade-off between what is gained 
(amplification) and what is lost (reduction) at each information producing step.  
In analysing the expedition to BOA Vista (the purpose of which was to explain 
a forest-savannah transition), he found that something was lost and 
something gained at each stage of the process of moving from compiling 
individualized sample data to drawing generalized universal conclusions. He 
shows how stage by stage they lost locality, particularity, materiality, 
multiplicity and continuity, which he indicates as reduction. On the other hand, 
they gained standardization, compatibility, text, calculation, circulation and 
relative universality.  The report contains not only information about the whole 
of the forest and savannah to which they can return, but also an explanation 
of its dynamics. He calls this amplification. 
‘An essential property of this chain is that it must remain 
reversible. The succession of stages must be traceable, 
allowing for travel in both directions. If the chain is interrupted 
at any point, it ceases to transport truth – ceases, that is, to 
produce, to construct, to trace and to conduct it’ (Latour, 
1999: 69). 
 
Latour argues that truth-value circulates like electricity passing through a wire, 
as long as this current is not interrupted. We can elongate the chain 
indefinitely by extending it at both ends, adding other stages, but we can 
neither cut the line nor skip a sequence, despite our capacity to ‘combine’ 
them all in a single ‘black box’: 
‘I can never verify the resemblance between my mind and the 
world, but I can, if I pay the price, extend the chain of trans-
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formations wherever verified reference circulates through 
constant substitutions’ (Latour, 1999: 79). 
 
Latour therefore realises that no ‘objective’ (absolute) knowledge is possible, 
but he indicates how a chain of transformations could be developed to 
‘transport’ the ‘truth’. He therefore gives guidelines for validity and reliability 
or, in other words, normativity. If you break these norms, you break the chain 
of truth. On this basis he explains how science could use this system. 
 
4.3.1. The circulatory system of science and scientific facts 
 
Latour tries to counter the prejudiced view that science studies aims to 
provide a social explanation of science.  
‘Science studies, to be sure, rejects the idea of a science 
disconnected from the rest of society, but this rejection does not 
mean that it embraces the opposite position, that of a ‘social 
construction’ of reality, or that it ends up in some intermediary 
position, trying to sort out “purely” scientific factors from “merely” 
social ones’ (Latour, 1999: 84). 
 
 
According to Latour (1999: 97) there are no true statements that correspond 
to a state of affairs and false statements that do not, but only continuous or 
interrupted references. Truthful scientists did not break away from society to a 
cold, objective world of science, nor were liars influenced by the vagaries of 
passion and politics in society. To him the quality of reference of a science 
depends on its capacity to interest and convince others and its routine 
institutionalization of these flows. 
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On the one hand the problem is that judging the validity of a statement by 
how interesting and convincing it is to others (groups or society in general) 
implies that false statements could be accepted as true if they were simply 
well propagated. This implies that truth is related to what the group finds 
convincing123.  
 
On the other hand he is at pains to point out the value of the verification 
chain, which in itself supplies evidence that allows the scientist to make 
claims. This would hopefully automatically convince a consensus view of the 
truth. 
 
Unfortunately, groups could be so biased that they might never find the truth. 
Furthermore, groups are ‘just many-minds-in-many-vats’ in Latour’s own 
words, yet he wants to use groups to vouch for truth. 
 
From an ontic position, truth should at least be related to ontic principles and 
confirmation (or falsification) through empirical experience. Truth could be 
used or abused (by half-truths in propaganda, for instance) because of the 
relation of humanity with reality. People have the freedom to act and can do 
so in conformity or nonconformity with the norm. It is this same freedom of 
choice that allows of the translation operations that Latour speaks of: 
                                            
123
 On the one hand it could also explain the problem of Aristargus who propagated a helio-
centric universe and was ignored for 18 centuries. 
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‘Translation operations transform political questions into 
questions of technique, and vice versa; during a controversy, 
operations of conviction mobilize a mixture of human and non-
human agents’ (Latour, 1999: 98). 
 
 
Latour mapped the five different loops that science studies need to consider 
in order to reconstruct the circulation of scientific facts (see Fig. 3 below).  
 
Fig 3. Illustration of Latour’s model of the scientific process. (Latour, 1999: 
100). 
 
 
The conceptual element (links and knots) is in the middle, like a central knot 
tying the four other loops. 
 
The first loop is concerned with expeditions and surveys, instruments and 
equipment and also with sites in which all the objects of the world, relevantly 
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mobilized, are assembled and contained.   
Through this mobilization the world is converted into arguments. 
(Latour, 1999: 102) 
 
These logistics are indispensable to the practice of science. 
 
The second loop is labelled autonomization,  
… because it concerns the way in which a discipline, a 
profession, a clique, or an ‘invisible college’ becomes 
independent and forms its own criteria of evaluation and 
relevance. (Latour, 1999: 102) 
 
No one can (independently) specialize without the concurrent recognition of a 
small group of autonomous peers. In addition it includes the history of 
scientific institutions and the history of professions and disciplines. 
 
The alliance loop indicates that nothing can be developed, for example, no 
discipline can become autonomous, and no new institution can be founded 
without alliances. Groups that would previously not have had anything to do 
with each other may be enrolled:   
‘The military must be made interested in physics, industrialists in 
chemistry, kings in cartography, teachers in educational theory, 
congressmen in political science’ (Latour, 1999: 103).  
 
 
These alliances do not prevent the pure flow of scientific information but are 
the lifeblood of scientific activity. 
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The fourth loop of public representation indicates the massive socialization of 
novel objects like atoms, fossils, bombs, radar, statistics and theories into the 
collective that could overturn the normal system of beliefs and opinions. This 
link is not more remote than the previous loops. How have societies formed 
representation of science, nuclear energy, nuclear disasters, etc?  
Like all the other loops, this loop requires from scientists a 
completely different set of skills, unrelated to those of the other 
loops, and yet determinant for them all. (Latour, 1999: 105) 
 
Latour confronts this by highlighting the anomaly that one could not expect to 
produce a discipline that would modify everyone’s opinion, without expecting 
at least a passive acceptance of the discipline. 
‘Our sensitivity to the public representation of science must be 
all the greater because information does not simply flow from the 
three other loops to the fourth, it also makes up a lot of the pro-
suppositions of scientists themselves about their objects of 
study’ (Latour, 1999: 106). 
 
 
The fifth loop has to hold many heterogeneous resources together. Latour 
explains what would happen if there was no fifth loop.  
‘The world would stop being mobilizable; disgruntled colleagues 
would flee in all directions; allies would lose interest; and so 
would the general public, after expressing either its shock or its 
indifference. But this death would ensue just as quickly if any of 
the other four loops were cut off’ (Latour, 1999: 107). 
 
This model does not allow of a separation of a scientific content from an 
extra-scientific content like social fictions or social dimensions. The ‘content’ 
of science is not something contained; it is itself a container: concepts hold 
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the collective tightly together. A concept does not become more scientific 
because it is further removed from what it holds, but because it is more 
intensely connected and promotes closer circulating reference. 
 
Latour developed a sociologically oriented model of science as a ‘collective’ 
of relations represented in five loops. No other collective is exactly the same; 
it is unique and therefore different (distinguishable) from any non-scientific 
‘collective’. He does not indicate its uniqueness but simply assumes it. Latour 
further resists specifically the philosophy of language that sees reality as two 
disjointed spheres separated by a gap. He wants to bridge the gap with an 
operator between the changing matter and constant form and transforms from 
the one to the other in a circulatory reference process. He believes the 
circulatory process guarantees truth. Truthful statements do not break the 
chain of reference and are accepted in routine institutionalisation of ideas as 
well as by groups. 
 
4.3.2. From fabrication to reality 
 
In his effort to break the division of world versus mind (or word), Latour 
investigated the terminology of the old paradigm. He found that ‘fabrication’ 
carries the implication that something is false and that ‘constructed’ implies 
that it must be deconstructable. He indicates that they were technical 
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metaphors used in early science studies as in ‘construction of fact’ or 
‘fabrication of neurons’. (Latour, 1999: 114) 
 
In studying various other metaphors he discards the correspondence theory 
that postulates a correspondence between world and words, so that the word 
‘cat’, for instance, is represented in the world by a small ‘meowing’ animal. He 
developed new terms, namely articulation and proposition. 
 
A ‘pro-position’ suggests not a position, thing, substance or essence 
pertaining to nature that is made up of mute objects facing a talkative human 
mind, but an occasion for different entities to interact. 
 
In a sense Latour uses the term articulate to overcome the limitation of 
‘correspondence’ between words and world. Essentially it implies that the 
word ‘dog’ does not bark like the animal and therefore ‘lacks’ 
correspondence, but, on the other hand, it articulates the proposition. To 
articulate is to signify or give symbolic meaning:  
‘Instead of being the privilege of a human mind surrounded by 
mute things, articulation becomes a very common property of 
propositions, in which many kinds of entities can participate’ 
(Latour, 1999: 142). 
 
Furthermore, while statements are aimed at correspondence, which they can 
in principle never achieve, propositions rely on the articulation of differences 
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that make new phenomena visible. Latour regards articulation as part of 
reality: 
‘Articulation between propositions goes much deeper than 
speech. We speak because the propositions of the world are 
themselves articulated, not the other way around. More 
exactly we are allowed to speak interestingly by what we 
allow to speak interestingly’ (Latour, 1999: 144). 
 
According to Latour these articulated propositions established between 
knower and known are relations that are entirely different from those 
established traditionally. As far as he is concerned, it captures much more 
precisely the rich repertoire of scientific practice. It is interesting that Latour 
places meaning in reality itself.   
 
Latour furthermore uses the term event to highlight the possibility of adding 
new elements to an experiment or discovery, for instance:   
‘No event can be accounted for by a list of the elements that 
entered the situation before its conclusion’ (Latour, 1999: 
126). 
 
Latour accepts events as part of hybrid reality, which explains that new 
elements could be added to experiments as well as to the process of 
discovery. One can thus always discover another item of a collective, 
relationship or artefact. The important issue here is that another element of an 
artefact does not change it to something other than an artefact. If the 
technical structure of an artefact is discovered, it remains artefact and does 
not become technology as Ihde would have it. 
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4.4. Technology 
 
Because he opposes the traditional subject-object relationship as a means to 
obtain knowledge and has developed his own circulatory system, Latour 
believes that the less familiar the terms describing human and non-human 
association are as regards the subject–object dichotomy, the better; he 
believes each element is to be defined by its associations and is an event 
created at the occasion for each of those associations. 
 
This chosen stance unfortunately forces Latour to lose some of the 
advantages of the subject-object relationship, as will be shown later. 
 
Latour (1999: 193) argues that in the modernist settlement, objects were 
housed within nature and subjects within society. Latour replaces subjects 
and objects with different terms in a new paradigm. 
 
He replaces ‘society’, which is turned into a fairy tale of social relations from 
which all non-humans have been carefully enucleated by the social scientists, 
with the notion of the ‘collective’. We live in collectives and not in societies.  
Collective is defined as an exchange of human and non-human properties in 
a corporate body:   
‘Whereas objects could only face out at the subjects – and 
vice versa – non-humans may be folded into humans through 
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the key processes of translation, articulation, delegation, 
shifting out and down’. (Latour, 1999: 193) 
 
Latour offers four meanings of technical mediation where human and non-
human actants could interact or mediate. (Latour, 1999: 178) 
 
The first he calls goal translation, where he uses translation to mean 
displacement, drift, invention, mediation or the creation of a link that did not 
exist before and that to some degree modifies the original goal. He cites the 
example of a citizen with a gun and shows how this combination (gun – 
citizen or citizen – gun) displaces each individual actant’s goal and generates 
new possibilities through composition, which is also the second meaning of 
technical mediation. Here the example is that B-52s do not fly – the US Air 
Force flies. 
 
The figure below provides a summary of what Latour indicates as the various 
steps of interaction between actants, human and non-human. (Fig. 4) 
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Fig.4 Illustration of technical mediations in different steps. (Latour, 1999: 184) 
 
Because Latour attempts to develop a new paradigm in opposition to both the 
modernist settlement and the ‘object-subject’ dichotomy, he does not define 
any object or subject as ‘technological’: 
‘We now understand that techniques do not exist as such, that 
there is nothing that we can define philosophically or 
sociologically as an object, as an artefact or a piece of 
technology. There does not exist, any more in technology than in 
science, anything to play the role of the foil for the human soul in 
the modernist scenography’ (Latour, 1999: 190,1). 
 
He actually provides a solution to the problem regarding technical artefacts or 
‘objects’: 
‘Technical artefacts are as far from the status of efficiency as 
scientific facts are from the noble pedestal of objectivity. Real 
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artefacts are always parts of institutions, trembling in their mixed 
status as mediators, mobilizing faraway lands and people, ready 
to become people or things, not knowing if they are, composed 
of one or of many, of a black box counting for one or of a 
labyrinth concealing multitudes’ (Latour, 1999:193). 
 
Quite correctly Latour clearly recognises the fact that entities (or artefacts) 
can acquire different meanings in different contexts. This is because meaning 
is revealed in relationships within related contexts.  
 
Artefacts reveal meaning not only in contexts but also through their structural 
uniqueness124. These ‘so-called real’ artefacts that Latour mentions still need 
to be identified as types of artefacts in the last instance. When he does 
identify them he limits them to a certain functional-structural type of 
combination. It is also here that the use of subjects and objects – terms which 
Latour rejects – could fruitfully be used.  
 
                                            
124
 From an ontic position, within an ontology, an issue that Latour does not consider is the 
fact that entities have constant structures. What this implies, is that all artefacts, on the other 
hand, also have an ontic orderliness and constancy of structure and that this structure could 
be identified only on the basis of this constancy. Furthermore, all entities ontically have some 
unique characteristic that distinguishes them from other kinds of entities and which in a sense 
qualifies and in certain cases limits their applications, otherwise we would not be able to 
identify or classify them.  
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Latour accepts meaning as part of reality. Furthermore, artefacts can have 
different meanings in different contexts. Why can an artefact not have an 
existential (ontic) meaning in an ontic (transcendental) context? 
 
Latour only sees the societal context of artefacts in which artefacts seem to 
have unlimited, multiple applications depending on the (unlimited) contexts.  
On further consideration, in an ontic framework, it could be argued that all 
artefacts have limited typical applications. 
 
The ontic being governed by orderliness and an order for every entity in 
reality implies that every structure has an inner typicality that qualifies or 
distinguishes it from all other structures in reality. This typicality is 
characteristic and reveals unique meanings in different contexts. It would 
therefore be possible to identify the typical structure with its typical 
characteristics in typical use contexts. It is also possible that this structure 
could be used in a-typical contexts and in a-typical ways. A book is typically 
meant to be read although it can a-typically be used as a paperweight or 
doorstop. 
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4.5. Human and non-human 
 
Latour concentrates on the problem of the relationship between humans and 
non-humans, which to him represents the divide between nature and 
society.125 
 
He argues that one does not need the noun technique or its upgraded 
version, technology,126 when separating humans from the multifarious 
assemblies with which they combine. He prefers the adjective technical, 
which can be used in many different situations. (Latour, 1999: 191)   
 
Firstly, the term applies to a series of subprograms. When one says that 
something is a technical point, it implies that one deviates (for a moment) 
from the main task and will eventually resume the original or main task. 
 
Secondly, the term ‘technical’ indicates the subordinate role of people, skills 
and objects that perform this secondary function; they are indispensable but 
invisible in a black box, if functioning normally. 
 
                                            
125
 As argued before, concentrating on this relationship would not allow a totality view on the 
technical as it in principle transcends this relationship. 
126
 Unfortunately he does not explain the nature of this upgrade. 
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Thirdly, it could indicate a hitch or catch in the smooth functioning of the sub 
programme as indicated by the phrase ‘there is a technical problem to solve 
first’. In this sense it could be an obstacle, a detour, or the beginning of a new 
translation of goals. 
 
The fourth meaning Latour indicates is the unique ability to make oneself 
indispensable. This occupation of privileged though inferior positions indicates 
obligatory passage points. 
 
Lastly, the term could indicate a modus operandi, a chain of know-how or 
gestures bringing about some anticipated result as in a technique of 
communication. (Latour, 1999: 192) 
 
Latour disagrees with the traditional notion that a richer mixture of the social 
and technical characterizes primitive collectives, whereas modern, more 
advanced collectives are more objective and therefore devoid of ties with the 
social order. This implies that modern technology and humanity are seen as 
objective and efficient, whereas primitive technology is seen as ‘low-tech’. He 
argues that one finds more extended chains of action between machines, 
automatons and devices as well as more people and more transactions in 
modern collectives. (Latour, 1999: 196) 
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According to Latour, critical theory states that techniques are social because 
they are socially constructed.   
‘To say that social relations are “reified” in technology, such that 
when we are confronted with an artefact we are confronted, in 
effect, with social relations, is to assert a tautology, and a very 
implausible one at that: If artefacts are nothing but social 
relations, then why must society work through them to inscribe 
itself in something else?’ (Latour, 1999: 197). 
 
Latour maintains that society is constructed but not socially constructed. 
(Latour, 1999: 198) Social order is impossible without socialized non-humans. 
 
He devised a model (Pragmatogony) with the intention of fighting modernism 
by finding the hideout in which science has been held since being kidnapped 
for political purposes. In this pragmatogony he fights the myth of progress. He 
points out the relationship between humans and non-humans and the pattern 
that emerges where relationships are constituted from previous relationships, 
as illustrated in the following model. 
 
The odd numbers in this model deal with humans and the even numbers with 
non-humans. Whenever we learn something about the management of 
humans, we shift that knowledge to non-humans and endow them with more 
and more organizational properties. In the odd-numbered levels the opposite 
process is at work. What has been learned from non-humans is re-imported 
so as to reconfigure people (see Fig. 5 below). 
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Fig.5. Illustration of Latour’s pragmatogony. (Latour, 1999: 213) 
 
At Level 1, humans engage in societal interactions to repair a constantly 
decaying social order. They manipulate and interfere and survive in groups.  
Latour calls this social complexity, but it could possibly be better expressed 
as societal complexity, since ‘societal’, (not ‘social’, as social scientists would 
have it) indicates a structural collective of humans. 
 
What Latour calls the basic tool kit is found at Level 2. What is a tool? It is the 
extension of social (or societal) skills to non-humans. We generate tools by 
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shifting societal or human competencies to non-humans – by treating a stone 
as a partner, modifying it and using it to act on another stone:  
‘Pre-human tools, in contrast to the ad hoc implements of other 
primates, also represent the extension of a skill rehearsed in the 
realm of social interactions’ (Latour, 1999: 211). 
 
At Level 3, Latour speaks of ‘social complication’. The social, or rather 
societal, realm becomes visible and attains through the enlistment of the non-
human (or tools) some measure of durability as in cultural traditions and 
habits. The involvement of non-humans resolves the contradiction between 
durability and negotiability because non-humans stabilize social negotiations, 
are at once pliable and durable, and can be shaped quickly. Once shaped 
they can last longer than the interactions that fabricated them. 
 
Techniques are placed at Level 4. He defines technique as a ‘modus 
operandi’. Techniques are articulated subprograms for actions that subsist (in 
time) and extend (in space). They suggest a semi-social organization that 
assembles non-humans from very different materials, seasons and places: 
‘A bow and arrow, a javelin, a hammer, a net, an article of 
clothing are composed of parts and pieces that require 
recombination in sequences of time and space that bear no 
relation to their original settings’ (Latour, 1999: 209). 
 
 
In a sense the ‘social’ or human interaction of the previous level is utilized in a 
non-human sphere. Techniques are the processing of tools and non-human 
actants by organizations that extract, recombine and socialize them. 
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At Level 5, we come across society. It is from techniques, the ability to nest 
several subprograms, that we learn what it means to subsist and expand, to 
accept a role and perform a function. By re-importing this competence into the 
definition of society we taught ourselves to reify it, to make society stand 
independent of fast-moving interactions. Society exists, it precedes individual 
action, lasts longer than any interaction and dominates our lives. To Latour, 
society is not socially constructed. Non-humans proliferate below the bottom 
line of social theory as far as he is concerned. It is a collective that is more 
than merely social. 
 
At Level 6, we find internalised ecology:  
‘The intense socialization, re-education, and reconfiguration of 
plants and animals – so intense that they change shape, 
function, and often genetic makeup – is what I mean by the term 
‘internalised ecology’ (Latour, 1999: 208). 
 
Latour argues that in order to admit animals, plants and proteins to the 
emerging collective, one must endow them with the social characteristics 
necessary for their integration. This results in a man-made landscape for 
society, like cities and towns.  
‘In describing the sixth level we may speak of urban life, 
empires, and organizations, but not of society and techniques – 
or symbolic representation and infrastructure’ (Latour, 1999: 
208). 
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The megamachine is found at level 7. If one considers where industry comes 
from, one realizes that it is neither a given nor a sudden capitalist discovery of 
the objective laws of matter. The megamachine is seen as the organization of 
large numbers of humans and non-humans by means of chains of command, 
deliberate planning and accounting procedures with specific functions or 
goals: 
‘At some point in history human interactions come to be 
mediated through a large stratified, external body politic that 
keeps track, through a range of ‘intellectual techniques’ (writing 
and counting, basically), of the many nested subprograms for 
action.  When some, though not all, of these subprograms are 
replaced by non-humans, machinery and factories are born.  
The non-humans, in this view, enter an organization that is 
already in place and take on a role rehearsed for centuries by 
obedient human servants enrolled in the imperial mega machine’ 
(Latour, 1999: 207). 
 
The hypothesis can be summarized as follows: before it is possible to 
delegate action to non-humans and to relate non-humans to one another in 
automation, it must first be possible to nest a range of subprograms for action 
into one another without losing track of them. 
 
At Level 8 one finds industry that developed by allowing non-humans to 
replace humans in the mega-machine. Latour extends to matter a further 
property that can be thought of as exclusively social in his notion of industry. 
Non-humans have the capacity to relate to one another when they are made 
part of the assembly of actants that everyone calls a machine. This 
automation is given autonomy of some sort and submitted to regulating 
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conditions or laws that can be measured with instruments and accounting 
procedures: 
‘From tools held in the hands of human workers, the shift 
historically was to assemblers of machines, where tools related 
to one another, creating a massive array of labor and material 
relations in factories that Marx described as so many circles of 
hell’ (Latour, 1999: 206). 
 
To relate non-humans to one another in an assembly of machines, ruled by 
laws, is to grant them a sort of social life. 
 
At Level 9 Latour places networks of power. The phrase socio-technical 
imbroglio is preferred because it replaces the dualistic paradigm of social and 
technical with a seamless web of technical and social factors. The extension 
of networks of power in telecommunications, transportation and the electrical 
industry is impossible to imagine without a massive mobilization of material 
entities. The technical invention of electric light led to the establishment of a 
corporation of unprecedented scale, its scope directly related to the physical 
properties of electrical networks. In this regard various global corporations in 
motorcar manufacturing and petroleum products also come to mind. 
 
Techno-science is placed at Level 10. 
‘Through technoscience – defined, for my purposes here, as a 
fusion of science, organization, and industry – the forms of co-
ordination learned through “networks of power” (see Level 9) are 
extended to inarticulate entities’ (Latour, 1999:203). 
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Non-humans are endowed with speech, although primitive; with intelligence, 
foresight, self-control and discipline, both on a large scale and on a micro-
scale.  Although automata have no rights, they are more than material 
entities: they are complex organizations. 
 
The eleventh layer is political ecology. The last interpretation of the crossover 
– the swapping of properties between humans and non-humans – is the 
simplest to define, because it is the most literal, according to Latour:   
‘Lawyers, activists, ecologists, businessmen, political philoso-
phers, are now seriously talking, in the context of our ecological 
crisis, of granting to non-humans some sort of rights and even 
legal standing’ (Latour, 1999: 202). 
 
He argues that previously, contemplating the sky or space above earth meant 
thinking of matter or nature; it has now become a socio-political imbroglio, 
since the depletion of the ozone layer has caused a scientific controversy, a 
political dispute between North and South, and immense strategic changes in 
industry. Literally, not symbolically as before, we have to manage the planet 
we inhabit and must now define a politics of things. 
 
As with all previous crossovers, the last one mixes elements from both sides: 
the political with the scientific and technical. Technologies have taught us how 
to manage vast assemblies of non-humans: our newest socio-technical hybrid 
brings what we have learned to bear upon the political system. 
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To Latour the illusion of modernity has been to believe that the more we grew, 
the more separate objectivity and subjectivity would become, creating a 
radically different future. The mistake of the dualistic paradigm was its 
definition of humanity. To conceive of humanity and technology as polar 
opposites is to overlook the sociotechnical nature of human interaction. We 
are never limited to social ties and never face only objects. 
 
His diagram relocates humanity right into the crossover, the central column, 
the articulator and mediator between mediators. This seems almost ironic. 
Latour designed this scheme to deal with the subject-object dichotomy as well 
as the human non-human issue. Here he places humans (subjects) as the 
active mediator between passive objects and other cultural subjects or 
societal relationships. Ironically he also distinguishes between social 
relationships (involving human cultural subjects) and tools and machines 
(involving non-human natural and cultural objects) and places the human 
between them. 
   
The term ‘totality’ can be used for Latour’s hybrid collectives.  
 
4.6. Epistemological implications 
 
According to Latour, subjectivity and objectivity are not opposed: they grow 
together, irreversibly. This implies that there is more than one way of knowing. 
He traces the dispute between Socrates and Callicles and highlights the fact 
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that reason (science) was utilized to obtain political power against the people 
(demos). Indicating that unlimited power could be dangerous and should be 
limited to what is ‘right’ is only one step closer to truth via reason. In this 
context of aristocracy, the hordes are defeated by a force superior to the 
reputation and physical force of the people (demos) and their endless and 
useless practical knowledge:  
‘When Truth enters the scene, it is not as one man against 
everyone else, it is as an impersonal, transcendental natural 
law, a Might mightier than Might’ (Latour, 1999: 225). 
 
Socrates identified two kinds of persuasion: conviction (without under-
standing) and knowledge (epistéme). Furthermore, he makes a distinction 
between real knowledge and practical know-how: 
‘The distinction between knowledge and practical know-how 
is both what allows him to appeal to a mouth-shutting 
superior natural law and also what is enforced by the very 
action of shutting the mouths of the ten thousand people who 
go about their business every day “without knowing what 
they do”. If they knew what they were doing, the distinction 
would be lost’ (Latour, 1999: 231). 
 
One can recognize how a certain form of reasoning (epistéme) was 
kidnapped for a political purpose it could not possible serve. Against this 
background Latour indicates the difference between what he calls Science 
no. 1 and Science no. 2. 
 
Science no. 1 is not a description of what scientists do. It is an ideology that 
has never had any other use apart from offering a substitute for public 
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discussion. It has always been a political weapon for doing away with the 
constraints of politics. 
‘Science no. 2 deals with non-humans, which in the 
beginning are foreign to social life, and which are slowly 
socialized in our midst through the channels of laboratories, 
expeditions, institutions, and so on, as recent historians of 
science have so often described’ (Latour, 1999: 259).  
 
This hints at different points of view and their integration into as many lives as 
possible. Science no. 2, unlike Science no 1, needs lots of controversies, 
puzzles, risk-taking and imagination; scientists and the public involved in 
controversies should not keep their mouths shut. 
 
Latour reminds us that the division between theory and practice, between 
content and context and even nature and society, is not a given; the divide is 
made by Reason.  Similarly, the division between knowledge and belief was 
created, which in its turn divided reality into facts and fetishes.  The irony is 
that in the classical division, fabricated facts become illusory; if not fabricated, 
they become real (see Fig. 6. below). 
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Fig. 6. Latour’s illustration of facts and fetishes correlated to knowledge and 
belief. (Latour, 1999: 273) 
 
The same is true of fetishes.  When facts were allowed into our collective 
existence, great clouds of fetish delusions, oppressions, manipulations and 
prejudices were dissipated.  But facts have been taken too far in an attempt to 
transform everything else into beliefs or something believable.  The burden of 
supporting all these beliefs becomes unbearable when science itself is 
submitted to the same doubt.  It is one thing to attack beliefs when we are 
supported by the certainties of science, but what happens when science itself 
is transformed into a belief?  The only solution is post-modern virtuality.  
Virtuality is what everything turns into when belief in belief runs amok. 
 
Latour proposes a reunited situation because he has proved that facts are in 
fact ‘fabricated’ through human action in a ‘fabricative’ experiment. He names 
this new collective factishes (see Fig. 7 below). 
  
 
 
 
 
211 
 
Fig. 7. Latour’s construction of factishes. (Latour, 1999: 274) 
 
‘The factish suggests an entirely different move: it is because it 
is constructed that it is so very real, so autonomous, so 
independent of our hands’ (Latour, 1999: 275). 
 
Attachments do not reduce autonomy, but foster it. Latour regards the terms 
‘construction’ and ‘autonomous’ as synonyms. He attacks the modernists and 
postmodernists, indicating that in all their efforts at critique, they have left 
belief untouched. They believe in belief. He argues that it is a belief in belief 
that allows of the distinction between a world ‘out there’ and a palace of 
ideas, imaginations, fancies and distortions ‘in here’. For the postmodernists 
there is one physical world ‘out there’ and many mental worlds ‘in here’. 
‘The role of the intellectual is not, then, to grab a hammer and 
break beliefs with facts, or to grab a sickle and undercut facts 
with beliefs (as in the cartoonish attempts of social 
constructivists), but to be factishes – and maybe also a bit 
facetious – themselves, that is, to protect the diversity of 
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ontological status against the threat of its transformation into 
facts and fetishes, beliefs and things’ (Latour, 1999: 290,1). 
 
According to Latour, the subject–object dichotomy has lost its ability to define 
our humanity because it no longer allows us to make any sense of 
‘inhumanity’! He attempts to substitute the notion of humans and non-humans 
for the subject-object dichotomy. He claims not to try and overcome the divide 
but to go in another direction. The term ‘collective’ that combines humans and 
non-humans is Latour’s answer to the subject-object dichotomy. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
If it were true that idea-frameworks regulate concepts like a paradigmatic 
regulator, it would imply that a new paradigm allows new possibilities. 
Latour’s new ontology as regulative framework also allows of new possibilities 
and opportunities for notions and concepts. He literally starts with an ontology 
where he chooses, in opposition to Descartes, a relative certainty rather than 
absolute certainty.  
 
Latour also opposes the classical position of a ‘mind-in-a-vat’, which implies 
that the brain (or reason) is superior to all other faculties. Don Ihde also 
mentions that Galileo preferred his observations through the telescope to the 
speculative world-view that the earth was the centre of the universe. Galileo 
was a Copernican who believed that the sun was the centre of the galaxy. 
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This choice of Galileo also rejects the absolute dominance of reason (Ihde, 
1990a: 44, 57). 
 
Latour effectively unmasked phenomenology and illustrated that it deals with 
only a ‘world-for-a-human-consciousness’, limited to human intentionality. He 
actually accuses it of being the cause of the most dramatic split between 
subject and object, leaving us with a ‘world of science’ left entirely to itself and 
a world of intentional stances left entirely to humans. 
 
Latour explicates the division of mind and the superiority of the mind by 
means of an interesting interpretation of the historic argument between 
Socrates and Callicles; he argues that these ideas have their origin in the fear 
of mob rule. This fear led to the fallacy of ‘absolute’ truth that cannot be 
overrun by a ‘mindless mob’, and, associated with it, the ‘competent’ mind 
that possesses the knowledge of absolute truth and that can therefore not be 
dominated by ‘unreasonable’ brute force, but by the power of reason only. 
 
4.7.1. Latour’s realism 
 
Latour believes in a hybrid world made up of people, things and societal life 
forms. He rejects the natural scientist’s position that facts are accurate only 
when purged from all subjectivity, politics and passion, as the original Greek 
philosophers indicated.  He also rejects the view of the humanities that 
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humanity, morality and subjectivity are only real if protected from 
contamination by science, technology and heartless objectivity that limit 
human freedom. 
 
Essentially Latour discards the ‘historical’ dispute relating to modernity and 
postmodernity; he is aiming at a politics of things, the task of sorting out the 
‘cosmos’ from an ‘unruly shambles’. This he believes to be more important 
than arguments about whether or not words refer to the world. 
 
Latour develops a different ‘epistemology’. He argues that knowledge does 
not reside in the face-to-face confrontation of a mind with an object any more 
than words can designate things. The word ‘dog’ does not bark like a real  
‘dog’. 
 
Latour developed a model of transformation in a circulatory reference process 
in which the mind ‘contacts’ reality. He pictures it as a trade-off between what 
is gained (amplified) and lost (reduction) at each information-producing step. 
Traceability and reversibility guarantee truth. In his view, true statements that 
correspond with a state of affairs and false statements that do not, do not 
exist – only continuous or interrupted references that circulate.  
 
He proposes a model of science as a collective with five loops to explain the 
circulation of scientific facts. Some of the interesting implications are that the 
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model does not allow of a separation of a scientific content from a meta-
scientific content like social fictions or social dimensions.  
 
In the light of the notion of the seamless web that must bridge the ( to Latour 
unacceptable) dualistic socio-technical divide, aspects of this ‘totality’ are not 
recognised. Society is a seamless web and nothing else. A collective like the 
scientific process exists only as a total collective. The question could be 
posed whether someone could limit his/her interest or study to a certain 
dimension like the social dimension. Could one be interested in the social 
aspect instead of the political aspect of a new scientific discovery? If ‘yes’, 
then the ‘scientific’ content of Latour’s model should allow for a ‘meta-
scientific’ possibility like social dimensions. If science is a collective, one can 
focus on some of its aspects, which will allow of social, economical, technical 
and other functional views of an object or field of study. In this way the socio-
technical as a possibility will not be discarded. 
 
Discarding the theory of correspondence, he creates new expressions, 
namely ‘articulation’, ‘event’ and ‘proposition’. The term ‘event’ highlights the 
possibility of adding new elements to an experiment or discovery. The term 
‘proposition’ is an opportunity (event) for different entities to interact and the 
term ‘articulation’ goes much deeper than speech and is placed as part of 
reality.   
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4.7.2. Latour’s views on Technology 
 
Latour argues against the modernist view of objects in nature and subjects in 
society.  
 
The term totality includes the possibility of interlaced human and non-human 
parts. Latour’s notion of a gun–citizen is such a totality that could be 
structurally analysed. Latour indicates various ways of technical mediation 
like goals, translation, composition, black boxing, etc. which are excellent 
examples of the interaction or interlacement of parts in a totality or an event. 
 
Because he opposes the ‘object-subject’ dichotomy, he does not define any 
object or subject as ‘technological’. The question is why he does not identify a 
totality or collective as ‘technological’. He did identify a scientific ‘totality’ or 
collective; then why not a technical or technological collective? Could 
‘technology’ not also have such a structure? He furthermore identified techno-
science as a fusion of science, organization, and industry, which could be 
seen as a ‘collective’. 
 
To him technology does not exist; there is nothing that can philosophically or 
sociologically be defined as an object or an artefact or a piece of technology. 
He argues that the adjective ‘technical’ is more appropriate than the nouns 
‘technique’ and ‘technology’ to distinguish humans from the multifarious 
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assemblies with which they combine. Although there is something to be said 
for Latour’s claim, the totality (collective) itself should be distinguishable from 
other collective events and collectives. This is a transcendental necessity. 
The ontic uniqueness of entities implies that an entity should be 
distinguishable from all others to qualify as an entity. To identify an entity 
therefore distinguishes it from all other entities. To identify A simultaneously 
distinguishes it from everything that is not A. 
 
To put it more formally and positively, each collective (totality) or event must 
be distinguishable from all other (dissimilar) events or collectives. The fact 
that Latour could create a model of the scientific collective implies that it is 
different from a technical or artistic collective, from a galaxy of stars or other 
hybrids in his world. A citizen–gun totality is certainly not the same as a 
citizen–motorcar totality. If this is true, a technical (or rather, technological) 
totality, which is the interlacement of unequal objects and subjects, should 
reveal a unique set of characteristics different from a scientific or artistic 
totality. Latour missed this point completely. 
 
He further indicates that ‘real artefacts are always part of institutions’, ‘not 
knowing if they are composed of one or of many, of a black-box counting for 
one or of a labyrinth concealing multitudes’. This again raises the question 
whether artefacts are technical by necessity or on some other basis. Could 
one have an artistic artefact, economic artefact or even religious artefact that 
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is therefore not technical? This implies that not all artefacts are technical. 
Furthermore, some indication of the nature or characteristics of such artefacts 
will be required to distinguish between technical and non-technical artefacts. 
Like Ihde, Latour does not make such a distinction. Where Ihde simply 
assumed that all artefacts are technical, Latour simply assumes that they are 
not identifiable as they are interlaced with some bigger totality. If all entities 
have meaning in contexts, it implies that all artefacts will also have meaning 
in a fundamental ontic context. On the basis of its typical context a-typical 
contexts could be highlighted127. Latour missed this as well128. 
 
The fact that Latour suggests that artefacts are part of a totality or collective 
indicates that totalities could have a technical sub-structure. He indicates five 
meanings of the word ‘technical’: 
• a series of sub-programmes; 
• the subordinate role of people, skills or objects, indispensable but 
invisible in a black box; 
• a hitch or snag in the sense of an obstacle, like a ‘technical problem’; 
                                            
127
 This was extensively argued previously, but can be summarised as follows: if all structures 
have a typical inner structure, then this will be highlighted in a typical context. All other non-
typical usages will not change the typical structure. Technical artefacts, like tools, could thus 
be identified in a typical context. 
128
 As explained before because he did not consider the ontic characteristics of the technical. 
He was interested in the ‘politics of things’ which do not cater for transcendental 
investigations. 
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• a unique ability or knack or gift; 
• a modus operandi or chain of know-how. 
 
Although not his intention with this typology, and because the ontical 
transcends his specific focus these designations do not reveal the unique 
nature or characteristic of the technical that would distinguish it from other 
non-technical activities. 
 
In his pragmatogony Latour refers to essential prerequisites in the societal 
knowledge, experience or know-how required before a society can ‘develop’ 
or progress to the next level. Although this is not a historical progression, it is 
a progression of complexity. In this model he expresses some notions of 
science and technology that should be highlighted. 
 
At level 2 Latour speaks of a basic tool kit. A tool is the extension of the 
societal skills of humans to non-humans. We generate tools by shifting 
competencies to non-humans, treating a stone as a partner to act on another 
stone. This indicates a process of formation: forming things of stone by using 
another stone. 
 
At level 4 Latour refers to technique as a modus operandi. A technique is an 
articulated sub-programme for actors that subsist in time and extend in space. 
According to Latour, ‘a bow and arrow, javelin, hammer, clothing or a net are 
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composed of parts and pieces that required recombination’. In this sense all 
these artefacts are the result of a technical recombination or forming process, 
but are not necessarily technical in themselves or technical operators or tools 
to act on other objects. 
 
At level 8 we find industry that developed by allowing non-humans to replace 
humans in the mega machine of organizational structure and relations for the 
purpose of producing or assembling products. 
 
At level 10 we come across the term ‘techno-science’, which is a fusion of 
science, organization and industry. The question arises: why not technology 
and science? The reason is that to Latour technology ‘does not exist’, but 
science as collective does. What distinguishes science from, for instance, 
industry and art? They are all collectives (totalities), but Latour has no way of 
distinguishing between them in his pragmatogony. This is a notable weakness 
in Latour’s argument. 
 
Latour’s efforts to divert the subject-object dichotomy and the division 
between knowledge and belief brought about the creation of the term ‘factish’ 
indicating a combination of facts and fetish. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
221 
He believes that the dichotomy cannot be overcome, but he indicates that the 
intellectual is not supposed to break beliefs with facts or undermine facts with 
beliefs, but rather to protect the diversity of their ontological status.  
 
The implication is that this protection is extended to all the entities involved, 
including subjects and objects, humans and non-humans, facts and fetishes, 
as well as the beliefs which Latour tries to ignore. Reason and belief can 
enrich each other instead of undermining each other.   
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5. An Analysis of the Notions129 of Wiebe E Bijker130 
 
Bijker explains that his book, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs. Towards a 
Theory of Sociotechnical Change, is the result of a personal detour that 
turned into a main route. He started with socio-political concerns about the 
role of technology in society and this became an academic thesis. 
 
Like many Dutch engineering students in the 1970s, he was drawn to the STS 
movement whose goal was to enrich curricula of both schools and universities 
by offering new ways to explore issues such as the risk of nuclear energy and 
environmental degradation. 
 
This analysis is based on this book. It is important to realize that Bijker’s 
approach is sociological131 rather than philosophical, in contrast to the 
predominantly social-philosophical approaches of the previous authors.   
                                            
129
 Although argued previously, it is again a reminder that only the notions of the author 
toward the technical will be investigated. It is assumed that the author is significant and 
worthwhile and no attempt to evaluate his theory and its respective critical reactions are 
contemplated as this transcends the focus and purpose of this study which only concentrate 
on the ontical logic behind the assumptions and notions. None of his critics attempted to 
concentrate on the transcendental conditions as it transcended their foci as well.  
130
 My thanks to Prof Mouton for highlighting Wiebe Bijker as a worthwhile author to study. 
131
 This implies that he will not be able to distinguish the meaning-nucleus of the technical, as 
he does not proceed from an ontological viewpoint. 
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5.1. Introduction 
 
Bijker (1995: 4-5) says that the stories we tell about technology reflect and 
can also affect our understanding of the place of technology in our lives and 
our society.  He believes that such stories harbour theories. In his studies he 
found three models: 
‘First, there were those who looked down their noses at mere 
story-tellers. These were the scholars, often with 
backgrounds in the social sciences, who advocated general 
typologies, precise conceptual definitions, and macro-
theoretical schemes that could produce “real” insights and 
explanations. 
Second, there were those who poked fun at any theoretical 
generalization beyond the uniquely detailed story. These 
students, often of the historians “tribe”, scanned the empty 
theoretical boxes and abstract schemata that did not display 
any familiarity with what “really” went on. 
Third, there were the political activists, who considered any 
detour into academia a betrayal of the immediate societal 
tasks that should be the constant overriding concern of 
critical intellectuals’ (Bijker, 1995: 5). 
 
He found that all three approaches are equally necessary. He believes that 
effective societal action concerning issues of technology and science cannot 
do without scholarly support, while academic technology studies have much 
to gain from engagement with politically relevant issues. Furthermore, to his 
mind, only an integration of detailed empirical case studies with general 
conceptual frameworks can form this link between academia and politics. 
 
Lastly he believes that an integration of case studies, theoretical 
generalizations and political analysis is called for to understand the relations 
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between technology and society and resolve issues of socio-technical 
change. 
 
Bijker uses as a guide a new research programme of a constructivist study of 
technology, which is mainly based on a combination of historical and 
sociological perspectives. This is the so-called SCOT (social construction of 
technology) paradigm. Efforts to include economics and philosophy are also 
made, as will be illustrated later. 
‘A central adage for this research is that one should never 
take the meaning of a technical artifact or technological 
system as residing in the technology itself. Instead, one must 
study how the technologies are shaped and acquire their 
meanings in the heterogeneity of social interactions’ (Bijker, 
1995: 6). 
 
In light of the fact that any disciplinary approach cannot cater for an ontic 
totality view, any statement about the meaning of a technical artefact that 
indicates some meaning other than in the ontic needs to be investigated in 
this thesis, as this thesis simultaneously tries to identify other possible frames 
which could enlighten the ontic framework. 
  
It is accepted that the meaning of something should not reside in itself. This 
pre-supposes that no ‘thing-in-itself’ exists. One can now search for a 
framework within which to interpret this meaning in line with the principle of 
meaning in context. Bijker searches for this context in social interaction. This 
is obviously not the only framework that can be used. Although the framework 
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of social interaction would highlight various issues, it must also be borne in 
mind that any transcendental issue would transcend this specific framework. 
 
If meaning were ultimately associated with reality, then the widest possible 
context, which will encompass all other contexts, or is fundamental to all other 
orientations, would be the context of ontic conditions. This framework would 
focus on the ontic meaning of technology in all its potential and possible 
relationships and within all possible frameworks. 
 
The chosen societal or social relations framework would make assumptions 
about ontic reality132 and could generate contextual fallacies, if not closely 
monitored.  
 
5.1.1. Socio-technical change framework 
 
Bijker highlights the fact that within the constructivist’s approach three lines of 
work can be distinguished, namely the systems approach, the actor-network 
approach and the social construction of technology (SCOT) approach.  From 
the SCOT approach he has developed arguments that he believes are of 
general relevance for the whole spectrum of modern constructivist studies. 
 
                                            
132
 This is in line with all special or disciplinary scientific activity. 
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He points out that the newer research programmes are designed to avoid the 
pitfall of linear development or even implicit assumptions of linear 
development. Such assumptions were often found in earlier technology 
studies (see Fig. 8. below): 
 
 
Fig. 8. Bijker’s illustration of a six-stage model of the innovation process. 
(Bijker, 1995: 7) 
 
The problem is that an expected linearity blinds us to retrospective distortions, 
because it results in an implicit teleology or determinism, suggesting that the 
whole history of technological development followed an orderly rational path, 
as if today’s world was the precise goal towards which all decisions in history 
were directed. 
 
Another pitfall that he highlights is the asymmetrical analysis of technology.  
This indicates a focus on successful innovations, which suggests an 
underlying assumption that it is the success of an artefact that offers some 
explanatory ground for the dynamics of its development.  A historical account 
concentrating on the retrospective success of an artefact leaves much untold. 
A ‘failed’ artefact could also have contributed to the stabilization or closure of 
a design. It could, if nothing else, indicate how something should not be done. 
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This is an important contribution to our insight into the development of 
‘artefacts’.  
 
Bijker also refers to the key debate in the history of technology on the primacy 
of internalist versus contextualist (or externalist) studies. Internalists believe 
that one can understand the development of a technology only if one starts 
with an understanding of the minute technical design details of technology. 
Contextualists, by contrast, believe that the economic, social, political and 
scientific contexts of a technology are as important to its development as the 
technical design characteristics.  
 
The irony here is that in certain circumstances both are right and wrong. If 
one is interested in studying the historical development of a technical design 
like the computer chip, one requires an ‘understanding of the technical design 
in its minute details’ and the appropriate framework. On the other hand, if one 
is interested in studying an artefact in society, one requires the broader 
context. The focus of the problem will determine the appropriate framework. 
This is an application of the epistemological principle of meaning in context133.  
 
                                            
133
 In the epistemology of the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea it is argued, as mentioned 
in chapter one, that facts are placed within the framework of a law order, reflected within a 
correlating theoretical framework. The latter determines the meaning of all concepts. This is 
indicated by the idea of meaning in context. 
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What does seem to be lacking is the insight that the transcendental questions 
of technology transcend even these frameworks and that the place of the 
technical in reality might contribute to a better understanding of its structure 
and its interaction with humanity and society134. This was precisely the 
critique of Van Riesen (1949: 1): that from the beginning too much attention 
was given to the influence of technique on society, with the result that the 
place and characteristics of the technical as entity were neglected.  
 
Although Bijker regards context as important he is not a pure contextualist.  
He believes that  
‘… rather than being satisfied with the distinction between 
technology and its context as the basic dimension for 
analysis, we must figure out a way to take the common 
evolution of technology and society as our unit of analysis’ 
(Bijker, 1995: 10). 
 
At this point some issues should be highlighted. 
 
Firstly, to find the true meaning of technology, a transcendental account of 
ontic conditions should be used, but this does not mean that the ontic is the 
only possible perspective to use when studying technology. 
  
                                            
134
 Keep in mind that the SCOT movement does not advocate a transcendental approach and 
that it transcends their focus. This unfortunately still does not mean that it is not relevant or 
cannot contribute to our understanding of the ontic conditions of the technical. 
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Secondly, Bijker has already stated that he is interested in the context of 
social interactions, which focuses on how technology and society interact. 
Transcendental questions will transcend this specific framework since the 
framework pre-supposes a notion of technology and of society as necessary 
pre-requisites in the framework, and the focus of his framework would be on 
the interaction of the two elements and not the transcendental conditions or 
the structure of either of these entities. 
 
Thirdly, Bijker indicates that he wants to specialize even further. He is 
interested in the evolution or development of technology, in the development 
of society, and especially in the commonalities of these developments or 
evolution.  
 
This is a legitimate framework or context within which to study the 
‘developmental interaction’ of technology and society. He will, however, 
require some orientation and notions that are ‘outside’ this framework and for 
that he would need to use a philosophical or orientating framework to guide 
certain assumptions.  
 
To put it differently; the framework above presupposes three notions, namely 
society, technology and evolution. It does not allow of the notion of a totality 
and cannot provide a comprehensive definition of society, technology or 
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development, because all are presupposed in the framework.  Furthermore, 
something cannot be fully explained by its relationships only135. 
 
Bijker also highlights the issue of technological creativity.  The long-standing 
question is whether it is a ‘necessity’, which implies that an invention will 
sooner or later emerge out of felt needs, independent of individual creativity, 
or whether the act of ingenuity without which needs might never be fulfilled is 
primary, with individual ‘genius’ being the impetus behind creative technology. 
 
Bijker tends to regard the development of technology and its inventions as a 
social process. He introduces a conceptual framework that links the stories of 
individual inventors to a sociological analysis of their positions in a specific 
technological culture. This is in line with his chosen sociological 
‘developmental interaction’ framework and is quite legitimate, provided it is 
realized that it is but one framework for or approach to the study of the 
development of technology. 
 
                                            
135
 Although it might seem that the position of Bijker is criticized too quickly, it by now should 
be clear that our analysis is involved in developing a ‘meta-theory’ or ‘pre-disciplinary 
theoretical’ approach where almost none of the theory of Bijker will be discussed for the sake 
of its theory, but for the sake of assessing the relevant ontological assumptions. Bijker states 
his framework and assumptions in his own words and it is obvious that any ontical totality 
view of technology will transcend his theoretical framework. 
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A last guideline comes from political science. The notion of power, according 
to him, was not addressed by earlier sociologies of technology. Power as a 
central category has been avoided because explanations in terms of power 
so easily result in important factors being overlooked. Bijker refines the notion 
of power to illustrate that strategies are employed to create a certain 
outcome. In his analysis of power strategies, he especially focuses on the role 
of artefacts. He further focuses on the actual design process of an artefact. 
 
In his selection of artefacts he picked cases that would allow of a focus on the 
‘hard’ contents rather than their systematic aspects. He therefore 
concentrates on ‘elementary innovations’, rather than technological systems; 
for example, the bicycle rather than the motorcar, Bakelite rather than 
synthetic material in general and the fluorescent lamp rather than electric 
lighting in general: 
‘The cases are also varied in terms of their underlying 
engineering background: mechanical engineering (the 
bicycle), chemical engineering (Bakelite), and electrical 
engineering (the fluorescent lamp). With respect to industrial 
context, the cases move from a blacksmith’s workshop 
(bicycle) to an early scientific laboratory (Bakelite) to a large 
industrial laboratory (fluorescent lamp)’ (Bijker, 1995: 12). 
 
Further differences are that the bicycle is aimed exclusively at the consumer 
market, Bakelite as a moulding material is aimed at the industrial market, and 
the fluorescent lamp has a hybrid character. In patent literature a distinction is 
made between a product and a process patent. The bicycle and fluorescent 
lamp are products, whereas Bakelite is a process patent. 
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It is important to note that the selection of these cases was guided by ‘an 
intuitive and common sense idea’ about ‘technology’ and ‘society’ and their 
‘developmental process’, and that a clear definition or description of society 
and technology has not been provided. It is taken as a given. Again this is in 
line with the fact that a ‘specialized’ framework or context would borrow 
notions and approaches via assumptions from other general frameworks or 
philosophical frameworks. 
 
No new transcendental or ontological description or definition of technology or 
its ontic nature could therefore be expected136, but rather a contribution to our 
understanding of the developmental interaction between society and 
technology. Concentrating on artefacts and the design of artefacts in his case 
studies should enable Bijker to make a clear distinction between artefacts and 
technology, thereby avoiding the contextual fallacy that occurred when Ihde 
equated artefacts with technology.  
 
5.1.2. Requirements for a theory of Socio-technical Change 
 
Bijker highlights four requirements for a theory of technological development 
as is shown in the table below. 
                                            
136
 Although this is clearly stated a lot of critique was received on the fact that Bijker did not 
give a totality view of the technical when it was correctly concluded. Refer to 5.6 
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Table 1. Bijker’s requirements for a theory of technological development. 
(Bijker, 1995: 13) 
 
Firstly, he acknowledges that two approaches to technical change exist: a 
rational, goal directed activity and a process of trial and error with an 
accumulative result of small and mostly random modifications.  The most 
recent studies of the sociology of scientific knowledge stress the contingent 
character of scientific development; it is assumed that this contingency would 
also be fruitful for studies in technical development. This borrowing assumes 
that all technical development cannot be logically or pre-determinately or 
even easily explained.  
 
On the other hand, he noticed that too much contingency would result in 
actors who have no meaningful history of their own.  Evidently, an explanation 
of orderly constancy and continuity in history and the conditions under which 
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they exist is required. According to the first requirement listed in Table 1, 
namely ‘change/continuity’, technical change and stabilization or the stability 
of artefacts must be explained. 
 
The second requirement that is highlighted is the principle of symmetry.  This 
concerns the issue that the success or failure of an artefact is to be explained 
symmetrically by the conceptual framework. The principle of symmetry has its 
origins in the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge (Edinburgh 
School) of the early seventies and has had a major influence on all 
subsequent sociology of science studies: 
‘Understanding the construction of “working” and 
“nonworking” as nonintrinsic but contingent properties is the 
second requirement for the theory of technical change …’ 
(Bijker, 1995: 15) 
 
It is important to stress that the notions of ‘working’ and ‘non-working’ are 
limited to the ‘social developmental’ framework. It would not be valid for a 
transcendental approach to ontic conditions. In an ontological framework the 
‘meaning’ of something is related to its ‘ontic’ identity (structure) and meaning 
or ‘working’, so to speak. If something loses its ‘identity’ or ‘purpose’ or 
‘working’ it will cease to have the same meaning. A wineglass that broke into 
splinters is not a wineglass any more but glass splinters, but it does not 
change into ‘nothing’.  
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On the other hand, a sword may lose its ‘societal function as weapon’ in the 
modern age and become only a historical or artistic artefact, but it still 
remains a sword. The implication is that even though an artefact can become 
‘non-working’ in a societal context, it still is an entity or (changed) ‘artefact’ in 
an ontic context and could therefore still be identified as ‘something’. If this 
were not the case, it would be impossible to identify an artefact as artefact. It 
is only because one can still (ontically) identify an artefact as artefact that 
Bijker can determine whether it is ‘working’ or ‘non-working’ in a societal 
context.137  
 
It would in light of the above argument be a contextual fallacy to conclude that 
the ‘societal’ working or non-working of artefacts is equal to the identity and 
‘working or non-working’ of artefacts in an ontic sense.  
 
The third requirement is closely related to the orderliness of and order for 
reality expressed in the constancy and change of reality. Bijker indicates that 
the emphasis on the contingent character of technical change may seem to 
imply that anything is possible and that each configuration of artefacts and 
social groups can be built up or broken down at will. He stresses that it clearly 
underestimates the solidity of society and the stability of technical artefacts. 
This also loses sight of structural constraints. The third requirement stresses 
that the actor and structure of the artefact should be made visible.   
                                            
137
 Please refer to 1.5.3.5. 
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The final assumption is that society must be analyzed as a seamless web:   
‘The analyst should not assume a priori different scientific, 
technical, social, cultural and economic factors’ (Bijker, 1995: 
15).  
 
From a transcendental philosophical view this requirement seems very 
limiting. All assumptions have an a priori character at first. The notion of the 
‘seamless web’ itself is therefore assumed a priori.  
 
The question arises why one may a priori assume the notion of a ‘seamless 
web’ but not ‘scientific, technical, social, cultural and economic factors’. What 
about a case where a framework is constructed (as Bijker does when he 
assumes a priori ‘society’, ‘technology’ and ‘interactive development’) in which 
a specific focus on the economic or political influences of artefacts are of 
interest? Can one then assume a priori an economic or political factor? 
 
Furthermore, there is the question of lingual, political, aesthetical, ethical or 
certitudinal factors. They were not mentioned above; can it therefore be a 
priori assumed that they may be a priori assumed?   
 
5.2. The Social Construction of the Safety Bicycle 
 
In chapter two, Bijker systematically analyses the historical technical 
conditions and societal attitudes towards bicycles. 
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He identifies or ‘defines’ the notion of ‘relevant social groups’.  ‘Relevant’ in 
this sense implies groups related to an artefact and which had an impact on 
such an artefact. With this notion Bijker therefore correlates a social group 
with a specific artefact. 
 
Another notion is ‘interpretative flexibility’. The Penny Farthing could be 
regarded as an ‘unsafe bicycle’: it is difficult to steer and propel and, because 
of its high front wheel construction, it topples over easily, resulting in a hard 
fall for its rider. This, however, was one of its attractive features to young men 
with daring and athletic skills who wanted to show off and impress girls, 
making it a ‘macho bicycle’. Interpretative flexibility therefore articulates the 
more fundamental concept of ‘meaning in context’, suggesting that artefacts 
could have different meanings for different groups in different contexts. 
 
He stresses that the macho bicycle is radically different from the unsafe 
bicycle – it is designed to meet different criteria, it is sold, bought, and used 
for different purposes and it is evaluated according to different standards. In 
his classification it is considered a machine that ‘works’, while the unsafe 
bicycle is a ‘non-working’ machine. 
 
In terms of Bijker’s descriptive model, it is implied that the Penny Farthing 
was deconstructed into two different artefacts: 
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 ‘Each of these artifacts, the “Unsafe” and the “Macho” are 
described as constructed by a relevant social group, and this 
description also includes a specification of what counts as 
“working” for that machine, for that group’ (Bijker, 1995: 75).  
 
It is important that ‘working’ and ‘non-working’ are socially constructed 
assessments, rather than intrinsic properties of the artefact and are only valid 
in social interaction between artefacts and social groups. This limitation will 
also limit the conclusions that one arrives at about artefacts. 
 
Bijker thus argues that the account of bicycle development can be adequately 
summed up by distinguishing two separate artefacts, the ‘unsafe’ and the 
‘macho’, hidden within one contraption of metal and rubber, etc.  This 
demonstrates the notion of interpretative flexibility, if one considers the 
different design trends. 
 
He points out that designers who regarded the bicycle as unsafe sought to 
solve the safety problem by moving the saddle backward, adding auxiliaries, 
reversing the position of the small and large wheels and making changes to 
the basic scheme. The ‘macho’ developed in the opposite direction: the front 
wheel was made as large as possible, stiffer spokes were developed for the 
large wheel, etc. 
‘To distinguish two different artifacts in this way is more 
straightforward than trying to cope with the wide spectrum of 
different designs, even though one needs some imagination 
to see them within that one Ordinary’ (Bijker, 1995: 76). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
239 
Bijker calls this sociological deconstruction. The possibility of demonstrating 
the interpretative flexibility of artefacts by sociological deconstructions implies 
a sociological explanation of the development of artefacts:   
‘If no interpretative flexibility could be demonstrated, all 
properties of an artifact could be argued to be immanent after 
all. Thus there would be no social dimension to design: only 
application and diffusion – or context, for short – would form 
the social dimensions of technical development’ (Bijker, 
1995: 76). 
 
A point that Bijker seems to miss is that meaning can also be attached to 
relationships. Not only the artefact has properties; the relationship between 
the social group and the artefact has meaning too. Interpretative flexibility 
should therefore also refer to the relationship itself; therefore, to allocate all 
meaning as immanent to the artefact, as he indicates, is not the only possible 
alternative.  
 
To Bijker it is important to realize that relevant social groups do not simply 
see different aspects of one artefact. The meanings given by a relevant social 
group actually ‘constitute’ the artefact. There are as many artefacts as there 
are relevant groups and there is no artefact not constituted by a relevant 
social group. 
 
The fact that different groups give different meanings to an artefact and in 
essence create a ‘societally’ useful artefact seems acceptable. From an ontic 
point of view the structure of the artefact, which is stable or persistent, with an 
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identifiable uniqueness or qualification, will determine its meaning. The 
meanings of other groups in other contexts cannot change the ontic nature or 
reality of the artefact. In an ontic context the meanings attributed by groups 
cannot constitute the reality of the artefact.  
 
To Bijker, meaning-giving serves as a substitute for the idea of objectification. 
In a certain sense meaning turns into a feature of the meaning-giving subject, 
whether this is an individual or group, but this perspective leaves out of 
consideration the ontic conditions (or modal aspects) that make every 
conceivable act of meaning-giving possible.  
 
From his chosen sociological framework Bijker indicates that once an artefact 
has been deconstructed into different ‘societal’ artefacts, what then has to be 
explained is how these different artefacts develop, which dominate and which 
fade. In the case of the bicycle the macho dominated in the beginning, but 
was superseded by the ‘safety’ bicycle. The notions of ‘stabilization’ and 
‘closure’ can explain this. 
 
Closure means that the ‘interpretative flexibility’ of an artefact (in a societal 
context) diminishes. Consensus among the different relevant social groups on 
the dominant meaning of an artefact emerges and the dominant artefact will 
stabilize within the relevant social groups.  It is important to realize that the 
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invention of the bicycle was not an isolated event, but an eighteen-year 
process before final closure and stabilization occurred. 
 
In this case study Bijker argues for and succeeds in meeting two of the four 
requirements for a theory of socio-technical change.  The focus on relevant 
social groups and interpretative flexibility ensures that the model meets the 
requirements of symmetry while the concept of closure and stabilization 
explains constancy amidst what is contingent. 
 
No specific link between artefact and technology has been identified yet, 
other than the a priori assumption that there is a link. In addition, no 
distinction between the technical and technological was highlighted, nor 
between the societal and technical. The implication is that the societal 
construction of a ‘safety’ or ‘macho’ machine does not indicate whether it is a 
technical or technological artefact in addition to it being a societal (group) 
artefact.  
 
5.3. The Social Construction of Bakelite 
 
In this section Bijker uses an empirical case study to illustrate that, even in 
the instance of an individual inventor, a social constructivist analysis is 
possible and yields fruitful results.  The second aim is to explain the concepts 
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of ‘technological frame’ and ‘inclusion’, which relate the interactions of 
individual actors to the social process that forms relevant social groups. 
 
In his case study Bijker describes the cultural, scientific and industrial 
background of the case. The earliest moulding material, which was of natural 
or semi-natural origin, determined the cultural context of chemical work in this 
field. 
 
In summary, he explains that natural rubber (or ‘India’ rubber) cannot 
withstand temperatures above 80 °C or less than 10 °C. In a vulcanization 
process, rubber is heated with sulphur, which renders it more flexible and 
durable. Varying the amount of sulphur could control this; more sulphur 
makes it harder and less flexible, suitable for many new applications. 
 
He points out that the range of applications brought new relevant social 
groups into the picture. Applications ranged from electrical insulation to ‘hard’ 
rubber (vulcanite) and ebonite, from car battery storage compartments to the 
manufacture of surgical instruments, artificial teeth and ebonite furniture. 
 
He continues by explaining that the depletion of natural supplies necessitated 
the creation of new plastic materials like Parkesine from nitro-cellulose, which 
could be produced from paper and ivoride. 
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5.3.1. Technological Frame 
 
Bijker introduces the notion of ‘technological frame’, referring to the relevant 
social group of celluloid chemists. They were strongly motivated to produce a 
plastic material, initially aimed at the consumer market, but eventually also the 
industrial market. 
 
They tried to modify the production process to remedy the flammability of the 
product and to develop new applications. They searched for cheaper raw 
materials, working towards a fully synthetic plastic. It is this diversity but also 
coherence that the concept of technological frame is meant to capture.  Being 
located among actors, it structures the interactions between the actors of a 
relevant social group, and it develops when interaction with an artefact 
begins. Existing practice guides future practice but without logical 
determination. If existing interactions move members of an emerging relevant 
social group in the same direction, a technological frame will develop, 
otherwise there is no frame, no group and no further interaction. 
 
Bijker gives an example of this in his case study. He compares Parkesine and 
celluloid. Parkesine, the first celluloid substitute, did not give rise to a specific 
technological frame because the interactions around it came to an end before 
a relevant social group and further interaction could develop. The opposite 
happened to celluloid: its stabilization was accompanied by the establishment 
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of a relevant social group of celluloid chemists and their continuing 
interactions gave rise to a new technological frame (see Table. 2). 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of elements of the technological frame of celluloid 
chemists. (Bijker, 1995: 126) 
 
5.3.2. Degrees of inclusion in a technological frame 
 
The degree of inclusion of an actor in a technological frame shows to what 
extent that particular frame structures the actions. 
 
Bijker explains how Baekeland, the inventor of Bakelite, was involved in 
different relevant social groups. As amateur photographer and later the 
inventor of Velox photographic paper that was sold to Kodak Eastman, he 
was part of the technological frame of photo chemists. After the deal with 
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Kodak Eastman, he could not become involved in photography and he moved 
to an electro-chemist frame. 
 
Baekeland became interested in the reaction between phenol and 
formaldehyde in about 1902. At that stage the chemistry of phenol-
formaldehydes was in disarray:  
‘Chemists in Europe were mixing various formaldehydes, 
phenol, solvents, acids, and alkalies, under different pressures 
and with or without applying extra heat to dry the product. The 
results ranged from sticky syrups to unmanageable solids that 
defied chemical analysis’ (Bijker, 1995: 144). 
 
 
Baekeland tried to find patterns in this chaos. He set out to map the role of all 
possible variables in the reaction, typical of someone with a high degree of 
inclusion in the technological frame of photo chemists, unlike the celluloid 
chemists that simply substituted one solvent for another or the dye chemists 
aiming at chemical analysis. From this it is clear that one can be included in 
different technological frames and in different relevant groups. Bijker shows 
that Baekeland had a high degree of inclusion in the technological frame of 
the photo-chemists. 
 
5.3.3. The Stabilization of Bakelite 
 
It was several years before a form of Bakelite stabilized for a longer period; 
this is different from the development of the bicycle. Bijker points out that in 
  
 
 
 
 
246 
the case of the bicycle it was the interpretative flexibility of the various 
relevant social groups that constituted different artefacts resulting in closure. 
Here we also see a series of quite different bakelites, the first four of which 
did not stabilize for longer than a few weeks or months:  
‘Only the fifth, by that time called Bakelite, did stabilize for a 
long period of time, although of course further modified as 
more relevant social groups got involved. It seems more 
appropriate to view this as a stabilization process, because it 
did involve the gradual “condensation” of one specific 
meaning of the artifact Bakelite ...’ (Bijker, 1995: 151). 
 
Baekeland could not devote all his time to Bakelite research. After various 
trips he continued his research and filed his first patents. These ‘heat-and-
pressures patents’ did not describe the process in any precise sense. This 
process was still to be refined in the following years after he filed the original 
patent on 13 July 1907: 
‘It is fascinating to see in Baekeland’s laboratory notebooks 
how great the interpretative flexibility of the various ‘facts’ still 
was, long after the ‘moment of invention’ as symbolized by 
the filing of the patents. Baekeland continued to be unsure 
and he studied virtually all parameters’ (Bijker, 1995: 152). 
 
Between 1911 and 1917 several developments contributed to the stabilization 
of Bakelite. Firstly, a number of patent litigations, which formed the newly 
emerging relevant social group of Bakelite engineers, occurred. This was 
partly because more chemists from the celluloid chemists’ group were 
enrolled and partly because the trials helped to explicate the Bakelite 
technological frame. Although Baekeland won all his legal battles, he also 
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engaged his opponents afterwards and found new forms or license 
agreements to develop Bakelite even further: 
‘These patent struggles and commercial rearrangements did 
contribute to the stabilization of Bakelite, as can be seen in 
Baekeland’s description of Bakelite after the closure of the 
controversy with Leback and his review of Phenol-
formaldehyde resins after the resolution of the conflict with 
Aylsworth and Redman’ (Bijker, 1995: 172). 
 
 
The second way in which Bakelite was further stabilized was collaboration 
with other industries. Bijker (1995: 174) explains that the automotive ignition 
people took to Bakelite. Its insulation properties, chemical resistance and 
quality as moulding material soon won over most producers. Automotive 
engineers soon found other applications, like steering wheels, door handles, 
instrument panels, gearshifts, knobs etc. The electricity industry made 
switches, insulators, moulded meter covers, circuit breakers, parts for home 
appliances such as toasters, washing machines, electric irons, vacuum 
sweepers, etc. The booming telephone and radio industries, which needed 
small, precision-moulded components, gave further stimulus to the application 
of Bakelite. 
 
The third important factor in the stabilization of Bakelite was World War I. 
Bijker (1995: 176) explains that firstly, the companies of German origin had to 
split. Secondly, the plastics market was affected. There was a greater 
demand for ignition systems for military trucks and aeroplanes, but raw 
materials were scarcer. In Europe it caused a wild search for substitutes, 
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resulting in mostly inferior quality with changing compositions and properties. 
At the end of the war the market was flooded with these wartime substitute 
plastics that damaged the regulatory function and public image of synthetic 
plastics. In the United States the public image of plastics did not suffer such 
damage. Here  
chemistry came out of the classroom and enjoyed the positive 
connotations of the ‘machine age’. (Bijker, 1995: 178). 
 
After the war an over-supply of phenol resulted in low prices that were 
advantageous for marketing Bakelite products. 
 
The relevant social group of industrial designers was the fourth factor in the 
stabilization of Bakelite.  
In the 1930s, industrial design emerged as a profession. (Bijker, 
1995: 179). 
 
It was then typically restricted to luxury items produced in small quantities. 
The new streamlined machine style, recognized as modern, worked against 
the poor image of the substitute plastics of the First World War.  
During the Great Depression manufacturers had another goal: 
to produce better products for less money. Industrial design 
thus had to contribute to the reduction of the manufacturing 
costs and mass production while maintaining products’ 
exclusive and luxurious appearance. (Bijker, 1995: 182). 
 
Lastly, Bijker (1995: 188) explained, the stabilization of Bakelite was 
influenced by the relevant social group of customers. Based on two surveys 
conducted in Germany and Holland, the construction of a consumer group 
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was attempted. Bakelite had a relatively positive connotation and was more 
familiar in industrial regions than in rural areas and better known for its 
elegant designs than for its non-flammability or chemical resistance. It was 
known as an object of use but was not associated with elegance or luxury – 
as a gift, crystal or delftware would have been preferred. 
 
From the above it is clear that stabilization was not a quick, straightforward 
process. It involved various ‘relevant’ groups, from engineers to users, and 
various political and economic factors over a length of time. The process of 
production also underwent change, which brought about variations of 
Bakelite. 
 
5.4. Technological Frame as a Theoretical Concept 
 
In the case study of bicycles, Bijker concentrates on the succession of 
different ‘social’ artefacts. With Bakelite it seems one should focus on the 
process of technical change. Bijker points out that additional concepts are 
required for doing this. 
 
He proposes the notion of a technological frame.  According to him, 
technological frames outline both the central problems and the related 
strategies for solving them. He explains the dynamics of technological frames, 
highlighting that they do not reside in individuals but are located in relevant 
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social groups. It therefore needs to be continuously sustained by actions and 
interaction. They are not fixed entities but are built up as part of the 
stabilization process of an artefact:  
‘The social construction of an artifact (e.g., Celluloid), the 
forming of a relevant social group (e.g., Celluloid engineers), 
and the emergence of a technological frame (e.g., the 
Celluloid frame) are linked processes’ (Bijker, 1995: 193). 
 
 
To simplify matters Bijker implicitly indicates a one-to-one relationship 
between a relevant social group, its technological frame and an artefact. 
 
Two important issues must be highlighted. Firstly, a group of actors consisting 
of different relevant social groups (engineers, consumers, industrialists, etc.) 
is of course working with a variety of artefacts and, secondly, different 
relevant social groups could use one artefact. Bijker illustrates it as follows 
(see Fig. 9). 
 
Fig. 9. Bijker’s illustration of technological frames. (Bijker, 1995: 196). 
 
Where relevant social groups differed in their attribution of meaning, 
interpretative flexibility was observed and different artefacts were socially 
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constituted (unsafe or macho machine).  When consensus emerged among 
the social groups, the process of ‘closure’ was noted. 
 
This differs from ‘stabilization’ in which the artefact acquires an increasing 
degree of stability. Stabilization occurs not because, in the conflict of relevant 
social groups, one eventually dominates, but because the artefact does not 
change significantly: 
‘By rendering the two sides of the analysis – social groups 
and technical artifacts – into aspects of one world, “techno-
logical frame” will be helpful in transcending the distinction 
between hitherto irreconcilable opposites: the social shaping 
of technology and the technological impact on society, social 
determinism and technical determinism, society and techno-
logy’ (Bijker, 1995: 195,196). 
 
The ‘technological frame’ serves as the connecter in Bijker’s theoretical 
framework of the ‘common evolution of technology and society’ – he believes 
that he connects ‘irreconcilable opposites’ within his framework, which is, in 
short, society and technology, as indicated in the quotation above. In effect he 
only ‘connects’ a relevant ‘group’, which is a component of society, and 
artefacts, which are not necessarily technological, within this ‘structure’.  
The assumption that artefacts are technological in nature is questionable, as 
has previously been indicated. Therefore it is not socio-technical but group-
artefactual relationships that are identified.  
 
Lastly, a more appropriate way to explain the notion of ‘technological frame’ is 
to describe it as a group-artefactual frame. Yet no explanation of why it 
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should be ‘technological’ instead of ‘technical’ is given. It is actually the 
acceptance of artefacts by society – in other words, techno-literacy – that is 
studied, as well as the feedback of these artefacts on the techno-knowledge 
and techno-practice used to stabilize designs.  
 
5.5. The Social Construction of Fluorescent Lighting 
 
Bijker demonstrates further how his framework can be put to work to link the 
development of artefacts and the development of society and social power.  
In the previous chapters he reviewed cases of mechanical and chemical 
engineering with a consumer and industrial focus; these cases involved a 
process and a product. 
 
Here he chose an electrical engineering case with the intention of addressing 
the economic and power dimensions of technological development. The 
technical design had been completed months before the ‘final’ social 
construction was carried out by managers at a conference table. In this case 
it was proved that economic and political power play a role in technical 
development. 
 
5.5.1. The history of the Electric Lamp Industry 
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Bijker (1995: 201,2,3) summarised the history of the electric lamp industry. In 
the 1880s Thomas Edison began the electric lighting industry in the US. 
Three large companies dominated the market. They were the Edison General 
Electric Company, the Thomson-Houston Electric Company and 
Westinghouse. 
 
The Edison and Thomson-Houston companies merged in 1892 to form 
General Electric. The proliferation of patents for all sorts of technical electrical 
artefacts was a problem; it became difficult to set up any electrical system 
without infringing upon some or other patent. 
 
By 1896, General Electric and Westinghouse established a cross-licensing 
agreement allowing access to each other’s patents. General Electric 
commanded 50% and Westinghouse 10% of the market, and smaller firms 
shared the rest. 
 
Because these small lamp manufacturers found it difficult to compete with 
General Electric, they established the National Electric Lamp Company in 
1901. It was set up as a holding company, leaving the individual firms 
relatively independent. Interestingly, General Electric purchased almost 75% 
of the stock but kept out of the day-to-day management. 
‘Publicly, the National Electric Lamp Company and General 
Electric presented themselves as competing, but they signed 
various patent licensing agreements, and most of the firms in 
the electric lamp business (including Westinghouse) partici-
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pated in price and market-sharing agreements’ (Bijker, 1995: 
203). 
 
 
The development of the tungsten filament lamp also dealt the final blow to gas 
and arc lighting. By 1912 General Electric held an 80% market share and 
licensed most of the remainder under its patents. General Electric held all the 
crucial patents and between 1913 and 1945, lighting in the USA was 
incandescent lighting as manufactured by General Electric. (Bijker, 1995: 
203). 
 
On the supply side, the market was thus relatively cohesive. 
General Electric and Westinghouse manufactured all types of 
lamps, while smaller companies had to limit themselves to a 
few types. (Bijker, 1995: 204) 
 
On the demand side the market was segmented. Firstly, outdoor lighting, 
including street lighting, used incandescent lamps and neon-sodium 
discharge lamps. Secondly, coloured outdoor advertising lamps formed a 
different segment of the market and high-voltage discharge lamps were used 
in this segment. (Bijker, 1995: 204)  
 
Bijker indicates (1995: 204) that the market for indoor lighting was divided 
between household and large commercial buyers. Lastly, there were so-called 
miniature lamps for automotive and photographic uses. A last group called 
specialized lamps was used for different specialized purposes. (Bijker, 1995: 
204) 
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Bijker (1995: 204,5) points out that a new relationship developed called the 
Mazda group. The Mazda companies consisted of General Electric and 
Westinghouse with a special agreement while all the other smaller firms were 
licensed according to a more limited or restricted agreement. The Mazda 
companies had links with sales agents, central electric utilities and fixture 
manufacturers.  All dealers had to sell Mazda lamps at consumer prices 
ultimately set by the Mazda companies. Grocery, drug and electrical stores 
acted as retailers, more strictly controlled than would have been the case 
under normal market conditions.  
 
Bijker (1995: 206) indicates that the central electricity-producing utilities had 
originally been organized as licensees of the Edison, Thomson-Houston or 
Westinghouse companies and with the continued increase in the use of 
electrical appliances both groups stayed dependent on one another. The 
basis of this relationship was an understanding that each side would promote 
the interests of the other two. 
‘The utilities undertook to sell and promote Mazda lamps – 
and the appliances and other electrical apparatus of the 
Mazda manufacturers as well – and for their part, the Mazda 
manufacturers undertook to promote their products in such a 
way as to add to the amount of electricity consumed’ (Bijker, 
1995: 206). 
 
 
Lastly, Bijker (1995: 207) points out that a similar close relation existed 
between the Mazda companies and the fixture manufacturers. The Mazda 
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companies produced mainly lamps. Smaller companies produced sockets, 
reflectors and other auxiliaries.   
 
A system of specifications for incandescent lighting was introduced. This 
system was maintained by the RLM Standards Institute, an association of the 
largest fixture manufacturers. It established standards that the products of its 
members had to meet, which also favoured Mazda lamps. 
 
The Mazda companies therefore occupied a privileged position and 
dominated the market and were bound to an agreement with the electricity 
suppliers to add to the electricity that would be consumed. 
 
 
5.5.2. Fluorescence and the social construction of fluorescent lighting 
 
‘The phenomenon of fluorescence had already been known 
for a long time, when the physicist George Stokes studied 
fluorite, a mineral that displays the effect strongly, and coined 
the term “fluorescence”’ (Bijker, 1995: 217).  
 
 
Bijker (1995: 217) mentions that the term ‘fluorescence’ was used for 
illumination phenomena caused by some form of external radiation like X-rays 
or ultraviolet as opposed to illumination caused by heating (incandescence).  
Phosphorescence is fluorescence that persists for a while after the existing 
radiation has ceased.  Bijker mentions that phosphors were sometimes used 
for all fluorescent materials, which is confusing. 
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The successful application of neon lamps in advertising led to the 
use of fluorescence to create a wider spectrum of more distinctive 
colours. The tubes were internally coated with fluorescent 
powder. (Bijker, 1995:  217)  
 
The colour of the light, the high voltage and high installation costs initially did 
not seem to make it suitable for general indoor lighting. 
 
In France, Andre Claude experimented with high voltage daylight lamps and 
by 1936 it had been possible to obtain white light from a single tube. It was 
used on a limited scale indoors. Claude’s company started conducting 
business in the United States but General Electric had managed to confine 
them to the field of outdoor lighting through an agreement not to intrude on 
each other’s markets. General Electric had meanwhile given little attention to 
fluorescent lamps since before World War I and only made a serious effort in 
the late thirties. In July 1935 a high-efficiency lamp was demonstrated at a 
closed meeting of naval officers and General Electric officials. It was tested 
aboard a ship and some months later a practical, low-voltage fluorescent lamp 
was introduced to the public at the national convention of the Illuminating 
Engineering Society. 
 
On 21 April 1938 General Electric announced the commercial 
availability of the low-voltage fluorescent lamp. (Bijker, 1995:  
220) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
258 
When the fluorescent lamp was officially launched it was specifically meant to 
provide ‘tint-lighting’. It could provide a wider variety of brighter and deeper 
colours than incandescent lamps. It was expected to find application in 
specialized lighting, ranging from theatre interiors to ballrooms, art galleries 
and showcases.  
‘But within half a year of the introduction of the fluorescent 
tint-lighting lamp, another artifact emerged: the high-
efficiency daylight fluorescent lamp’ (Bijker, 1995: 227). 
 
 
The utilities feared that the efficiency of the fluorescent lamp might lead to 
decreased electricity sales. An internal memorandum of Westinghouse lends 
support to these fears. (Refer to Table 3) 
 
Table 3. Comparison of profits to be gained by different relevant social groups 
in the cases of the fluorescent lamp and the incandescent lamp.  (Bijker, 
1995:  228) 
 
The comparison of profits in the above table shows that utilities got half as 
much for fluorescence as for incandescence. Lamp suppliers got six times 
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more and the equipment manufacturers got three times more. Even the 
contractor got more. 
 
The utilities tried to keep the fluorescent tint-lighting lamp in the forefront in 
opposition to the high-efficiency daylight fluorescent lamp. They argued that 
claims about high-efficiency might be true, but only when fully verified, which 
had not been done as far as they were concerned. A controversy arose.  
Although the utilities and the Mazda companies both felt threatened, a third 
relevant social group appeared on the scene: the smaller independents. In 
1938 the Hygrade Sylvania Corporation introduced its own line of low-voltage 
fluorescent lamps. This was followed by the Consolidated Electric Lamp 
Company in 1939 and later also by the Duro Test Corporation. For the latter 
two it was just an addition to their established line of incandescent lamps. 
 
Under its B-class license restrictions, Hygrade Sylvania cashed in since it had 
long been attempting to grow, but was never able to command more than five 
percent of the total market. Its engineers worked on fluorescent lamps as 
early as 1934 but it did not seem commercially attractive. When the Mazda 
Companies introduced their lamps in 1938, Hygrade increased its research 
activities, gained control of some patents and started its own low-voltage 
fluorescent lamp production. It resulted in a patent infringement suit, which 
was only settled after World War 2. 
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Hygrade’s fluorescent lamps challenged General Electric’s control of the 
market. The utilities sensed a realignment of forces taking place among lamp 
manufacturers. The Mazda companies admitted that Hygrade was capturing a 
sizeable portion of the market; in this way the general public became a 
relevant social group and Hygrade made this relevant social group its ally. 
Bijker (1995:  234) points out that within the relevant social group of the 
general public, women were singled out as a group because a widespread 
acceptance of fluorescent lighting in the home would directly depend on the 
housewife. 
 
The last relevant social group according to Bijker (1995:  234)  was the fixture 
manufacturers. General Electric and Westinghouse only produced lamps; the 
other companies produced the fixtures. Yet Hygrade produced its own 
fluorescent lamp fixtures and thus marketed complete lamps, putting pressure 
on the fixture manufacturers. 
 
To resolve this conflict a conference between the Mazda companies and the 
utilities was held on 24 and 25 April 1939: 
 ‘At this conference the idea emerged that fluorescent lighting 
might be reserved for high-level lighting only. At the meeting 
a third fluorescent lamp was designed – not on the drawing 
board or the laboratory bench, but at the conference table’ 
(Bijker, 1995: 238). 
 
The light this lamp was supposed to provide was the colour of daylight and 
could be indicated as the high-intensity daylight fluorescent lamp. Bijker 
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stresses that the lamp did not even physically exist, but there was closure, 
albeit rhetorical closure. The stabilization of the lamp would still take another 
year and the introduction of the fluorescent lamp was so rushed that the 
Mazda companies had not been able to prepare the fixture manufacturers for 
their task of designing the auxiliaries. The result was an inadequate supply of 
fixtures. Many small firms took advantage of the situation and started 
fluorescent lamp fixture businesses: 
‘These ‘tin-knockers’ often produced quite objectionable 
installations, which were nevertheless so satisfactory to their 
customers that the demand for fluorescent lamps quickly 
increased further. On the other hand, this also boosted the 
power factor problem’ (Bijker, 1995: 247). 
 
 
The Mazda companies, utilities and fixture manufacturers held a number of 
meetings and the result was an agreement that some kind of certification 
system had to be developed. It would specify the technical requirements that 
all auxiliary parts had to meet. 
 
The Fleur-O-Lier Association was established, sponsored by the Mazda 
companies; the specifications were to be developed by the lamp 
manufacturers. Bijker (1995:  248) points out that progress was slow because 
the initial specifications were not acceptable to the utilities. He highlights that 
the negotiations about the certification scheme show unambiguously that the 
artefact that was stabilizing was the high-intensity daylight fluorescent lamp.   
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Bijker (1995:  249) indicates that one of the reasons why the Mazda 
companies and utilities wanted to control the fixture manufacturers was to be 
able to compel them to produce fixtures equipped with glass shielding so that 
lamps would not be too bright, which could damage the eyes. Ironically, such 
glass shielding was less necessary than in the case of incandescent lamps 
but one did have to use more electricity to get the amount of light that one 
would have had if the glass shielding were not there. According to Bijker this 
possibility of controlling the light output finally got the relevant social group of 
utilities to co-operate fully with the certification scheme.  
 
In conclusion, Bijker (1995: 248) believes that it was Hygrade Sylvania that 
got the process going. In 1939 they started producing fixtures for their 
incandescent lamps themselves. Bijker points out that these were well 
designed and enabled Hygrade to offer a complete lighting unit of the highest 
standards. Its line of fluorescent fixtures, furthermore, included a wide variety 
of styles. 
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5.5.3. Power and the Development of Artefacts 
 
‘One point will be evident by now: the fluorescent lamp was 
developed in the midst of power games. Various exertions of 
power figured prominently, though not always identified as 
such: patent licensing, cartel forming, price setting, political 
pressure’ (Bijker, 1995: 260). 
 
 
Bijker regards power as a relational concept. It is exercised rather than 
possessed. Just as an artefact is constituted in interaction rather than having 
an intrinsic meaning independent of context, power is an instance of 
interaction. 
 
Bijker (1995:  263) employs the terms ‘semiotic power’ and the ‘micro-politics’ 
of power. The case studies indicate that meanings become fixed or reified in 
certain forms, which then articulate particular facts, artefacts, agents, 
practices and relations. This fixity is semiotic power, the taken-for-granted 
categories of existence as they are represented in technological frames. 
 
The micro-politics of power describes how various practices transform and 
structure the action constituting a particular form of power – that of producing 
technological frames. 
‘It will be clear that semiotic power and micropolitical power 
are inextricably linked: micro-politics results in a specific 
semiotic structure, while the semiotic power in turn influences 
the micropolitics structures’( Bijker, 1995: 263). 
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According to Bijker (1995:  263) the semiotic and micropolitical aspects of 
power can be directly linked to the processes of closure and stabilization. He 
argues that the reaching of closure, where the interpretative flexibility of an 
artefact is diminished and its meaning fixed, can be seen as semiotic power 
resulting from a multitude of micropolitical structures in relevant social groups.  
 
He elaborates that in the stabilization process the micropolitical interactions 
also result in fixing more elements in the semiotic structure. The result is that 
more people in the relevant social group are enlisted, new relevant social 
groups can be formed and the meanings of the artefact can be elaborated 
upon. 
 
The conclusion is that a technological frame linking these processes 
constrains the actions of its members and exerts power through the fixity of 
meanings of artefacts (semiotics). It also empowers its members by providing 
problem-solving strategies, theories and practices that represent the micro-
political aspects of its power. 
 
The following example can serve as illustration: to have a patent does not in 
itself makes one powerful. The crucial question is how the micropolitics of 
power will result in that patent being instrumental in transforming the actions 
of others. 
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5.5.4. The Politics of Socio-technical Change 
 
Bijker (1995:  269) develops his arguments in three steps. Firstly, in the 
bicycle case study, he indicates that it is necessary to regard ‘technical’ 
development not as a straightforward process, but as a social process 
involving relevant social groups and the interpretative flexibility of artefacts. 
This illustrates the fact that development cannot be explained solely by 
referring to the intrinsic properties of artefacts. To him, artefacts ‘work’ 
because they have been accepted by a relevant social group. 
 
Secondly, he introduces the notion of technological frame. In this model he 
demonstrates how the interpretative flexibility can be mapped and how an 
artefact can either fail or attain a stable interpretation, which he indicates as 
closure. The artefact, on the other hand, can also stabilize to a certain 
degree. Technological frames link these two processes interactively. 
 
In the last case study Bijker proposes a twofold notion of power. His 
conception of power has two aspects: a semiotic aspect that emphasizes the 
importance of the fixation of an artefact’s meanings and a micropolitical 
aspect that focuses on the continuous interaction of relevant social groups in 
the technological frame. This case introduces the idea that the distribution of 
power is a factor in the shaping of technology and society. 
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With these insights Bijker (1995: 173) explains that the notion of a ‘seamless 
web’ serves as a reminder that non-technical factors are important for 
understanding the development of technology. It inclines to contextual 
approaches as opposed to internalist analyses. To him it is never clear, 
neither a priori nor independent of context, whether a problem should be 
treated as technical or as social and whether solutions should be sought in 
science, economics, or some other domain. He reminds us that it was not 
engineers but managers at a business meeting that designed the high-
intensity fluorescent lamp. 
 
At this point it must be stressed that Bijker’s chosen framework does not allow 
him to solve the problem of whether something is ‘social’ or ‘technical’138. It 
should be borne in mind that his framework is only concerned with social and 
technical interaction. He has to assume a priori notions of society and 
technology and assume that there is interaction. This includes the possibilities 
of societal development of technology and technical development of society. 
The true nature of the problem can of course be outside, or transcends, this 
chosen framework; if that is the case, he will have to borrow from a wider 
context. 
 
He stresses that the relations analyzed were simultaneously social and 
technical and should be called socio-technical ensembles. He states that the 
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 Argued in previous footnotes. 
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technical is socially constructed and the social is technically constructed. To 
him, all stable ensembles are bound together as much by the technical as by 
the social. (Bijker, 1995: 273) 
 
From an ontical point of view this is possibly another example of a ‘contextual’ 
transgression. He actually analyzes social groups (as components of society) 
and their interaction with artefacts, of which some were definitely not 
technological, especially bicycles and lights. Bakelite could be moulded and 
used as a technical component in a technical forming process. Socio-
technical is almost too presumptuous. Socio-artefactual or group-artefactual 
is possibly more precise. 
 
But he wants to do more. He aims at a relation or heterogeneity that is more 
than just social and technical, which in principle lies ‘outside’ his chosen 
framework. 
‘The theory of socio-technical change that I am developing, for 
example, must mirror the heterogeneity of this socio-technical 
“stuff” without resorting to just “adding up” the social and the 
technical’ (Bijker, 1995: 274). 
 
 
Bijker uses the notions of ‘technological frame’ and ‘inclusion’ to distinguish 
between different configurations of the power or political relationship between 
society and technology 
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In his first configuration no clearly dominant technological frame guides the 
interactions. To Bijker (1995: 276) this means that no single dominant group 
and no effective set of vested interests exist in that interaction. Under such 
circumstances, there will be many different innovations which could be 
completely unconventional, implying that these socio-technical ensembles are 
subject to variation in all respects. 
 
In his second configuration Bijker explains that one dominant group is able to 
insist upon its definition of both problems and appropriate solutions, which 
implies one dominant technological frame. Under such monopolistic 
circumstances, Bijker believes that innovations tend to be conventional. 
 
In his third configuration, in which there are two or more entrenched groups 
with divergent technological frames, arguments that carry weight in one of the 
frames will carry little weight in the other. Under such circumstances Bijker 
believes that criteria external to the frames in dispute may become important 
when appeals are made to enlist third parties. Amalgamation of vested 
interests is the process of closure that often occurs. 
 
Bijker (1995: 279,280) also argues that there are three routes for the politics 
of socio-technical relations: 
 
The first is to forget that the initial interest in STS was politically motivated and 
simply regard STS as an academic field. 
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A second route turns to political concerns like science and technology policy 
studies where the insights gained are used to develop concrete policy 
instruments. 
 
He prefers a third route leading to a politics of technology. This politics will 
deal with questions of value-ladenness, of potentials (emancipatory and 
oppressive), of democratization and of the embeddedness of technology in 
modern culture. The semiotics and micropolitics of power in socio-technical 
ensembles are what interest him. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
Bijker highlights the fact that technical development is not a straightforward 
process but an undetermined (indeed, indeterminable) societally influenced 
process where relevant societal groups interact in the process of 
development. No groups have a privileged position and all groups cannot be 
controlled. 
 
He also highlights the power play involved on both sides of the technological 
frame, namely closure by different groups and the stabilization of different 
artefacts. He also emphasizes the relational character of power play. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
270 
To him the constructivist perspective provides a rationale for a politics of 
technology. Interpretative flexibility indicates that the stabilization of artefacts 
is a social process and hence subject to choices, interests and value 
judgments or, in short, politics:  
‘Without an understanding of the interpretative flexibility of 
socio-technical ensembles, the analysis of technology and 
society is bound to reproduce only the stabilized meanings of 
technical artifacts and will miss many opportunities of 
intervention’ ( Bijker, 1995: 281). 
 
 
It is true that the societal stabilization of artefacts and the interaction between 
groups are societal processes and hence subject to various choices, which he 
defines as politics. Whether interpretative flexibility indicates that stabilization 
is a societal process is questionable. It is only a function of his chosen 
framework. As argued, interpretative flexibility indicates that within various 
frameworks different meanings could be given to different artefacts. In an 
ontological framework an artefact will be interpreted in its ontic or real 
character, whereas in Bijker’s chosen framework it can only be interpreted 
within the developmental interaction between groups and artefacts. Within his 
framework interpretative flexibility is a societal process. But it is important to 
realize that it is but one framework. 
 
 
The constructivist argument that the core of technology – that which 
constitutes its ‘working’ – is socially constructed is likewise limited to a narrow 
framework as seen within the relationship between society and technology. 
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Obviously, the core of technology can also be analyzed in terms of a 
transcendental account of ontic conditions, of which the societal is one 
dimension. 
  
Within Bijker’s chosen framework a politics and theory of socio-technology 
have to account for a balance between malleability and obduracy and a 
balance between actor and structure. He (Bijker, 1995: 282) tries to explain 
that an artefact in the role of exemplar (that is after closure, when it is part of a 
technological frame) becomes obdurate. The relevant social group has 
invested so much in the artefact that its meaning has become quite fixed and 
forms part of a network of practices, theories and institutions, so that it cannot 
easily be changed. 
 
Bijker (1995: 283) highlights that the obduracy of technology can take on at 
least two different forms, one associated with the artefact as exemplar and 
the other with the artefact as boundary object. For him, part of the process of 
closure and stabilization is the creation of inside/outside boundaries. Actors 
with a high degree of inclusion are further inside the boundary than actors 
with a lower degree of inclusion. The obduracy of artefacts as boundary 
objects for actors with low inclusion presents an ‘all or nothing’ choice. 
 
 
He (Bijker, 1995: 284) describes the choices indicating that for actors with a 
low degree of inclusion, an artefact presents a ‘take it or leave it’ decision. He 
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argues that they cannot modify the artefact when they take it, but life can go 
on if they leave it. For highly included actors, on the other hand, there is no 
life without the exemplary artefact, but a lot of life in it. 
 
Although the combination of technological frames of actors and artefacts and 
the semiotics and micropolitics of power are meant to describe this process of 
developing socio-technical ensembles, it was shown that Bijker did not 
consider all the indicators of an ontic framework as could be expected from a 
disciplinary approach. Some important distinctions are the following:  
 
He equates groups to society and artefacts to technology. He furthermore 
cannot distinguish different types of artefacts and sees artefacts as ‘all 
products of technology’, denoting ‘machines as well as technical processes, 
hardware as well as software’ (Bijker, 1995: 291). As argued before, artefacts 
cannot be equal to technology139.  
 
Lastly, Bijker (1995: 13) specified the requirement of society as a seamless 
web. A conceptual framework should not make a priori distinctions between, 
for example, the social, the technical, the scientific and the political. This can 
be disputed from a transcendental epistemological point of view. It is 
accepted that the term ‘a priori’ has different meanings in different contexts. It 
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 We leave aside other aspects of Bijker’s sociology because we restrict our analysis to 
those elements that may contribute to an ontological totality view on the technical.  
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is not clear in what context Bijker uses the term, but as he chose an 
interactive social-technology framework, it is assumed that he uses it in this 
framework.   
 
If this is the case, his framework pre-supposes or assumes the notions of 
society and technology, as has already been indicated. He requires both as a 
priori before he can even start analyzing the interaction. From an 
epistemological point of view all assumptions are initially a priori until a 
posteriori proved or disproved. It is therefore an epistemological ‘pre-
condition’ to start with an assumed paradigmatic context and concepts. 
Unfortunately the requirement that no a priori distinctions should be made can 
in this context also mean that no such distinctions validly exist, because they 
are not to be used.   
 
This brings about the question: why this requirement? Is it not possible that 
two artefacts can exist and could be distinguished on the basis of different 
aspects? The implication from an epistemological point of view is that Bijker 
cannot use different aspects to distinguish between, for example, economic 
artefacts, artistic artefacts, technical artefacts and say, religious artefacts.   
 
One can sympathize with this requirement if he has in mind that in society 
there are structures (like artefacts, ‘totalities’ or Latour’s ‘collectives’) that 
function as concrete entities, involving all possible aspects simultaneously, 
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which should not in a biased fashion be reduced to one of their aspects. A 
requirement of fairness or validity or an appeal for the analysis of the totality 
should suffice, or even an appeal that society should be viewed as a web. 
Even this appeal is a priori and he should not get involved in a priori 
exclusions. 
 
Although Bijker has contributed to our understanding of the development of 
artefacts and the relationship between the social and technical, he does not 
offer a unique description or model of ‘technology’. It has, of course, never 
been his intention. Before he starts his analysis he actually proceeds from an 
a priori understanding of technology and society. 
 
His study of the history of artefacts and their interaction with groups sheds a 
different light on artefactual development and the undetermined character of 
such development that is influenced by various social actors in various social 
contexts. Ironically, he studies artefacts (and their relations to groups) and 
calls it technology. None of the artefacts he mentions are either technical 
operators or involved in techno-practice and should not be linked to the 
technical or techno-practice at all. Unfortunately his study of the politics of 
things does not bring us any closer to the technical or to techno-practice.  
 
From an ontological perspective it would also be clear that he also tries to 
achieve goals that transcend the limits of his chosen framework. 
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6. Conclusions and proposals 
 
The study started off with the questions of what ‘technology’ is and where it 
fits into reality and society.   
 
Linguistically the term ‘technology’ indicates the study or science of the 
technical (‘techno’ and ‘logy’) – in other words technical science or techno-
science. This is especially evident in the German tradition. In the English 
tradition many problems arise. One of these problems is that the term 
indicates a science, which makes the phrase ‘science and technology’ 
tautological. Furthermore, many authors imply something ‘more’ than ‘just’ 
science when they refer to technology – for instance, some material ‘objects’, 
artefacts, tools, instruments or even processes. 
 
On the other hand some authors use the term ‘technology’ not in the sense of 
a scientific study but in order to designate an artefact or even the process of 
producing artefacts. Sociologists view technology as some knowledge 
producing activity involving tacit practical know-how that can change society. 
Its power to change society is of particular interest to some sociologists. 
 
As could be expected140, no clear ontical definition of technology as 
                                            
140
 As was argued before, an ontical totality view of the technical transcends the focus of 
sociology as discipline. 
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technology has been found in the studied literature. Many definitions of 
technology as a set of artefacts or as a set of systems or set of techniques 
are found but it seems that the authors are reluctant to go beyond the idea of 
technology as an important agent of change in society. It is therefore clear 
that technology is important and should be studied. It has furthermore simply 
been assumed that technology exists and is not just a figment of the 
imagination. On the basis of this assumption further transcendental 
consideration is not required. The issue, therefore, is to develop a theory that 
would recognize the importance of technology and to give some flesh to the 
ideas. 
 
The result is that technology has been studied from various angles – for 
example, its interaction with society in a framework that assumed society, 
technology and an interaction. The typical nature of technology as ontical 
entity cannot be studied in such a framework because before one can work in 
that chosen framework one has to assume some kind of ‘idea’ of ‘technology’ 
and ‘society’ and of the ‘interaction’ between them. One cannot reappraise 
one’s own conception of technology in that specific framework.141 
 
As a result of these assumptions about technology in the various frameworks 
various difficulties have arisen. For example, artefacts that are definitely not 
technical are indicated as technological. Furthermore, no difference between 
                                            
141
 Extensively argued in previous sections. 
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technological and technical142 artefacts is indicated and some authors do not 
distinguish between technological and non-technological artefacts.  
 
In order to go beyond the idea of technology as an agent of change it has 
been decided to move away from the term technology on the assumption that 
it is an (ontically) inadequate lingual construction143 from a transcendental-
empirical point of view and to develop a model of technical activity against 
which certain notions of technology can be measured. In principle it is 
possible to create ‘lingual constructions’ or terms for things that do not exist in 
an ontic sense. An example would be ‘time-machine’, meaning a machine 
that ‘creates time’ or which allows ‘time travel’ which exists only in science 
fiction and in our imagination. Another type is a combination of contradictory 
terms that does not indicate things that can possibly exist in reality (ontically) 
– like ‘a square circle’ or ‘round triangle’. The issue here is whether the lingual 
construction ‘technology’ denotes any empirically tested (ontic) phenomenon.  
 
6.1. Historical influences on techno-practice. 
 
In the literature it is clear that historical development has made a fundamental 
contribution to our understanding of techno-practice. Techno-practice has 
                                            
142
 This could indicate confusion. 
143
 That would be a lingual construction that does not account for ontic conditions like for 
instance a ‘square circle’. 
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been indicated as related to the historical development and formative power 
of humanity. More diversified, advanced societies have more advanced 
techno-practice.  
 
History has also shown that advanced societies were sometimes 
outmanoeuvred by less developed societies, as was the case when more 
advanced European nations lost wars against Mongols on horseback. This 
indicates that historical development is indeterminate. It is still not clear why 
certain societies developed and others collapsed. 
 
In the literature three phases of techno-practical development are utilized, 
namely the ancient or distant past, current history and the future.  
 
6.1.1. Historical developments or revolutions?  
 
Jonas (1990: 41, 42) states that if we are concerned with characteristics of 
modern techno-practice (he uses the term technology), we should ask what 
distinguishes it formally from all previous instances of techno-practice. One 
major distinction in his opinion is that modern techno-practice is an enterprise 
and process, whereas earlier techno-practice was a possession or artefact. 
He describes techno-practice as comprising the use of artificial implements 
(artefacts) for the business of life, together with their original invention, 
improvement and occasional additions. He believes such a tranquil 
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description will do for the greater part of the history of techno-practice but not 
for modern techno-practice. In the past, generally speaking, a given inventory 
of tools and procedures used to be fairly constant, tending toward a mutually 
adjusting, stable equilibrium of ends and means, which – once established – 
represented an unchallenged optimum of technical competence for lengthy 
periods. 
 
Jonas (1990: 42) accepts that revolutions occurred, but more by accident 
than by design. The agricultural revolution, the metallurgical revolution that 
led to the Iron Age, the rise of cities, and so forth, just happened rather than 
having consciously been created. Their pace was so slow that only in the time 
contraction of historical retrospect do they appear to be ‘revolutions’, creating 
the misleading impression that their contemporaries experienced them as 
such. 
 
Innovation does not always originate in so-called advanced societies. With 
the introduction first of the chariot, then of armed horsemen into warfare, the 
innovation did not originate in the military art of the advanced societies that it 
affected, but was thrust on it from outside by the (much less civilized) peoples 
of Central Asia.  
 
Instead of spreading through the technical universe of 
their time, other technical breakthroughs like Phoenician 
purple-dying, Byzantine ‘Greek fire’, Chinese porcelain 
and silk, and Damascene steel-tempering, remained the 
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jealously guarded monopolies of the inventor com-
munities. Still others, like the hydraulic and steam play-
things of Alexandrian mechanics, or the compass and 
gunpowder of the Chinese, passed unnoticed in spite of 
their serious technical potentials (Jonas, 1990:42). 
 
This interesting situation can now easily be explained if one considers the 
distinction given in the technical model of ontical categories. The closely 
guarded secrets of the inventor communities were obviously the techno-
practice of the invention. At that stage no patent protection existed, therefore 
one had to keep the process a secret. The artefacts (called technology) and 
its usage potential (techno-literacy) were obviously widely recognised.  
 
To Jonas, the great classical civilizations had reached a point of what he calls 
'technical saturation' – a balance between means and needs and had little 
cause later to go beyond it. He believes that from there on, 
…convention reigned supreme.(Jonas, 1990:42) 
He believes tools, techniques, and objectives remained essentially the same 
for long times – from pottery to monumental architecture, from food growing 
to shipbuilding, from textiles to engines of war, from time measuring to 
stargazing. To him improvements were sporadic and unplanned. Progress 
therefore – if it occurred at all – was by inconspicuous increments to a 
universally high level that still excites our admiration and, in historical fact, 
was more liable to regression than to progression. The former at least was 
the more noted phenomenon, deplored by the epigones with a nostalgic 
remembrance of a better past (as in the declining Roman world).  
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More importantly, to Jonas, there was, even in the best and most vigorous 
times, no proclaimed idea of a future of constant progress. He argues that 
there was never a deliberate method of going about it, like ‘research,’ 
exchanging information widely about the experience, and so on. Additionally 
no ’natural science’ as a growing body of theory existed to guide such semi-
theoretical, pre-practical activities (Jonas, 1990: 41, 42). 
 
At this stage it is important to realize that a historical view could also shed 
light on our understanding of techno-practice. The fact has to be noted that 
there is an idea of a future of constant progress in modern techno-practice, as 
well as a deliberate method, such as research, of going about it. This also 
brings about a need to investigate the 'research' method of techno-practice at 
a later stage. 
 
6.1.2. Historical Frameworks 
 
Hickman (1990a: 245) enquires about the relation between contemporary 
technology and the technologies of the past. Do changes in technological 
paradigms, including our attitudes toward technology and the metaphors and 
myths we use to characterize them, emerge from hardware innovations, or do 
such innovations arise from our changing metaphors, myths, and paradigms?  
At this point it must be highlighted that the guiding model allows for interaction 
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between two independent issues – the hardware and the paradigms – in 
techno-practice and artefacts, techno-knowledge and techno-science. 
 
Hickman states that, despite different perspectives, there is a startling 
consistency in accounts of the history of technology. Various authors 
articulate three stages: a remote past, an immediate past and an immediate 
future.  
He highlights various authors to illustrate his argument. What was found 
interesting was the fact that although variances between his examples of 
different authors exist the interesting consistency indicates an interesting 
historical context in which techno-practice could be interpreted. 
 
If one consider the interesting fact that in the development of a society from 
agriculture to industrial, the agricultural activity was not replaced but just 
augmented by the industrial, meaning that although more of the community 
were involved in the industrial than in the agricultural, the agricultural still 
existed side by side with the industrial, still supplying in the minimum needs of 
society. 
 
In a sense a similar tendency was found in thee interpretation of the different 
historical frameworks of the authors he compiled.  This could possibly be 
useful in interpreting the different types of techno-practice found in modern 
society. 
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A summary of some of the authors that Hickman covered could be highlighted 
to indicate some interesting correlations.  
 
The position of the late Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1990: 
254-263), can be summarised by highlighting that an understanding of the 
patterns of technological history is based on an examination of humanity's 
changing consciousness of its own making and doing and not on a chronicle 
of technological inventions. He argues that there have been three such 
stages, which he calls the technology of chance, the technology of the 
craftsman, and the technology of the technician. What was found interesting 
was the idea that during early human history, technological innovation was 
largely perceived either as chance occurrence or as a gift of the gods.   
 
Later, when a sufficient store of technical skills had been accumulated, 
technology (techno-practice?) came to be thought of as a body of knowledge, 
or know-how, to be identified with the work of an artisan. This could possibly 
be better described by the term ‘techno-knowledge’ 
 
In its current phase, the technology of the technician, methodology and 
execution have become the proper tasks of the engineer and the worker, 
respectively. A distinct awareness is highlighted of the human’s own inventive 
power within an abstract system of invention called ‘technology.’ In this case it 
seems better to indicate it as techno-practice. 
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Another example noted by Hickman (1990b: 82) is that of Marx. What was 
interesting to note was that Marx regards the first stage of technology simply 
as ‘pre-capitalism,’ which he divided into three sub stages: 
  
The first was the family and tribe going about their hunting and gathering, and 
engaging in primitive agricultural practices. Secondly, slaves were required 
for the smooth operation of the technological system as agricultural 
production became more advanced and the crafts and trades were more 
developed. Thirdly, medieval Europe replaced slavery with the feudal system. 
The rise of the bourgeoisie, who accumulated capital and exploited the 
worker, prepared Marx's second major period of technology. 
 
Marx’s second stage of technology is known as ‘capitalism’ and, the third 
stage and the immediate future is Socialism. 
 
Hickman (1990b: 82, 83) also highlighted Dewey’s view of technical 
development and indicates that Dewey's first stage is that of the hunter. His 
view is that tools are almost nonexistent for the hunter. What was found 
interesting is the suggestion that the aesthetic and the instrumental were not 
readily distinguished or easily distinguishable and there is little awareness of 
objects as such because they are thoroughly functionalized. His second stage 
highlights the Greeks. The third stage highlights the scientific revolution of the 
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sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  
 
Hickman (1990b: 82, 83) suggests that another way of reading Dewey's 
history of the philosophy of technology is to treat his remarks on hunting 
cultures as preliminary. This would make his first stage the one dominated by 
the Greeks. Dewey's second stage would then be the scientific revolution of 
the age of Galileo, and his third stage would be the immediate future that 
offers the possibility of applying the methods of scientific technology to every 
area of human valuation. This alternative description would have the 
consequence of bringing Dewey's schema into line with those of the other 
historians of technology (Hickman, 1990b: 82, 83). 
 
Hickman (1990:  247) indicates that another influential voice among historians 
of technology has been that of Lewis Mumford. Mumford warns us that the 
notion that a handful of inventors suddenly made the wheels hum in the 
eighteenth century is too crude to be precise. 
 
Mumford (1990: 283,4) divides the history of technology into three 
overlapping and interpenetrating stages: the eotechnic, the paleotechnic, and 
the neotechnic.  
 
Mumford places the eotechnic, or ‘dawn’ of modern technology, between the 
years 1000 and 1750. Its material resources were primarily wood and stone; 
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its sources of energy were wind, water, and animals; and its dominant attitude 
toward production was that of the craftsman.  
 
He indicates that the division between stages are not clear and stresses that 
most of the major inventions of the paleotechnic, germinated during the 
eotechnic. These inventions include the iron horseshoe the modern form of 
the harness, glass, mechanical clocks, the telescope, cheap paper, the 
printing press, the magnetic compass, and (to him) perhaps most important of 
all, the scientific method.  The developments were gauged by speculation that 
with the new machinery of the paleotechnic, a worker could perform nearly 
1,000 times as much work as his or her eotechnic predecessor. 
 
Seen in retrospect, however, their culture seems more crippled than 
developed. 
 
Here was something almost without parallel in the history of 
civilization: not a lapse into barbarism through the 
enfeeblement of a higher civilization, but an up-thrust into 
barbarism, aided by the very forces and interests which 
originally had been directed toward the conquest of the 
environment and the perfection of human culture (Mumford, 
1990: 283). 
 
No single date can be given for the end of his paleotechnic period. It did not, 
in his opinion, even get under way in the United States before the 1850s or in 
the Soviet Union before the 1920s. For most of Western Europe its end was 
probably marked by the close of the First World War in 1918, but there are 
some third world countries that have never experienced it to any significant 
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extent and whose technology is still best described as eotechnic. 
 
In time, however, the paleotechnic materials, coal and iron, were replaced 
with synthetics of all sorts. Steam power was replaced with electricity. 
Automation began to effect a shift from factory economies to service 
economies. But in 1934 Mumford warned that the neotechnic period was just 
beginning and that the ideals of the paleotechnic still dominated the industry 
and politics of the western industrial democracies. 
 
Since Mumford wrote, great technological inventions such as the gasoline 
engine, the phonograph, the motion picture, and the airplane have altered the 
cultural landscape. Since that time, the neotechnic period has seen the 
invention and development of television, computers, space-age alloys, and 
rockets to the moon (Hickman, 1990: 245-252). 
 
An important implication to be noted is that the techno-practice of the different 
eras could in principle be mixed in the current society and a historical 
framework must be accounted for in the model of techno-practice. 
 
6.1.3. Proposed model 
 
The preferred framework is a combination of Mumford (1990: 283) and José 
Ortega y Gasset’s (1990: 254). Mumford spoke of eotechnics, paleotechnics 
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and neotechnics and Ortega spoke of the technology of chance, the 
technology of the craftsman and the technology of the technician. 
 
The following historical model is proposed: 
Historically one can distinguish between (1) Basic Techno-practice, (2) Craft 
Techno-practice and (3) Automated Techno-practice. 
 
The term Basic Techno-practice is preferred because it is relevant to  
‘primitive’ techno-practice as well as an uncomplicated process still surviving 
today. This primitive (or in more recent times basic) techno-practice originally 
used to be individualized non-standard efforts by individuals that were 
conceived and successful only by chance and/or experience. There was no 
thought of developing or improving artefacts and, possibly, society. There 
were no standard procedures or systematic analysis and design to speak of 
and all artefacts were home-made for a specific purpose. Even today we find 
basic techno-practice in ingenious home-made solutions to small problems on 
farms and at home, and, of course, in some less developed societies.  
 
With the term Craft Techno-practice we would like to indicate the process that 
utilized tools and know-how in terms of standard procedures to create 
artefacts that could be sold, like shoes, clothes and furniture. Craft Techno-
practice has also provided the basis for the manufacture of machines and 
other driving engines like windmills, sailing ships and steam ships, and is 
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used in the building industry as well. This type of techno-practice still exists 
although it is sometimes modernized through machinery and used in 
specialized applications.  
 
The term Automated Techno-practice indicates the process that specifically 
utilize a systematic-technical method to describe the problem and provide its 
solution through designing artefacts and their production processes. This type 
of techno-practice is much more machine dependant and strives for total 
automation and standardized procedures. Because this is not always feasible, 
human artisans will still be required for certain jobs. It is closely linked to the 
industrial complex in society. A panoply of tools and machines are utilized. 
 
This historical characterization shows although techné existed prior to the 
techno-scientifically based modern automated techno-practice, it was not left 
uninfluenced by it. 
 
6.1.4. A revolution 
 
The development from craft techno-practice to modern automated techno-
practice has been called a revolution. The development from primitive (basic) 
to craft techno-practice was described as normal development, because the 
old and the new existed side by side for several centuries. 
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The beginning of modern automated techno-practice changed society and the 
whole approach to techno-practice. A developmental approach on the basis of 
scientific knowledge, the re-contextualisation of scientific knowledge as 
techno-knowledge, and its influence on techno-practice created the industrial 
revolution and revolutionized techno-practice itself. 
 
Modern automated techno-practice changed existing craft techno-practice into 
machine craft techno-practice. Modern technical tools like welders, pop-
riveters, grinders, electrical drills and machine equipment became available to 
the homeowner. In this way the basic (primitive) homemade techno-practice 
has been changed into simple singular solutions at home. Only in primitive 
cultures (mono-cultures) will some primitive techno-practical activity still be 
found. 
 
In essence techno-practice today is dominated by the modern techno-
scientific approach. It changed the craft and basic (primitive) approaches into 
machine craft and into simple singular solutions that one still finds at home. It 
is important to realize that techno-practice is not one-dimensional; it is multi-
dimensional totality ranging from automated and specialized processes to 
less specialized machine crafts and simple homemade solutions. They all 
contribute to artefacts that can be utilized in society. 
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6.2. A Transcendental Empirical Model 
 
A transcendental empirical model assumes an orderly ontic reality in which 
society and technical activity are to be found. 
 
An overview of a tentative model of the technical relationship as an evaluative 
model is provided in 1.5.4. Various notions and ideas are identified and 
classified according to the different parts of this tentative model. This model 
presupposes a certain ontology and epistemology that needs to be explained. 
On this basis a model of the technical process and its relation to society will 
be formulated. To recap, a summary of the technical activity will be supplied. 
The presupposed ontology and epistemology will be highlighted before 
insights and problems previously identified are integrated into models to 
indicate the interaction of the technical and society within reality. 
 
6.2.1. Model of the technical relationship 
 
This model was identified from various ontical elements that were identified 
from the various authors investigated. All the authors identified at least one of 
these elements in their assumptions or explanations. As explained it would 
rather be surprising if any disciplinary author would have highlighted all or 
most of these elements as it in principle transcends the focus of any specific 
discipline. 
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It indicates some relationship between ontic (factual) elements that was found 
to exist in the process of technical design, development and manufacturing on 
the one hand (Techno-practice) and the result of this activity (artefacts) and 
its usage of these artefacts (techno-literacy). On the other hand the 
requirements needed for techno-practice in terms of techno-knowledge and 
even techno-science was also observed and plotted on this model. 
 
The lines between the elements indicate the links and direction of the 
interaction between these elements. This is a tentative result of a synthesis 
from the current literature. It does give an overall view of the elements 
involved in the technical process of manufacturing and usage, which was 
indicated by the term ‘technology’ in various sources. This is obviously not 
final but can be a start to further developments. 
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Fig.1 The technical relationship (revisited) 
 
Firstly, TECHNO-PRACTICE was used to indicate the technical activities 
involved in innovation, design, production and maintenance in societies. The 
term included the use of tools and technical artefacts. The product of techno-
practice could be a new artefact but this does not imply that the artefact as 
such is necessarily technical144.   
 
The important issue here according to Schuurman (1980:12) is the fact that a 
techno-practical event always involves a human and a techno-practical fact is 
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 This was discussed extensively in the previous chapters. 
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always started by this event but then operates independently, through the 
control of machines. The ideal is mass production through individual control of 
each product through cybernetic feedback that makes individualised control 
possible. 
 
Sometimes, in phrases like science and technology, the term technology is 
used when techno-practice would have been more appropriate; for the sake 
of clarity, the phrase should probably be science and techno-practice. 
 
TECHNO-SCIENCE was used to indicate the reality of technical sciences 
(engineering) where knowledge of technical processes and of relevant 
scientific principles of, for instance, mathematics, physics and electronics, 
were registered and conveyed. It was linked to our techno-knowledge and 
received feedback from techno-knowledge and techno-practice, as well as 
from the artefacts themselves. In engineering engineers therefore study older 
artefacts to identify possible improvements to be developed as well as take 
note of better production and automation possibilities. The ideal of production 
and control from a distance, without human intervention, is still the end goal.  
 
TECHNO-KNOWLEDGE was used for the technical know-how in techno-
practice – for instance the maintenance or servicing or fixing of a technical 
component in an artefact or the design or production of a technical 
component in artefacts. This knowledge base could have been developed 
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through intuitive experience, artisanship and/or systematic knowledge 
obtained through scientific activity. The important issue here is that it should 
not be confused with scientific knowledge. 
 
TECHNO-LITERACY was used to indicate the human competence required 
for operating any artefact that needs some technical skill, like a cell phone, 
ATM, computer, VCR, motor car and so on145. There is no indication that 
techno-literacy requires techno-knowledge – only the ability to use an artefact 
efficiently. It has been illustrated that this notion is sometimes confused with 
techno-practice or techno-knowledge through the use of the term 
‘technology’. This term would also allow of a notion of techno-illiteracy akin to 
information illiteracy that would indicate incompetence in dealing with ‘hi-tech’ 
artefacts. This is obviously an important issue in relation to more advanced 
versus less advanced techno-literate societies and the impact of techno-
practice and associated artefacts on these societies. 
 
ARTEFACT indicates all structures formed (created, designed, produced) 
through human ingenuity. The types of artefacts are numerous and can be 
classified by (inner) structural principles inherent to the unique structure of 
each artefact, which should not be confused with the purpose of the artefact. 
 
This model is obviously related to society and reality, which implies that an 
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 ATM is an automatic teller machine and VCR is a videocassette recorder. 
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ontological framework that would illustrate this model’s place in reality and 
society is required. 
 
6.3. Proposed Ontology 
 
Where Latour believes we live in a hybrid world made up of peoples, stars, 
electrons, nuclear plants and markets etc. and further believes that humanity 
has the task to turn it into either an unruly shambles or a cosmos, it is 
proposed that this world is a cosmos already; it is not humanity’s task to 
create or construct a cosmos, but just to try and understand and live in it. In 
giving shape to human society, underlying principles are positivised – but 
these principles themselves are not the creation of human beings. If it were 
not for the order for and the orderliness in the cosmos that responds to this 
order for the cosmos, nothing would have been possible.  
 
Consider for a moment Latour’s hybrid reality of stars, electrons and nuclear 
plants. If no orderliness existed it would have been impossible to identify 
stars. Without an existing order for stars, they cannot be recognized as stars. 
His belief in a hybrid world presupposes some kind of order for his reality. The 
stars reveal an orderliness different from that revealed by electrons, but in line 
with the order for stars in reality. 
 
Every analytical act of identifying and distinguishing therefore presupposes an 
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order for as well as orderliness in the cosmos. Furthermore, this presupposes 
an element of constancy on the basis of which change could be distinguished, 
as well as characteristics that could be identified on the basis of similarities 
and distinguished on the basis of differences. 
 
In a certain sense everything is therefore subject to an order for, and reveals 
orderliness in the cosmos. This allows for a different notion of reality. Latour 
indicates a division in reality by phenomenology (1999: 9). The division 
between an objective reality (out there) and subjective reality (in here) can be 
replaced by the proposition that both these realities are in fact subject to 
conditions (in the sense of an order for). In a certain sense then no ‘objective’ 
reality (that is, a reality that is not subject to anything) exists. Everything is 
conditional or subject to conditions. All things are at least subject to the order 
for reality. 
 
Within this orderly reality one can distinguish an order for universal aspects 
as well as an order for concrete structures in reality. The Philosophy of the 
Cosmonomic Idea developed a well thought-out analysis of these two 
dimensions of reality that is extremely fruitful for the theoretical task of the 
various disciplines. In the course of this analysis the relevant distinctions will 
be explained.  An orientational summary will be highlighted in the following 
sections as required. 
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6.3.1. The functional cosmonomic order146 
 
We experience reality in its rich variety of aspects and entities.  In everyday 
life concrete entities are experienced in their multi-aspectual nature. For 
example, something like a motorcar has an aesthetic aspect (its beauty), an 
economic aspect (its price), and so on. Dooyeweerd (1953-1958) developed a 
systematic theory in which a detailed account of the different aspects in reality 
is given.  
 
Every aspect of reality is characterized by a unique core meaning, designated 
as its meaning-nucleus. In addition, every aspect is linked to all other aspects 
because the meaning of each aspect finds expression only in its coherence 
with those aspects that are different from it. Since the aspects are arranged in 
an ontic order, some connecting links refer back and others forward to those 
aspects that are placed earlier or later, as the specific case may be, within 
their temporal cosmic order. The nature of this temporal cosmic order is 
revealed as an order of complexity. 
                                            
146
 Please realise that up to now we were analysing ontic conditions. Only at this point can we 
try to explain these ontic conditions in an ontology. One could study ‘technology’ by studying 
different ontologies of different philosophers. The method chosen, the transcendental 
empirical method, allowed a study of ontical (factual) categories and not just the study of 
different ontologies. To study ontologies could direct the study towards investigating different 
ontologies instead of ontic (factual) elements. The study of different ontologies was therefore 
specifically excluded as it was felt that it could be an independent project on its own. 
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The following aspects can be identified: 
ASPECT OF REALITY  MEANING-NUCLEUS 
15) certitudinal aspect  faith and certainty 
14) ethical aspect   moral love 
13) juridical aspect  adjudication 
12) aesthetic aspect  harmony 
11) economic aspect  avoiding excess (balance) 
10) social aspect   social intercourse 
9  ) lingual aspect   symbolic meaning (signify) 
8  ) historical aspect  controlled formative power 
        (cultural development) 
7  ) Logical aspect   analytical thought 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
6 ) psychical aspect  sensory feeling 
5 ) biotic aspect   life 
4 ) physical aspect  energy 
3 ) kinematic aspect  motion 
2 ) spatial aspect   continuous extension 
1 ) numerical aspect  discrete quantity 
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The first six aspects are natural aspects and the next nine are cultural 
aspects, the reasoning being that natural laws prevail in the first six aspects 
and cultural norms prevail in the following nine aspects.  
 
6.3.1.1. Order of the aspects 
 
According to a cosmic principle of serial order the aspects are arranged in an 
order of increasing complexity.   
 
The meaning of the numerical aspect does not presuppose that of space, but 
the reverse does not hold, since the very distinction of one, two or more 
dimensions reflects the meaning of number. Similarly, magnitude reminds one 
of the quantitative foundations of space because it is possible to distinguish 
between one-dimensional magnitude (length), two-dimensional magnitude 
(surface), three-dimensional magnitude (volume), and so on. The difference 
between the (ontic) meaning of number and space and a theoretical analysis 
of the meaning of these aspects should be considered, because the latter 
cannot make headway without making use of terms relating to other aspects. 
When mathematicians speak of the domain of number they might not realize 
that the term ‘domain’ is derived from the core meaning of the spatial aspect, 
just as they might not realize that their employment of terms like constants 
and variable relate to the core meaning of the kinematical and physical 
aspects respectively. 
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Likewise the meaning of motion presupposes that of number and space 
because the path of a moving body will be non-existent without the 
(foundational) coherence with the meaning of spatial extension and because 
specifying the speed of a moving body requires an appropriate number – 
such as when the speed of a car is specified as 60 kilometres per hour: ‘60’ is 
a number while ‘kilometres’ represent a distance in space.  
 
The physical force needed to accelerate a car presupposes all three aspects 
mentioned. It differs from the mere continuation of a movement that reflects 
the core meaning of the kinematical as it is captured by the law of inertia, in 
terms of which it is meaningless to inquire into the cause of movement since 
one can only meaningfully refer to the cause of a change in motion. Motion is 
something given, something primitive; only a change of motion – acceleration 
or deceleration – requires a physical force. 
 
The biotic function of a living entity presupposes the physical aspect of reality 
but at the same time transcends the meaning of the latter because the 
opposition between ‘life’ and ‘death’ is not found within the physical realm. It 
is therefore meaningless to speak of ‘dead matter’ because it implies that 
matter must have been ‘alive’ before it died. 
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Sensitivity, which relates to the meaning-nucleus of the psychical aspect, pre-
supposes life, which relates to the biotic aspect – just consider the phrase 
‘sense organs’ – whereas logical thought, characteristic of the logical-
analytical aspect, is related to sensitivity. One must be aware of A and non-A 
before one can logically distinguish between them.  
 
Historical development, with formative control or power as its core meaning, 
is not possible without the ability to identify and distinguish (logically) and 
sensing (psychically). Language and symbols with meaning (from the lingual 
aspect) are formed, indicating the foundational link to the historical. Social 
interaction, one of the features of or actions in the social aspect, in turn pre-
supposes shared meanings in language. 
 
Appreciating the economic value of a commodity requires mutual (social) 
understanding on the basis of shared (linguistic) meanings (communication) 
and manifests an awareness of what is enough – the avoidance of what is 
excessive. Furthermore, aesthetic beauty or harmony pre-supposes the 
avoidance of excesses, which is the meaning-nucleus of the economic aspect 
of reality.   
 
The meaning of the juridical is based on the harmonization (aesthetic) and 
balancing (economic) of a multiplicity (numerical) of legal interests. Moral 
(and immoral) actions presuppose the meaning of the juridical aspect 
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because an immoral action such as stealing entails the foundational juridical 
meaning of unlawfulness. Finally the meaning of the fiduciary (faith) aspect, 
with its core meaning of certainty, is founded in ethical integrity, juridical 
righteousness, and so on. 
 
6.3.1.2. Analogical moments 
 
Each of these aspects illustrated above furthermore reveals additional 
meaning-moments through their relationships with the other aspects. This can 
be expressed as analogical moments. It is also called ante- and retroci-
pations: antecipations refer to aspects that follow while retrocipations refer to 
previous aspects. To illustrate ante- and retrocipations one aspect will be 
analysed in all its analogical moments. 
 
The lingual aspect with the meaning-nucleus of symbolic meaning or 
signification is number 9 on the list. 
  
1) In its retrocipation to the numerical aspect one can identify a meaningful 
moment of a unit of significance that could be distinguished from a unit 
of faith, for instance, or a unit of love. A word, for example, is the 
smallest unit of meaning in a language. 
 
2) Furthermore, a word may have different meanings in different contexts, 
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which is evidence of a link between the lingual and spatial aspects of 
reality. 
 
3) The special notion of linguistic constancy can be identified in the relative 
stability of the meanings attached to words. The meanings of words do 
not change abruptly but gradually. 
 
4) Evidence of linguistic change or dynamics is found in the fact that words 
can gradually acquire different meanings or shades of meaning, can 
become stronger or weaker or can become obsolete.  
 
5)  The expansion of meaning and the need for new words show that 
lingual growth is related to the biotic aspect of reality. 
 
6) The analogical link between the lingual and the psychical aspect reveals 
the possibility of sensitivity or emotion in signification. Words could 
display a certain ‘emotion’, as can be observed in euphemisms, where 
less emotive terms are used to describe sensitive issues. 
 
7) The logical analogical moment of the lingual aspect is illustrated by a 
language observing its own analyzable protocol without it obeying the 
rules of logic in the same way as science.  The question, ‘Are you here 
already?’ put to someone’s whose arrival we awaited, is illogical. 
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Nevertheless, we all use it and interpret it correctly as being an 
icebreaker or a way of starting a conversation. 
 
8.) The historical moment of power in the lingual aspect is illustrated by 
the fact that, in specific contexts, some terms or symbols have greater 
power of expression than others.  
 
9.) The 9th moment highlights the depth of meaning in its ante- and 
retrocipatory relationships. These different relationships indicate the 
possibility of disclosure that could be positivized by individual human 
capabilities. 
 
10) A dialogue illustrates lingual interaction. Without it one cannot 
communicate. Communication is actually lingual interaction, either 
directly or by means of transcending immediacy through print. 
  
11) The economic moment of the lingual aspect could be illustrated by the 
fact that terms or symbols could be succinct. An example is the single 
phrase advertisements in the motor industry that convey values, 
qualities and image. Another example is Occam’s razor that requires 
one to choose the simpler explanation of two equally valid statements.  
 
12) Lingual harmony in the aesthetical anticipation of the lingual aspect is 
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illustrated by the beauty of language as used in poetry. 
 
13) The influence of the juridical aspect, among other things, can be 
illustrated by the fact that language could be used legitimately or 
illegitimately. The issue of what is lingually proper, correct or just is 
revealed by all languages. Even when a dialect develops it answers to 
certain lingual ‘rules’. 
 
14) The ethical moment in the lingual aspect is revealed through lingual 
integrity. It highlights the fact that terms and symbols and the usage of 
language could reveal integrity. Because of lingual integrity one can 
use the correct words in lingual harmony. 
 
15) Lingual trust or certainty is the indications of lingual reliability or 
convincingness. If one is fairly certain that one is understood the result 
is expected to be a lingually reliable phrase. 
 
It is important to realize that every entity (in nature and in culture, which in this 
sense includes societal aspects such as the social, economical, aesthetical 
etc.) as well as processes, functions in all aspects of reality.  
 
This implies that technical activity will also display fifteen aspects in its own 
unique way. Furthermore, as is obvious in the above example, each 
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normative aspect supplies a guideline according to which norms and values 
could be positivized or actualized, or an area in which this could occur. This 
also could be used as a sounding board. In the economic aspect it is 
appropriate to speak of the economical and uneconomical actions of people. 
In the social aspect one can identify social and anti-social behaviour. This is 
true of all the cultural aspects. 
 
6.3.2. Structural order or structural cosmonomic order 
 
The structural cosmonomic order points to the structural conditions of entities. 
All things, events and societal relationships belong to the concrete dimension 
of the structures of entities.  Everything or every entity has a structural order 
or relationship.  It is important to differentiate between the structure of an 
entity and the fifteen aspects within which all entities function, but one cannot 
analyse any structure without implicitly or explicitly using some of the aspects. 
 
The functional cosmonomic order supplies a method or process to analyse 
and to classify entities in the cosmos.  Any concrete structure has fifteen 
aspects but reveal them in a unique relationship.  The aspects form the 
constant universal contexts within which entities function. Although the 
individuality of the structure of an entity could not be explained by the variety 
of aspects in which it functions, it has been found that the structure could still 
be recognizably expressed within the universal structure of the aspects. 
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(Strauss, 1998: 83). The fifteen aspects could thus contribute to a 
classification of types of entities.  
 
For instance, we find that the biotic aspect qualifies all living things.  This 
means that the biotic aspect indicates a unique or typical characteristic of all 
living things. Examples are trees and plants that are living things in 
contradistinction to material, things that are not alive.  
 
Material entities, like atoms, molecules, macro-molecules and macro-systems 
are physically qualified.  
 
The qualifying aspect is therefore the aspect that makes an entity unique, but 
it also identifies similarities to similar entities functioning within the aspect 
concerned.  
 
Both cats and dogs are psychically qualified – they are ‘sensitive’ living things, 
but they differ in many respects, namely, in their respective vitality (from the 
biotic perspective), their respective strength (from the physical perspective), 
movement (speed) and size (form). Even in their psychical ability, which is the 
qualifying aspect, differences like different conditioning and sensitivities exist. 
 
From the above it is also apparent that the qualifying aspect cannot describe 
the totality, or structure, of an entity. Before entities can be summarized, two 
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other important elements need to be added, namely the foundational function 
and its subject-object relationship in reality.  
 
Every man-made object possesses a historical technical foundational function 
because it was culturally and historically formed through controlled formative 
power. 
 
6.3.2.1. Subject / Object relations 
 
It is important to realise that entities reveal various subject and object 
functions in different contexts. 
 
Water, for example, is physically qualified.  This means that water is a subject 
according to the physical aspect of reality, but water does not have life. 
Therefore it is not actively involved in, or subject to, the biotic aspect or life 
cycle. On the other hand it could serve as a biotic object ‘supporting’ life in 
living things like plants. It could be a psychical object when it ‘cools’ a 
psychical subject such as an animal. It cannot think for itself but could be 
thought about as object in the logical aspect. It cannot talk as subject but is a 
lingual object to be talked about. It cannot make history but could have 
historical significance, such as the flood at Laingsburg. It cannot be social but 
could be a social object. It could be an economical object when sold. It could 
be beautiful although it cannot create art. It could be a legal object, and since 
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one can believe that water would quench one’s thirst, it can perform a 
certitudinal object function. 
 
6.3.2.2. Classification of subjects and objects (Typology) 
 
So far four types of subjects or objects have been identified: 
a.  natural objects; 
b.  natural subjects; 
c.  cultural objects; 
d.  cultural subjects. 
 
An example of each is listed below. 
 
Natural subjects – such subjects would be stones, plants, animals, and so on, 
each qualified in their own aspect within the natural aspects (the first 6). This 
classification contradicts the positivistic idea that every natural thing is an 
object. However, since these things are subject to specific laws, they ought to 
be subjects as far as their qualifying function is concerned; though they can 
also stand in many object relationships, as explained above. For example, a 
nursery that sells flowers actualises the economic object function of flowers 
and a flower arrangement actualises the aesthetic object function of flowers.  
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Natural objects – these would be bird’s nests, beehives, and so on: objects 
that were developed by natural subjects such as animals. Although the wax of 
a beehive is physically qualified and therefore a physical subject, it acts as a 
psychical object as far as its qualifying function is concerned; it should rather 
be seen as a psychically qualified object interlaced with a physical (subject) 
structure It can be empirically verified that a beehive is not equal to the wax 
alone, but is the wax in a specific spatial form or structure. 
 
Cultural objects – examples of these would be chairs, tables or other artefacts 
made by humanity. They are physical structures, and therefore physical 
subjects, but also culturally or societally qualified objects, implying they could 
be of different natures and qualified in any of the nine cultural aspects. A pen, 
for example, would be recognized as a lingual object although as far as its 
materiality is concerned it is a physical subject, since it is subject to physical 
laws like the law of gravity. On the other hand, pens also have object 
functions in all the other cultural aspects: they are economic objects to people 
who sell pens, aesthetic objects to artistic collectors or historic objects if they 
were used to sign an important agreement or peace settlement, for instance. 
 
Cultural subjects – an example of these would be language, which has no 
natural structure; that is, a physical structure. It is a lingually qualified 
structure and subjective or active as a form of life in a society. Without 
belabouring the point one can state that cultural subjects are also called 
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forms of life and actively operate in the cultural aspects and are qualified by a 
cultural aspect. One could call it a cultural relationship. For example, a family 
is a relational structure of parents and children with an authority structure and 
an identifiable unity. 
 
6.3.2.3. Types of Cultural Subjects 
 
Three types of relations can be identified: consociational collectivities, 
communal relationships and coordinational relationships. 
 
A consociational collectivity has a character of solidary unity and a permanent 
structure of super- and subordination (authority). By solidary is meant that a 
structure has a distinguishing character and continuity in spite of the fact that 
the members in the relation may change. Britain is still Britain in spite of the 
fact that a whole generation may die. The government further has authority 
over its people, which you might not find in other relationships. 
 
Communal relations have the characteristics of either solidarity or authority. In 
a family, for example, all the members form a solidarity unit but each 
household has its own authority relationship, parents over children for 
instance, no uniform authority structure for the whole family therefore exists. 
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Coordinational relationships have neither a solidary nor authority character, 
for instance, friendships, doctor and patient relationships or lawyer and client 
relationships. 
 
6.3.2.4. Enkapsis  
 
When the internal nature of an interwoven entity is retained it is indicated with 
the term enkapsis. It can briefly be explained as follows. Entities may 
embrace differently qualified (sub-)structures that are interlaced, but 
nonetheless retain their intrinsic sphere of operation. An animal, for example, 
has: 
a.  a physical substructure  
b.  a biotic substructure and  
c.  a sensitive-psychical structure  
 
In this case the first two intertwined structures are qualified by the psychical 
structure – animals are known to be sentient creatures. 
 
It is important to realize that the physical structure that already encompasses 
structural totalities (molecules and macro-molecules) also serves as 
foundation for the biotical structure in what is called a one-sided enkaptic 
foundational relationship. 
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It should be clear that the enkaptically bound structures are serviceable to the 
enkaptically encompassing totality without losing their individualities. 
 
6.3.2.5. Totality  
 
The term totality is used to indicate an enkaptical interlacement of unequal 
structures into a ‘unit’ or ‘whole’. This term is preferred to the part/whole 
concept where the part has the same nature as the whole. An example here 
would be salt (NaCl) consisting of Na (sodium) and Cl (chlorine) that forms a 
totality from ‘parts’ that do not display a salt structure (NaCl) on their own.  
 
The point is that an insight into enkaptical relationships and totality structures 
‘… uproots the unqualified way in which, especially in modern system theory, 
literally everything in reality is spoken of in terms of a whole and parts’ 
(Strauss: 1998, 87). 
 
6.4. Anthropology 
 
Techno-practice exists as cultural activity. This presupposes humanity and 
human activity. An understanding of human nature and inherent capabilities 
could clarify some misconceptions about science and the technical activity. 
 
Humans are multi-capable and also have multi-contextual knowledge to utilize 
in multiple contexts. In essence it means that a person could acquire 
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knowledge through science and then re-contextualize this knowledge in other 
contexts and different applications. 
 
As it is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop or even defend a theory of 
the nature of human beings, only a model of those aspects relevant to this 
thesis will be described. 
 
Human beings defy the limits of any specific discipline. What is really required 
is a philosophical view of man in all its relationships in reality and therefore 
also a view of reality itself. 
 
It is important to illustrate that people have more than the two classical ways 
of knowing namely through logic or through the senses. 
 
Polanyi (1978: 266) states that St Augustine brought his history of Greek 
philosophy to a close by declaring that all knowledge was a gift of grace. But 
Polanyi further argues that faith then declined and demonstrable knowledge 
was considered superior to it; by the end of the 17th century Locke declared 
that faith is not knowledge but mere personal acceptance, which falls short of 
empirical and rational demonstrativeness.   
 
In distinction to any dualistic view (logic-sensory, logic-belief or rational-
ethical dualisms) an attempt will be made to illustrate that the ability to 
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acquire knowledge lies outside the sensory or logical or ethical or belief 
capability. The view of enkaptical interlacement will also contribute to the 
explanation in the following model of human capabilities. 
 
6.4.1. A model of human capabilities 
 
ANTHROPOLOGY
 
Physical Structure 
Biotical structure 
Psychical structure 
Normative structure 
Personality Structure 
Structures Capabilities Products 
Strength and Form 
Life and reproduction 
Awareness and sensitivity 
Lingual signification 
Social Interaction 
Economic capability 
Aesthetic appreciation 
Juridical adjudication 
Ethical consideration 
Certitudinal/trust/Belief Belief systems/religion 
Know/ Will / imagine  
Ethics/Values 
Integrated personality trait 
Legal systems/Law 
Art/Music/Literature 
Economy/Business 
Societal structures 
Language/Signs 
Technology / artefacts Formative Power 
Science/Theory/ Logical analysis 
1 
2 
3 
5 
4 
 
 
Fig.9  Human structures, capabilities and applications. 
 
In this model the human being is depicted as a totality with five unequal 
structural elements, listed in the first column. The first three will briefly be 
mentioned only to provide a complete picture. 
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The first structure (indicated as 1 on the diagram) is the physical structure. 
Every human has a physical molecular structure consisting of molecules, 
macro-molecules, acids, elements and chemical processes that would be of 
interest to organic chemistry. This structure is enkaptically interlaced in a 
foundational relation to the following structure, which implies that none of the 
following structures can exist without this foundational structure. 
 
The second structure listed is the biotical structure. This should not be 
confused with the ‘biological’ structure, which indicates a theoretical image 
that includes physical, biotic and sometimes psychical sensory structures. 
The biotical structure indicates the life structure of cells and organs, as well 
as systems like the reproductive system. This structure requires the physical 
structure as a support structure without which it cannot exist. 
 
The third structure is the psychical structure of sensory awareness and 
sensitivity. This structure is in a one-sided enkaptic foundational relationship 
with the previous structures and cannot exist without their support. This 
means, for example, that no person that has lost his or her biotic function can 
be psychically aware.   
 
The fourth structure can be called the normative structure. This structure 
encompasses all our cultural capabilities from logic to faith. It pre-supposes 
the previous structures in the same fundamental way as a one-sided enkaptic 
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foundational relationship. To illustrate one can just consider one of the 
capabilities in the normative structure. Analysis, for example, as indicated in 
the logical aspect of reality, pre-supposes the awareness capability of the 
psychical structure. How would one be able to identify and distinguish 
something without an awareness of it?  
 
The normative structure illustrates concisely that all humans have certain 
capabilities. Although we have the capability, we still need to use or positivize 
it. This furthermore implies that one can, of course, neglect it or even act in an 
anti-normative way; for instance, instead of socializing one can act anti-
socially. 
 
It is revealing that all humans have the ability to analyse. This ability might not 
be developed to a high degree, but at least humans can identify and 
distinguish things in everyday life. Everyone can form or make things, which 
indicate the formative capability, signify meaning through signals and 
language, socialize, and have a notion of frugality or be a spendthrift. 
Appreciating beauty in an aesthetic sense is uniquely human and not found 
among animals. 
 
Almost all human beings have a notion of right and wrong; even gangs have 
codes of honour determining what should or should not be done, because 
humans have the capability to love and to act in ethical consideration of 
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others. Lastly humans have the capability to believe – not only in a religious 
sense, but also in daily life we trust or have confidence in our artefacts and 
our senses.  
 
The last structure is called the personality structure. This structure is the final 
node or centre of the human personality and acts as an integrating and 
unifying motivational point. This is the symbolic ‘heart’ of the person. The 
capabilities in this structure are willing, knowing, imagining and so forth.  
 
These three functions are always present in all human actions as direction-
giving motives or directives. To illustrate this we can consider the 
communication process. If one does not want to listen to a message it would 
negate all efforts of the sender. If the will is directed to the desire to listen it 
will call upon knowledge and imagination in order to concentrate on the 
message. Using knowledge, the listener will take cognisance of the message 
and try to store it in memory. Here the imagination will recreate the message 
as a recognizable image and place it in a framework of reference. 
 
The interesting point is that someone can know (and imagine and want) 
logically, technically, lingually, socially, economically, aesthetically, juridically, 
ethically or certitudinally. 
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If someone knows that the economy is going to slow down, the knowledge 
can be logically analysed, expressed in language and socially responded to. 
 
Knowledge from one context can be re-contextualised and utilized in other 
contexts. This allows of an endless, indeterminate permutation of possibilities 
in human endeavours. One can analyse the result of the action but cannot 
predict it147.  
 
6.5. Epistemology 
 
As was the case above with anthropology it is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to develop or defend an own epistemology. Therefore only a summary of 
relevant issues will be given. The important point to be highlighted correlates 
with the anthropology summarized above. Human knowledge allows of infinite 
possibilities since it can be acquired logically, lingually, ethically or through 
faith, and can be re-contextualised infinitely. 
 
As epistemology concentrates on knowledge and the conditions of 
knowledge, humanity’s ability to acquire knowledge would be an acceptable 
starting point. 
                                            
147
 The advantage of an anthropological view here could possibly explain how a human can 
‘mix-up’ scientific and technical knowledge because of the capability to re-contextualise 
knowledge. 
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6.5.1. The human ability to acquire knowledge 
 
The anthropological model of the previous section assumes that people have 
the ability to acquire knowledge. In the previous section this capability is 
placed in the central node of humanity that integrates the total personality. It 
was also illustrated that knowledge is always in a relationship with the will and 
the imagination as if they were three different directions or choices available 
to a person. The smallest piece of information involves simultaneously the will 
(to take note, to remember and so on) and the imagination that recreates this 
information as an associative image or framework in the knowledge base. 
When one recalls something that one knows, the will to recall and the 
imagination to recreate the knowledge as an image are therefore just as 
involved as the ability to acquire knowledge. 
 
This might also explain the link between the paradigmatic idea-framework that 
is required before conceptual knowledge can be acquired even on a personal 
level. The imagination needs to ‘create’ a framework in which facts and 
concepts could be interpreted and understood or known.  
 
As previously shown, Duintjer argues that humans do not acquire individual 
facts or experiences only, but requires a framework as a basis for interpreting 
and understanding individual experiences or facts. All theoretical activity 
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therefore requires an individual as pre-theoretical condition and a theoretical 
idea of reality as a transcendental condition in order to be able to direct the 
theoretical thought process (capability) towards something in this reality. 
(Kock, 1975: 47-50) 
 
It is important to stress that scientific activity, though typically logically 
qualified as logical analysis, is not the only way to obtain knowledge. This 
interaction between the will, imagination and knowledge acquisition allows 
knowledge to be obtained from many contexts and imaginatively re-
contextualised and utilized in other contexts. One therefore can know 
scientifically as well as non-scientifically. The knowledge obtained through 
science can be re-contextualised in other contexts like techno-practice, 
techno-science, techno-knowledge, education, management, the economy, 
military, stories, art and various other contexts as paradigm shifting insights in 
the development of society.  
 
When scientific knowledge is re-contextualised as educational knowledge, for 
instance, it is not scientific any more but becomes educational. The reason is 
almost too obvious to mention. If this were not the case, all scientifically 
acquired knowledge that has been ‘re-contextualised’ would remain science 
and would therefore NOT be re-contextualised. This implies that one context 
would not be able to share information with another, and that knowledge could 
not be re-contextualized. 
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The interesting issue here is that contexts would in that case not have any 
unique, identifiable characteristic, which negates the ontic principles of 
orderliness and order for as well as constancy and uniqueness that are 
required for the possibility to know. 
 
The theory of enkapsis and the interlacement of the psychical, normative and 
personality structures imply that human knowledge is supported by 
awareness, normative experience (such as formative power, logical analysis, 
lingual signification and so on) and the human ability to know, will and 
imagine things. These enable people to form logical concepts as well as idea 
frameworks within which all of experience can be interpreted and understood. 
 
Strauss (2006: 51) states that a scientist has two options; one either gives an 
account of the philosophical presuppositions with which one works, in which 
case one is working with a philosophical view, or one implicitly and uncritically 
proceeds from some or other philosophical viewpoint, in which case one is 
simply a victim of a philosophical view. 
 
6.5.2. Is reality knowable? 
 
The above issue in epistemology is focused on the idea that knowledge is 
possible because people have the ability to acquire knowledge. This implies 
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that it is the person that knows. The title of Polanyi’s ‘Personal Knowledge’ 
(1978: 17) indicates that the act of knowing includes appraisal as a personal 
coefficient, which shapes factual knowledge and strives towards universal 
standards.  
 
The question of the reliability of this knowledge arises. How can we be 
‘absolutely’ sure that what we know is the truth and not false or incorrect? In 
the history of philosophy this has been considered from various angles.  
 
What might be of interest is that in contemporary philosophy this problem can 
be related to the idea of confirmation as well as the problem of distinguishing 
science from non-science. Hess (1997: 18-20) compares Carnap and Popper:  
Carnap favours verification and tries to explicate good reason in terms of a 
theory of confirmation while Popper urges falsification and argues that 
rationality consists in method and that science commences with problems. 
Popper rejects the view that scientists induce theories from observation but it 
is now generally accepted that theories shape, constrain or colour 
observations. Feyerabend and Kuhn defend the view that observations are 
theory-laden148.  
 
                                            
148
 This also correlates with the capabilities indicated in the anthropology above concerning 
the interaction of the will, knowledge and imagination. Knowledge is imaginatively recreated 
into a theoretical framework or idea-framework. 
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The next issue in epistemology can be indicated as the nature of something 
that is knowable or the requirements for its being knowable. It is assumed that 
similarities and differences exist to indicate uniqueness, which makes 
something identifiable. If something cannot be uniquely distinguished it 
cannot be known. 
 
Furthermore, for something to be known requires a constant recognizable 
structure that allows change on the basis of, or within, what persists or 
endures. If something could change its nature it would not be recognizable 
and therefore not knowable.  
 
These two requirements are ontic in nature149. 
 
The assumption of an idea-framework150 as paradigmatic requirement for 
concepts is inherent in the knowledge process itself. This implies that certain 
motives or beliefs acting as idea-framework cannot be known factually or 
conceptually, since they are idea-frameworks themselves and would require 
an even more fundamental idea-framework to allow conceptualisation. This 
implies that our most fundamental assumptions cannot be further explained 
                                            
149
 This implies that it is inherently part of the orderly reality and is a requirement for all 
knowledge. 
150
 Refer to 6.5.1  
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and are thus in a sense not to be analyzed further. This highlights the limits of 
the human cognitive abilities and not the limit of the cosmos. 
 
6.6. The proposed model of techno-practice in its different contexts 
 
In this section a model will be described that explains the technical activity in 
different contexts. The basic contexts identified are ontological, anthropo-
logical, epistemological and societal. We will start with the ontological model, 
as it will link the technical activity to what is ontically given. 
 
6.6.1. Ontological context 
 
Just to recap, reality consists of a functional and structural dimension, and the 
functional dimension consists of fifteen aspects or modes. These modal 
aspects are neither functions of things nor properties of things but cohere with 
the dimension of structures since they co-determine the existence of 
structures or entities in the sense that entities function within the aspects of 
reality. This implies that an entity can be identified by a typical or qualifying 
mode that acts as a typical or type-law for the entity. 
 
Techno-practice seems to be qualified by the historical-technical aspect with 
its meaning nucleus of controlled formative power. This implies that techno-
practice differs from other types of activities on the basis of this typical 
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function. When artists form, they form under the typical law for art, namely the 
aesthetical function. They use (aesthetical) artistic techniques that are 
distinguishable from other types of techniques like economic or technical 
techniques. The difference between an artist and engineer is therefore not 
merely a construction of the mind but a distinction based on reality.  
 
To summarize some of these implications, a model is designed to illustrate 
some of the aspects of techno-practice. To keep in line with what is ontically 
given, the first column indicates the aspects of reality. The next column 
contains the aspects of techno-practice as well as analogical moments 
associated with each aspect. The qualifying aspect of techno-practice is 
indicated as the historical-technical with the nucleus of formative power. A 
short description of each aspect and analogical moment will follow. 
 
NUMERICAL
SPATIAL 
KINEMATIC
PHYSICAL
BIOTICAL
PSYCHICAL
LOGICAL
HISTORICAL/TECHNICAL
LINGUAL
SOCIAL
ECONOMICAL
AESTHETICAL
JURIDICAL
ETHICAL
CERTITUDINAL
SENSITIVITY AND AWARENESS 
LOGICAL/SYSTEMATIC 
FORMING/DESIGN/AUTOMATION
MEANINGFUL TRANSLATION
SOCIETAL INTERACTIONAL ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND EASE
HARMONIOUS APPLICATION
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
VALUES
BELIEFSYSTEMS AND DIRECTIONS
ONTOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF TECHNO-PRACTICE 
ASPECTS OF REALITY ASPECTS OF TECHNO-PRACTICE
n
a
t
u
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u
l
t
u
r
e
GROWTH/DEVELOPMENT
DYNAMICS
CONSTANCY
FORM AND SIZE OR SCOPE
UNITY AND DIVERSITY
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Fig.10   Ontological aspects of Techno-practice 
 
1) The numerical aspect could indicate the unity and diversity of techno-
practice. This calls to mind Latour’s notion that artefacts are composed 
of various parts in a black box, until it breaks down and one is left with 
one part too many or one broken part too many. The only difference 
here is that artefacts are seen as the result of technical processes and 
not as the same as or inherently part of technical processes. The unity 
and diversity of techno-practice as an entity needs to be distinguished 
from the numerically orderly moment of the technical aspect, which 
indicates a norm to be positivized through human intervention, implying 
that normative technical activity will adhere to the order of processes.  
 
2) The spatial aspect indicates a techno-practical context, which would 
differ from a scientific context. A techno-practical context always pre-
supposes an artefact as the result of a techno-practical action. To be 
identifiable, this artefact should have its own identifiable spatial form 
and size. In a techno-practical context the goal is the production or 
forming of artefacts. The analogical moment of the spatial aspect 
would indicate part and whole or a system of technical activity where 
processes could be identified as sub-systems or sub-assemblies of 
larger systems. 
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3) The motion aspect would indicate constancy or durability. This derives 
from the principle of constant motion in the sense that the motion of a 
body remains constant, unless changed by some force. This implies 
the constancy or durability of techno-practice as far as this aspect is 
concerned, as well as the norm of technical consistency in the 
analogical moment. Schuurman (1980: 29) indicates that consistency 
or durability is one of the norms in the production process.  
 
4) The physical aspect indicates the dynamics of techno-practical projects 
and processes. The relative dynamics of techno-practice indicates the 
changing nature of techno-practical processes, which is in a sense the 
opposite of the constancy of the previous mode. The norm in the 
analogical moment of the physical aspect could be identified as 
technical change in opposition to volatility or stagnation. 
 
5) The biotic aspect indicates growth or development. Is it controlled, 
healthy growth or ‘cancerous’ growth or perhaps stagnation or even 
disintegration? The idea of a developmental framework and the notion 
of systematic development have only become clear in modern techno-
practice. The norm of technical development (differentiation and 
integration) seems to be an obvious choice as one of the norms to be 
indicated in the biotic analogical moment within the technical aspect. 
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6) The sensitive-psychical aspect indicates sensitivity to, or an awareness 
of, techno-practice. This could range from ecological ‘insensitivity’ 
(from nuclear waste and accidents, to eliminating ecological sensitive 
areas for the sake of ‘development’) to unanticipated successes where 
balance in nature has been restored. It is this issue that is debated in 
the evaluation of techno-practice. Some believe that a return to a 
smaller scale of techno-practice will make greater sensitivity to nature 
possible, implying better control and less damage to the environment. 
The norm for technical activity could be technical sensitivity, derived 
from the sensitive-psychical analogy of the technical aspect. 
 
7) The logical aspect of techno-practice indicates the analytical side of 
techno-practice, which should be distinguished from scientific or 
economic analysis. Techno-practice therefore has its own type of logic. 
The analogy of the logical in the technical indicates the systematics of 
a logical foundation in techno-science and modern techno-knowledge 
that is utilized to identify and distinguish problems or parts of problems 
in order to create solutions. This logical systematics differs from 
science, because the focus is to solve a technical problem through 
systematic analysis, therefore re-contextualising logical analysis as 
technical analysis.  
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8) The historical or technical aspect of controlled formative power is the 
qualifying or leading motive uniquely identifying techno-practice. Here 
we find the intrinsic character of design and development of the 
artefact (involving engineers) as well as the production line to produce 
and form the artefact (involving technicians). Here the motive of 
automation and control from a distance has also been discovered. 
Techno-practice consists of technical design and production, the 
maintenance and management of the production process, as well as 
the management of the design and development process. There 
seems to be a distinction between these two processes in the 
engineering field as indicated by the terms ‘engineer’ (who designs and 
develop as well as manages the development process) and 
‘technician’ (who produces and maintains the production process).  
 
9) The lingual aspect indicates what is technically significant in techno-
practice, which was found to be in the production of an artefact as a 
result of the technical forming and designing process. We also found 
that artefacts could meaningfully translate goals and achieve different 
aims in different relationships, revealing different meanings in diverse 
contexts. The analogy of the lingual moment in the technical aspect 
indicates the norm of technical significance, which makes it possible to 
identify more and less significant technical activities. The notion of 
techno-literacy which refers to the literate or illiterate usage of artefacts 
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and its potential in every day life does not fit here as it is not part of 
techno-practice or of the technical process, but it does form part of the 
level of capabilities or skills of individuals in society. 
 
10) The social aspect indicates techno-practical interaction with, amongst 
others, society, science, the individual, the economy, politics and the 
state. This issue is strongly emphasized by the notion of acceptance or 
rejection of artefacts by society. The norm of technical interaction 
between different subsystems and processes in the production of an 
artefact is derived from the social analogical moment in the technical 
aspect. The whole issue of technical transfer between societies or 
groups is also indicated by this analogy. The artefact resulting from the 
techno-practical process is the most visible structure that interacts with 
society and is mistakenly identified as ‘technology’ itself. 
 
11) Philosophers warn against techno-practice being the ‘handmaiden’ of 
economics. Sociologists indicate that no techno-practice is possible 
without an inherent economic, political or other motive that ‘balances’ 
and pays the economic bill. Artefacts or new techno-practical 
processes can on the other hand bring competitive advantage and 
ease, which was not possible before. The internal norm provided by 
the economic analogical moment in the technical aspect could be 
indicated as technical economics, in the sense that technical 
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processes should follow the most 'economic' route without excess. 
This includes not only monetary values but also shorter or simpler 
solutions in a technical context, indicating an Occam's razor for 
technical processes: the avoidance of excessive techno-practices. 
 
12) The aesthetic aspect points to the beauty and harmony that can be 
achieved by techno-practice as opposed to the disruptive, 
disharmonious or ugly and non-acceptable effects it may have. The 
internal norm found in the aesthetical moment of the technical 
indicates harmonious solutions or processes in the technical activity.  
 
13) The juridical aspect has to do with patents, rights and recourse to the 
law. This legal framework allows of the regulation of individual and 
community interests concerning techno-practical use and misuse. 
Furthermore, the analogy of the juridical moment also points to the 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’, or the ‘correctness’ and ‘incorrectness’ of the 
technical processes themselves, and in a sense indicates that more 
correct or less correct solutions could be found for technical problems. 
 
14) The ethical aspect highlights the sympathetic and empathetic 
utilization of techno-practice versus unethical misuse or abuse. This is 
highlighted in various articles on ethics in various technical fields. The 
internal norm of the ethical moment points to technical preference of or 
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aversion to certain solutions or support, technical processes or tools. 
An example here would be the Linux versus the Microsoft usergroups.  
 
15) The certitudinal aspect points to commitment and trust in techno-
practice; not only the ‘quasi-ideological’ type of belief of the technocrat 
but also the everyday trust everyone has when getting into a lift, an 
airplane, a car and so on. Sometimes we entrust our lives to artefacts 
without even acknowledging it. The internal norm of the certitudinal 
moment in the technical aspect indicates technical reliability that 
should be the guideline for technical solutions. 
 
After the above short summary of the place of techno-practice in reality, a 
short description of techno-practice in relation to our human capabilities 
needs to be given. 
 
6.6.2. Techno-practice in an Anthropological framework. 
 
Tentatively the historical aspect with its meaning nucleus of ‘controlled 
formative power’ indicates historical technical production, which could be 
used to indicate any artefacts or tools made in any civilization. The next 
model tries to illustrate the nature of techno-practice as a technical activity 
within a framework, which indicates the relationship with human nature. 
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In the following model it is assumed that the technical activity is a human 
activity and therefore human capabilities actualised in processes are 
indicated in the second column. In the last column the context of each step in 
terms of product and/or capability is indicated.  
 
 
TECHNO-PRACTICE IN AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
HUMAN CAPABILITIES TECHNICAL PROCESS CONTEXT
Senses and techno-
knowledge through 
experience 
(Basic techno-practice)
Sensitivity of a problemPsychical awareness
Logical analysis
Analysis of experience
Systematic analysis
Craft techno-practice
Techno-logic from techno-
knowledge and techno-
science (Modern techno-
practice)
Technical formative power
Creative design based 
on systematic analysis
Forming based on 
theoretical and 
experimental design Creative design, 
theoretically and 
experimentally
Production through 
humans and machines
Normative commitment Developmental paradigm
Economically, societally, 
aesthetically, juridically 
meaningful
 
Fig. 11  Techno-practice in an anthropological framework. 
 
Human psychical awareness is the fundamental or first capability assumed 
where a problem is sensed that could be solved through formative power. 
Through senses and experience the problem is identified and sometimes 
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intuitively solved. This would be on the basic level of techno-practice.  
 
After sensing, systematic logical identification and distinctions are made. Here 
our basic logic capability is employed to develop craft technics or techno-
practice through experiential techno-knowledge not specifically derived from 
scientific experience. This could explain craft techno-practice. 
 
Our systematic analysis, enhanced by our ‘techno-logic’, which is derived 
from our techno-knowledge and techno-science background, indicates the 
systematics (as one part) of modern techno-practice. This techno-logic differs 
from scientific logic as its focus is on the solution of a technical problem. Both 
are derived from the original logical capability and contextualized in an own 
context or framework. 
 
These are the foundations of our formative power, of our ability to create a 
design, to describe it theoretically (lingually) and/or practically 
(experimentally) and then to proceed by forming (manufacturing) through 
human activity or production through machines. 
 
During the designing (process), interaction with societal needs should be 
anticipated, since the acceptance of the artefacts that result from this process 
will depend on societal values in terms of economics, aesthetics, 
meaningfulness and legitimacy. 
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The next issue is the question of whether or not techno-practice is an active 
subject or a passive object. Techno-practice is more than just the tools or 
artefacts. It seems to be a totality, an interlacement of human activities and 
knowledge as cultural subjects, resulting in artefacts as cultural objects in 
societal structures, or forms of life, which are also cultural subjects. One must 
conclude that it is not only a cultural subject or form of life but also a totality. 
 
Techno-practice is a cultural subject, qualified by the historical (technical) 
aspect with its meaning nucleus of controlled formative power, a totality 
consisting of an interlacement of knowledge and the application of knowledge 
through techniques of design and production. Societal support through 
societal acceptance, usage and structures guides techno-practice. 
 
The following figure summarises the structures involved in techno-practice as 
synthesized from the above. Each of these structures indicated in the second 
column has its own fifteen aspects, which could be further analysed. 
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Fig. 12  Overview of processes involved in Techno-practice compared to 
human capabilities. 
 
6.6.3. A comparison between basic and modern techno-practice 
 
In (Fig12) the similarities and differences between basic and modern techno-
practice are also indicated in two different columns. The model should be 
read from the bottom to the top. 
 
The technical part or the technical process first of all consists of an 
awareness of a problem that could be solved technically. (Point 1.) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
339 
After identification, the problem or parts of the problem is systematically 
analysed and described. (Point 2). Obviously, different in basic techno-
practice compared to modern techno-practice. 
 
The creative designing process is based on this systematic analysis. (Point 
3.) Here the designing function differs in basic and modern techno-practice. In 
modern techno-practice the design of the artefact and the production process 
are established – at first theoretically and sometimes experimentally – 
resulting in a form of artefact and production line based on the design. Many 
artefacts never go into production because of economic constraints or public 
sentiment. It ends with the forming of a prototype. 
 
The production process is based on this design and prototype. It is guided by 
economic and societal acceptance, and proceeds with human aid and 
mechanical support to the manufacture of artefacts. Some machines can 
even become automatic operators that can be controlled from a distance. 
 
The result of this process is an artefact. Various types of artefacts are techno-
practically produced. Types of artefacts can be identified by their destinational 
or qualifying function. We find artefacts in all aspects of reality. 
 
At point 4 the societal aspect of the process in modern techno-practice 
indicates societal acceptance through systems developed to support and 
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maintain acceptable artefacts. For example, the systems of support for 
motorcars would include roads, petrol stations, services and parts, legal 
guidelines and law enforcement, insurance schemes, financing services of 
banks for purchasing of cars and so forth.  
 
In a sense a society agrees to the usage of an artefact if it supports and 
develops the infrastructure for it. Many artefacts fail because the 
infrastructure has not been adequately supported. 
 
Society has a second more dynamic method to indicate an acceptance or 
rejection of artefacts and their support structures. According to the literature 
surveyed there is a triangle of political will, economic advantage and societal 
value and belief systems. These structures can be lobbied to support or reject 
certain artefacts and their support systems.  
 
A last point to consider is the societal context of technology. 
 
6.6.4. Societal context 
 
Sociologists point out that societies play a crucial role in the development and 
usage of artefacts. 
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This brings the place of society in the life of humanity to the fore. As has been 
stated, humans live in communities and cannot live without culture. Although 
the dualist view of the factuality of society and the values of culture should be 
avoided, the structure of society needs to be considered. 
 
All our cultural products and structures are actualized in society. People in a 
society create language. Economics and business operate within a society. 
Even churches are for a community of believers. This suggests that all 
aspects of reality are actualized by society, in which we see the emergence of 
societal or cultural products and structures. 
 
The following diagram attempts to illustrate this.  
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Fig.13 Techno-practice in a societal context. 
 
To explain this diagram briefly: one has to observe that all the cultural aspects 
are actualised within the functioning of a society, resulting in cultural or 
societal products and structures. For example, the logical aspect of reality can 
be actualised by humans in a society in the form of a wealth of analytical 
insights and logic classifications – keeping in mind that not all societies 
manage to develop science.  
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Another example is found in the economical aspect that could be actualised 
by humans in the establishment of firms and other (general) economic 
activities. Again, not all societies develop similar economies.  
 
The ethical aspect helps societies to develop their own peculiar value 
systems that differ from society to society. The belief aspect finds expression 
in diverse religious convictions, religious systems and churches. 
 
The historical technical aspect of reality enables the actualisation of a techno-
practice that differs from society to society. The techno-practice is indicated 
by the dotted line to show that the result of the technical formative activity is 
an artefact. It is important to understand that not only technical artefacts but 
artefacts of all kinds are indicated. 
 
These artefacts are used in various relationships in the societal structures. 
This explains why artefacts can be instruments in science as well as 
language and the economy. An indefinite permutation of contextual 
possibilities for types of artefacts can exist. 
 
The above diagram makes it clear why some-one can argue that structures in 
society are ‘socially constructed’, especially if the link to the transcendental 
conditions is not considered. If one does not bear in mind that society 
actualises given possibilities in structures it could easily lead to the 
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misconception that society as autonomous force constructs itself and its own 
structures. Such a notion of social construction focuses only on the right hand 
side of the above diagram, but does reveal that different possibilities can 
exist. This is more clearly illustrated by the term actualisation. 
 
6.7. Conclusions 
 
In this study the aim has been to illustrate how the need for a transcendental-
empirical analysis may be fruitful for an understanding and development of 
significant theoretical notions of empirically given phenomena. Only through 
an ontic framework could other frameworks be anchored and transgressions 
of these frameworks identified. 
 
The fear of a ‘master-narrative’ in postmodern thought has unfortunately also 
inhibited the possibility of a transcendental-empirical input into our theories. 
Here Latour’s suggestion of a ‘servant-narrative’ should be adopted.  
 
The transcendental-empirical approach reveals that, within modern society, 
techno-practice consists of development and design on the one hand and 
production and maintenance on the other. It also accounts for artefacts as the 
result of the techno-practical process and the fact that not all artefacts are 
technical in nature. The modern idolization of electronics and more 
specifically of micro-processing where micro-processors control almost all 
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specialised artefacts, should rather be designated more precisely as 
electronics or micro-processing rather than technology, which is a non-
empirical, ontically unreal term. Anyone indicating artefacts as technology is 
equating an empirically valid reality with an empirically inappropriate term.  
 
The term technology in the German context is correctly reserved to refer to 
the scientific study of the technical. A suggestion about the origin of the term 
in English is given in an explanation of the rationalistic legacy (Strauss, 2006:  
162) where it has been pointed out that instead of identifying the ontically 
given reality of the biotic or social we indicate such phenomena as biological 
or sociological, which suggests a confusion in our understanding of reality.  
 
Sociology studies social phenomena and not sociological phenomena. 
Sociological in the above sentence indicates a reflection on the scientific 
status of sociology as a scholarly discipline. The question regarding the 
nature of the sociological belongs to the philosophy of sociology and not to 
sociology itself. We have repeatedly highlighted the transgression of contexts 
by designating them as contextual fallacies. Such contextual fallacies have 
been found numerous times in the studied literature. 
 
Furthermore, the lingual activity of coining a phrase or creating a term is not 
identical to logical conceptualization. Therefore it is possible to create a term 
without clear, precise conceptualization. Latour states that technical is a good 
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adjective but that technology is an unsatisfactory noun. Furthermore it has 
been shown how technology was viewed as an intensification of technics 
without an explanation of what exactly is meant. No clear definition that 
distinguishes it from the ontically given technical mode of reality has been 
found either. It has been pointed out that in every instance where the term 
technological is used, it could be replaced by the term technical without any 
loss of meaning. This is a sign of insufficient conceptualization. 
 
Finally, particular sociologists do not account for the ontic nature of the 
phenomenon of the technical activity. They are instead interested specifically 
in the interaction with or influence of the technical activity on society. They 
therefore operate in a framework that already presupposes the technical as 
well as the societal and therefore they have to make assumptions about the 
technical process. It is therefore easy to concentrate on artefacts as the result 
of techno-practice in order to analyse their impact on society. It seems as if 
the term techno-practice is empirically clearer regarding the nature of the 
technical activity and the fact that it clarifies the confusion of viewing artefacts 
as the outcome of techno-practice instead of seeing the artefacts themselves 
as similar to the process. 
 
We may conclude that distinguishing between techno-practice, techno-
knowledge, techno-science and techno-literacy on transcendental-empirical 
grounds not only seems to clear up the prevailing terminological confusion but 
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may provide for a better systematic understanding of the nature of and 
interrelations between diverse types of techno-involvement found in our 
global village. In essence it implies that only through a transcendental 
empirical approach can ‘theoretical constructions’ be tested and verified to 
gauge its adequacy. Constructions without verification will lead to ‘figments of 
imagination’ which has no place in scholarly discourse. In a certain sense a 
paradigm shift is proposed where the ontic (transcendental) orderly reality is 
placed in focus again for all specialised (disciplinary) sciences. Furthermore 
the orientating link of philosophy for the disciplinary (special) sciences was 
highlighted again. All disciplines require a philosophical orientation to gauge 
its place in reality but also to guard against contextual fallacies. Contextual 
fallacies mostly occur in disciplinary (limited) contexts that do not correlate 
with ontical facts or contexts
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